University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

1999

Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to
Children: The New Language of Morality in Family
Law
Jane C. Murphy
University of Baltimore School of Law, jmurphy@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1111 (1999)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children:
The New Language of Morality in Family Law
Jane C. Murphy

VOLUME 60

SUMMER 1999

ISSUE 4

RULES, RESPONSmILITY AND COMMITMENT TO CHILDREN:
THE NEW LANGUAGE OF MORALITY IN FAMILY LAW
Jane C. Murphy*

Table of Contents
I. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Morality and Its Role in Contemporary Family Law.........
A. DefIning Morality.............................................
B. The Relationship Between Law and Morality ............
C.
Morality and Family Law ..................................
1. Protecting Children: A Central Moral Goal of
Family Law..............................................
2. The Link Between Family Law and Morality: Beyond Individual Rights vs. Community Values....
III. The "Old" Moral Discourse: Regulating Sexual Conduct...
A. The Meaning of Fault as Grounds for Divorce..........
B. Alimony Law in the Fault Era .............................
C. Custody in the Fault Era....................................
IV. The New Moral Discourse in Family Law.....................
A. Access to Marriage ...........................................
1. Who May Marry: Same Sex Marriage..............
2. Pre-Marital Procedures: Covenants and Counseling.........................................................
B. Reinforcing Responsibilities and Commitments Within
Families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Family Violence ........................................
a. Eroding the Doctrine of Family Autonomy..

1112
1118
1118
1126
1127
1127
1130
1134
1136
1145
1150
1154
1155
1156
1161
1165
1165
1165

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, B.A. 1975, Boston College; J.D.
1978, New York University School of Law. This article was made possible by a summer research
grant provided by the University of Baltimore Educational Foundation. I wish to thank Robert
Rubinson, June Carbone, Marsha Garrison, Barbara Babb, and Cheri Wyron Levin for their comments on this article. I also thank Margaret May for her excellent clerical and research assistance
and Robin Klein, Will Tress, and Luann Dickie for their research assistance. This article is dedicated
to the many children I have represented over the years and, most importantly, to my own four children, who inform and inspire my work in so many ways.
1111

1112

UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1111

b.

V.

New Laws: Reducing Domestic Violence
and Child Abuse ................................. .
i. Domestic Violence ....................... .
ii. Child Abuse ............................... .
2. Recognizing Commitment in Families Created
Outside of Marriage ................................... .
C. Family Dissolution ........................................... .
1. Access to Divorce ..................................... .
a. What No-Fault Divorce Really Means ....... .
b. Continued Debate About the Morality of Divorce in the No-Fault Era ...................... .
2. Protecting Children: Changes in Custody and Visitation Law ............................................. .
a. Developments Encouraging Post Breakup Involvement of Both Parents ..................... .
i. Joint Custody ............................. .
ii. Parenting Classes and Parenting Plans
b. The Child's Voice in Custody Proceedings ..
c. Refming the Best Interest Standard .......... .
i. The Nexus Requirement in Determining Parental Fitness ...................... .
ii. Primary Caretaker Standard ............ .
iii. Recognizing the Connection Between
Domestic Violence and Parental Fitness....... .... ..... ..................... .....
3. The Child Support Revolution .......................
D. Creating Rights for Family Members: From Discretionary Standards to Rules.......................................
Conclusion............................................................
I.

1167
1167
1169
1172
1175
1175
1175
1177
1180
1181
1181
1182
1185
1186
1186
1188

1191
1192
1197
1203

!NTRODUCTION

In recent years, commentators with a broad range of political perspectives have called for renewed attention to "morality" in family law.
This call has been made in a variety of contexts by legal scholars, I politi1. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 865, 879 (1989)
(finding that U[s]tate intervention into family life. _ . is less likely now than previously to be based
on moral judgments"); Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals & the Law: No-Fault Divorce and
Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503 [hereinafter Schneider, Marriage, Morals] (evaluating diminished moral discourse in family law and noting both advantages and disadvantages of the trend);
Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L
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cians,2 and policy makers.3 Two concerns about themes of family law
commentary emerge from these diverse sources. The fIrst theme argues
for a new direction in family policy. Those advocating a change in direction argue that traditional families-two parent, heterosexual married
couples with children-are essential to a healthy society and must be encouraged.4 They argue that contemporary family laws, most notably nofault divorce and related laws, have contributed to and fostered the decline of the traditional family.5 According to these commentators, the
REv. 1803, 1807-20 (1985) [hereinafter Schneider, Moral Discourse] (noting the "tendency toward
diminished moral discourse" in family law cases and statutes and the debate surrounding them); Jana
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443, 1527 (1992) (arguing that the
"increased dissociation of law and morality . . . is directly linked to the privatization of family
law"); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Last Decade(s) of American Family Law, 46 1. LEGAL EDUC. 546, 547
(1996) (noting a decline in moral discourse in some areas of family law); Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce
Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 741, 741 (1994) (critiquing the "nofault divorce culture" and suggesting connections between no-fault divorce and violence). But see,
e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DrvORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 198 (critiquing the
traditional moral judgments in family law as too narrowly conceived); Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral
Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 225, 270 (1997) (arguing that moral discourse in family law has evolved rather than diminished in recent decades); Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided
Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers Should Look Instead to the American Law
Institute, 11 INT'L 1.L. POL'y & FAM. 216, 230-36 (1997) (summarizing proposals adopted by the
American Law Institute that remove concepts of fault and marital misconduct from marital property
and alimony law).
2. As early as 1980, President Jimmy Carter, speaking from the White House, called for a
"reaffIrmation of families as a fundamental building block of our society." President Jimmy Carter,
Opening Session of the White House Conference on Families, Baltimore, Maryland (June 5, 1980).
More recently, both Republicans and Democrats have called for restoration of family values. See,
e.g., The Contract with America (July 11, 1998), <http://web.mit.edulrepublicansfwww/contracthtml>; see also Robert Wright, The False Politics of Values, TIME, Sept 9, 1996, at 42 (evaluating the bipartisan interest in values and morality).
3. Policy makers calling for a more explicit integration of traditional values in family policy
also cover the full range of the political spectrum. Compare CONTRACf WITH THE AMERICAN FAMILY
(Ralph Reed ed., 1995) with WIlLIAM A. GALSTON. LIBERAL PuRPoSES: GoOD. VIRTUES. AND DIVER.
SITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 213-37, 257-89 (1991).
4. Of course, defining "family" is both a critical issue within this debate and one that divides
many scholars. Compare Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional
Rights of Children, 27 Loy. U. CHI. Ll. 321, 327-28 (1996) (arguing that the institution of marriage
is integral to familial love and security) with Martha Minow, All in the Family and In All Families:
Membership, Loving, and Owing, in SEX. PREFERENCE. AND FAMILY: EsSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE
249,260 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) (arguing for an "expansive" definition of family on the ground that "values signaled by 'family' are worthwhile and ••• should be
promoted wherever possible").
5. Another recurring target of this group is welfare and its claimed connection to family disintegration. In recent years, key leaders and policymakers have blamed welfare for social problems like
poverty and family violence that contribute to family breakup. See Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Ending
Welfare Reform as We Know It, AM. PROSPECf, Fall 1993, at 84 (finding that a political consensus
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principles of privacy, individual rights and autonomy that underlie the
"no-fault revolution"6 should be deemphasized in family law policy. Instead, family law policy should promote a return to traditional principles
of right and wrong and marital commitment.7
The second theme is voiced primarily by some family law scholars
who have identified a change in the language of family law. The decreasing reliance on "fault" in family law over the last few decades, according to these scholars, has resulted in "a diminution of the law's discourse
in moral terms about the relations between family members" and the
"transfer of moral decisions from the law to the people the law once regulated."8 These scholars do not claim that contemporary family law lacks
a moral justification, nor are they strongly advocating corrective measures. 9 Rather, they note that the way current family law "expresses
among some liberals and most conservatives has emerged that blames single mothers receiving welfare for "weakened commitment to competence, work, and responsible living" which leads to poverty); Karen Hosler, Dole Draws Fire with Comments on Crime; Candidate Criticized for Appearing
to Link Spousal Abuse, Welfare, BALT. SUN, May 31, 1996, at 8A (quoting 1996 presidential candidate Bob Dole who blamed welfare programs for increases in domestic violence); Robert Scheer,
Gingrich, Savaging Welfare, Is on a Fool's Errand, L.A TIMES, Nov. 28, 1995, at B9 (describing
Gingrich's false "depiction of [a slain pregnant woman] as the product of an immoral welfare culture"). Of course, families are affected by policies outside the traditional law of domestic relations
such as welfare and employment policies. However, a thorough discussion of trends in those laws
and their affect on the stability of American families is outside the scope of this Article.
6. The term "no-fault revolution" was originally used by Lenore J. Weitzman in THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CIDLDREN IN
AMERICA (1985). That term and other references to the no-fault era throughout this Article refer to
the shift from exclusive reliance on fault grounds for divorce to the inclusion of no-fault grounds in
all states. This era began in the late 1960s and was completed in the early 1980s. The term also refers to changes in alimony and marital property laws that occurred during the same period throughout
the United States, which deemphasized the role of fault. The term "fault era" as used throughout
this Article refers to the period before the no-fault era when fault was a key factor in divorce, alimony, and custody decisions.
7. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN. FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING oUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM 20-21 (1995); GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB. THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIE1Y FROM
VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES (1995); William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, Pus.
INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12 (suggesting that no-fault divorce and related developments in the law
have led to increases in divorce and the weakening of the American family). Of course, concern
about the stability of the American family has emerged throughout American history since the Puritans voiced concerns about "fragility of marriage, the growing selfishness and irresponsibility of parents and the increasing rebelliousness of children." ARLENE SKOLNICK. EMBATILED PARADISE: THE
AMERICAN FAMILY IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 8 (1991) (quoting SARA M. EVANS. BORN FOR LIB.
ERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 63 (1989».
8. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note I, at 1807; see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 430, 431 (1985) (clarifying the meaning of moral discourse as "the frank invocation by courts of value-laden language to justify both doctrine and particular resUlts").
9. Carl Schneider and Jana Singer, for example, see this trend of diminished moral discourse
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ideas"lo-through the language of statutes and judicial decisions-increasingly relies less on moral language, ideas and prohibitions, and
more on principles of private ordering and individual freedom. They caution that this may have a negative impact on preserving traditional
families.
This Article challenges the assumption that no-fault divorce and related family law developments over the last three decades have signalled
a retreat from either a moral vision or moral discourse in family law.
Without question, the shift to no-fault divorce has resulted in sweeping
changes in both the moral justification underlying family law and the
language of the statutes and cases reflecting these developments. The Article maintains, however, that contemporary family law has not retreated
from morality; rather, the values that are embodied in both the language
of statutes and in judicial opinions have evolved over time and reflect
both a broader understanding of morality and a reconceived notion of
rights within the family.
Contemporary family law has replaced the emphasis on limiting sexual relations to marriage that characterized the fault era with an emphasis
on other values-equality, fairness, responsibility for dependent spouses
and, most especially, emotional and fmancial commitment to children.
The language of the laws embodying these new values contains fewer
explicit references to morality. But, this new discourse-with its emphasis on obligations, protection, duty, and equality-is the language of an
expanded meaning of morality informed by the concept of practicing virtues. Individuals lead moral lives by meeting their duties, treating others
fairly and protecting the vulnerable. I I
The new developments in family law that reflect this changed morality include increased regulation in child custody and visitation, child
support, and family violence. Other areas-access to marriage and the
rights of cohabitants-have not been dramatically changed in the no-fault
era but are being debated in ways that make the moral assumptions underlying the laws more explicit. 12 The debate about same sex marriage,
for example, has forced federal and state legislators, family law scholars,
and policymakers to rethink the religious, cultural and, most prominently,
as having boIh positive and negative consequences for family law. See Schneider, Marriage, Morals,
supra nole I, at 503; Singer, supra nole 1, at 1527.
10. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra nOIe I, at 1827.
11. For a fuller discussion of !he meaning of practicing virtues, see infra noles 29-72 and accompanying Iext.
12. See infra noles 241-312, 364-78 and accompanying IeXt.
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the moral values underlying the institution of marriage.13
Finally, this shift in values may also account for an increasing reliance on laws drafted as rules rather than the broad discretionary standards that have traditionally characterized family law. 14 Movements such
as the change from discretionary standards to required formulas for setting child support have conferred new rights on family members, particularly custodial parents and children.ls "Rights talk"16 is often associated
with diminished emphasis on morality because focusing on individual
rights over family concerns is thought to undermine marriage by encouraging pursuit of self-fulfillment over duties to other family members. 17
Rights among family members, however, can serve to reinforce the values of equality and commitment. The increased use of rules to create
rights and regulate obligations among family members reflects the law's
increased concern for enforcing family members' obligations to each
family's most vulnerable members, particularly children.ls
Both the language and the purposes underpinning current standards,
however, draw on moral principles. Pursuit of these new values involves
greater emphasis on issues that, at first glance, appear more concerned
with economic or psychological principles. For example, courts assessing
"fault" in a divorce context focus on issues like sexual misconduct. In
the no-fault era, courts spend more time on issues like determining income for child support and evaluating parenting skills. To the extent this
discourse translates to fmancial and emotional support for children, it relates to moral issues. This Article concludes that such a shift is desirable
because it has the potential to strengthen families-in all their current
forms-and their ties to the broader community. Most importantly, this
shift is one that furthers what has become the central moral goal of family law: protection of children.
Part One of this Article explores the meaning of morality by briefly
reviewing a variety of attempts to explore the meaning of moral conduct.
This Section draws on a variety of contemporary moral philosophers who
13. See infra notes 247-80 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 519·65 and accompanying texL
15. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The
Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 226-31 (1991).
16. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POUTICAL DIS.
COURSE (1991) (critiquing what she sees as the American preoccupation with rights, which validates
individual, arbitrary preferences rather than teaching collective responsibility and duty); infra notes
89-103 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 472·86 and accompanying text.
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have built on the classical tradition to develop a broader defmition of
moral behavior. This discussion provides a context for the current debate
about the meaning of morality in family law and moral discourse in the
no-fault era.
Part One also reviews the historical debate about how law should
strike a balance between promoting communitarian values and respecting
autonomy and individual rights. The Article argues that the conflict underlying this debate may be overstated. All laws have moral implications,
and decisions about law, made by citizens, legislators and policymakers,
necessarily involve choices that privilege some values over others. Regulating family members is a particularly value-laden task. A tension will
always exist between protecting individual freedom and privacy of family
members and state intervention to further the common good. However,
this tension does not require a retreat from the concept of rights within
the family; rather, rights can be conceived in a way that furthers the
moral vision of family law by using rights as a tool to ensure the protection of vulnerable members of the family.
Part One concludes by noting that the hierarchy of values embodied
in the moral vision of family law has changed over time. Sexual morality
has become less important over time while protecting children has become central to the moral framework of family law.
Part Two of the Article examines the traditional, fault-based moral
discourse in the law governing grounds for divorce, alimony and child
custody that prevailed in this country until the 1970's. It concludes that
this approach has several significant drawbacks. First, the fault-era's emphasis on sexual practices and traditional gendered family roles reinforced patriarchy and tended to hurt custodial parents-primarily women-and children. Additionally, the fault-era's reliance on broad
discretionary standards resulted in inadequate fmancial awards and dual
standards for men and women. Further, because moral discourse in family law has been primarily focused on issues of sexual conduct in marriage, the fault-era moral vision excluded families created outside of marriage. Litigating issues of fault also exacted significant financial and
emotional costs on families. Finally, the emphasis on regulating sexual
conduct in the fault-era did little to promote the evolving moral goal of
family law-protecting children.
Part Three of the Article explores the ways in which some laws that
developed in the no-fault era express morality in family law. Examining
current laws governing divorce, marital property, child support and custody, the Article identifies ways in which both the language surrounding
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the debates about such laws and the laws themselves express values of
equality, commitment and responsibility for family members, particularly
dependent members. The Article notes that for the ftrst time, the language of morality has expanded into two areas that were largely unregulated in the "fault" era-access to marriage and family violence.
The Article concludes that these developments over the last thirty
years represent a healthy trend toward an overall family policy that
strengthens families and protects each family's weakest members. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to achieve a family policy that protects
children. Finally, the Article identiftes additional measures, both in traditional domestic law and in the broader policy arena, that must be accomplished to truly strengthen families, and most importantly, to protect
children.
II.

MORALITY AND ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW

A. Defining Morality
Before evaluating the changes in the role of morality and moral discourse in family law over the last thirty years, it is necessary to clarify
what is meant by morality in this context and how it relates to the law.
Until recently, popular debate about morality in this country often focused on sexual practices. 19 A brief review of moral theory and philosophy reveals a much broader meaning of morality, which is beginning to
be reflected in law and social policy.
Defming morality is a challenging task. Efforts to formulate principles of moral behavior have occupied cultures throughout the history of
19. Carl Schneider sees this limited view of morality as part of a recent trend that signals a
change in "the social position of moral discourse...• [T]he very term 'moral' has in some milieux
taken on a narrow-and derogatory-meaning. Specifically, it is at best confined to questions of sexual morality. 'Morality' means 'traditional morality' which means sexual morality." Schneider, Marriage, Morals, supra note 1, at 537. Although Schneider suggests that the association of morals with
sexual practices helps to account for the recent decline in moral discourse in family law, he notes
that similar observations were made by commentators almost seventy years ago. See id. at 537 n.77
(citing WALTER LIPPMAN, A PREFACE TO MORALS 285 (1929) ("[I]n the popular mind it is immediately assumed that when morals are discussed it is sexual morals that are meant.")); see also
Michael J. Meyer, Family Virtues and the Common Good, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 409, 413 (1996)
(" [T)he entire realm of virtues is often reduced .•. into one subset, such as sexual virtues, teenage
chastity or marital fidelity."); Kenneth L. Woodward, What Is Virtue?, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1994, at
38 (comparing the modem American association of virtue with "sexual purity" to the ancient
Greeks, medieval theologians and some contemporary moral philosopher's association of virtue with
the "good person").
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humankind.20 Even a modest attempt to draw from the major Western
schools of moral philosophy, which have influenced the contemporary
debate about morality and families, would require a review of the ethical
traditions of classical Greece, medieval Christendom, the natural law
moral philosophers of seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain~ the
utilitarian school, and the rational or Kantian school of thought.21 A detailed and thorough review of the ethical traditions represented by these
cultures and schools of thought, much less including the many modem
strains of non-Western thought that have influenced these debates, is beyond the scope of this Article.22 There are, however, central themes or issues that emerge from these traditions that provide insight into both the
general debate about morality and the debate within family law.
One dimension of morality relates to its meaning as a code or set of
rules that determines "right" and "wrong" behavior.23 Under this meaning of morality, which most closely resembles the approach during the
fault era in family law, the primary value of a moral code is to identify
conduct that should be punished or, to a lesser extent, rewarded. 24
A broader meaning of morality, one that offers much greater potential for family law, relates to the concept of practicing virtue.25 One must
20. See generally ALAsDAIR MAclNrYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF Enncs: A HISTORY OF MORAL
P!in.osOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TwENI1ETII CENTURY (2d ed. 1998).
21. See generally JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF Ennes (1983).
22. For a summary of these ethical traditions, see generally FINNIS, supra note 21;
MAcINTYRE, supra note 20.
23. The term "moral" can be defmed as "of or relating to principles of right and wrong behavior •.. expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior." WEBSTER'S NEW COllEGIATE Dlc.
TIONARY 748 (5th ed. 1977). Alan Wolfe defines a moral code as "a set of rules that define people's
obligations to one another." ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBUGATION
2 (1989); see also Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1827 ("A decision made on moral
grounds turns on whether particular conduct is 'right' or 'wrong,' whether it accords with the obligations owed other people or oneself. ").
24. See, e.g., LoN L FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 30 (1969) (describing this approach to
morality as the "morality of duty").
25. Terms like values, virtue, and morality are used somewhat interchangeably in much of the
literature on this topic and in this Article. While the word "values" may simply connote one's preferences, its recent use in phrases like "family values" has given it a meaning that approximates
"virtue." See, e.g., Hugh Leavell, Forget Family Values, Marital Values Hold Key, SAN DIEGO
UNiON-TRlB., Mar. 9, 1996, at E3 ("The cry for 'family values' is heard across the land."). To the
extent one understands morality as the practice of virtue, virtues and values are also linked to the
term morality.
The subject of morality and its relationship to virtues and values have enjoyed a resurgence of
interest among politicians and scholars in recent years. For a discussion of politicians' current "relentless" interest and discussion of morality, values and virtue, see Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, The Lazy
Politician's Way to Win: Embrace Virtue, LA TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at M6; Susan Reimer, Virtue
Has Become a Growth Industry, BALT. SUN, Nov. 21, 1995, at IE; Woodward, supra note 19, at 38;
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begin with the ancient Greeks' and the medieval theologians' understanding of the pursuit of virtue as essential to attaining the "Good Life" in
order to understand how little the ideal of sexual purity, which was the
focus of moral inquiry in the fault era, expresses about this broader concept of morality.26 Under this classical view, moral individuals are those
who strive for excellence and the full realization of human potentiaJ.27
Many contemporary moral philosophers28 have embraced this tradition
that views practicing virtues as the path to personal happiness and makes
people, among other things, responsible citizens and parents.29
Which virtues to practice constitutes much of the debate among
those philosophers and cultures that ascribe to the concept of the good
life.30 No tradition places primary emphasis on sexual purity; the concepts covered by the term virtue cover a much broader range of behavior.31 Alasdair MacIntyre has attempted to delineate the differences and
Wright, supra note 2, at 42. Both scholarly and popular press books on virtue and morality have also
flooded the market. See generally WILLIAM J. BENNETr. THE BOOK OF VIRTUES: A TREASURY OF
GREAT MORAL STORIES (1993); A CALL To CHARACI'ER (Colin Green & Herbert Kohl eds., 1995);
ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE. AfTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE.
CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds.,
1995); JAMES Q. Wn.sON. THE MORAL SENSE (1993); VIRTUE (John W. Chapman & William A. GaIston eds., 1992).
26. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. THE 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA' OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (Bums,
Oates & Waskbum, 1915); ARiSTOlLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARiSTOTI.E (W.D. Ross trans., 1941).
27. Immanuel Kant, although often associated with an emphasis on moral law or codes, echoes this view that conforming to rules about right and wrong is not itself central to the moral or
good life. See IMMANUAL KANT. GESAMMELTE SCHRIFrEN (Prussian Academy 1923), cited in GEORGE
ARMSTRONG KELLy, IDEAUSM. POLITIes AND HISTORY: SOURCES OF HEGELIAN THOUGHT (1969). Instead, obeying the rules is only important insofar as it prepares man to aspire to a life of virtue and
goodness. See id.
28. See, e.g., MAcINTYRE, supra note 20; Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203 (R.B. Douglass et aI. eds., 1990); James Q. Wilson, The
Family-Values Debate, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1993, at 24.
29. Lon Fuller's description of the two dimensions of morality-the "morality of duty" and
the "morality of aspiration"-helps to clarify this dual meaning of morality;
The morality of aspiration is most plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy. It is the morality
of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers.••. Where the
morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at
the bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible.•••
FULLER, supra note 24, at 5; see also RICHARD B. BRANDT, EnncAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NOR.
MATIVE AND CRITICAL Ennes 356-68 (1959) (comparing the dimension of morality that imposes duties or rules with the morality that encourages excellence and aspiring to one's fullest potential); J.M
FINDLAY, VALUES AND INTENTIONS (1961); W.D. LAMONT, THE PRiNCIPLES OF MORAL JUDGMENT
(1946); A.D. LINDSAY. THE Two MORALITIES: OUR DUTIES TO GOD AND SOCIETY (1940); A.
MACBEATH. EXPERIMENTS IN LIVING 55-56 (1952); JEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 40-42 (1990).
30. See MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 181-203.
31. See id. at 121-80; see also VIRTUE, supra note 25.
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similarities in the conceptions of virtue from a variety of Western thinkers, ranging from Aristotle to Benjamin Franklin.32 Identifying individual
virtues within the cultures represented by these thinkers, MacIntyre notes
some of the differences in each culture's "lists of ... virtues. "33 As an
example, he notes that the New Testament praises humility as a vLrtue,
while Aristotle would include it as one of the vices related to magnanimity.34 Benjamin Franklin's list of thirteen virtues for private moral accounting includes some virtues not mentioned in Aristotelian or biblical
lists (cleanliness, silence, industry) and others (the drive to acquire) that
the ancient Greeks had considered vices.35 MacIntyre summarizes the different approaches to virtue represented by this "relatively coherent tradition" of Western thought:
We thus have at least three very different conceptions of virtue to confront a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the
achievement of the specifically human telos whether natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the New Testament and Aquinas); a virtue is a quality which has utility in
achieving earthly and heavenly success (Franklin).36

MacIntyre concludes that despite the differences in individual virtues
represented by these three conceptions, they share a core concept of virtue-that the value of practicing an individual virtue must be measured
by how such practice contributes to the good of one's whole life.37 Under
this conception, while practicing the individual virtues is worthwhile for
its own sake, what is most important is how the virtues contribute to the
ultimate goal of living a unified, good life.38
This concept of practicing virtues can only work in a society that
shares the "[same] overriding conception of the telos of a whole human
life"39 or "shared moral rrrst principles."40 The belief that certain choices
are morally superior to others was rrrst challenged by the moral and po32.
33.
34.
35.

See MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 181, 185.
[d. at 181.
See id. at 182.
See id. at 182-183.
36. [d. at 185.
37. See id. at 185-203.
38. Macintyre ultimately concludes that, because modem American society lacks a shared concept of the Good Life, this tradition of practicing the virtues to achieve a shared societal vision of
the ideal life has no place in contemporary American culture. See id. at 252-55.
39. [d. at 202.
40. [d. at 253.
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litical philosophers during the Enlightenment-Locke41 and his intellectual descendants, Mi1l42 and Dworkin43-who believed in tolerance for
each individual's creeds and belief systems.44 This belief in moral relativism makes it difficult, if not impossible, to defme a society's core values.4S Further, even if a society can be said to share a moral code at a
given time, many moral philosophers believe new experiences and
knowledge may change both the hierarchy of values and the values
themselves.46
Much of the rhetoric about virtue or values in the United States today is really an attempt to reinstitute the classical and medieval Christian
tradition of transforming certain political issues, for example same-sex
marriage and abortion, into issues that can be resolved by the invocation
of moral principles.47 More specifically, the debates within family law
concern the evolution of values that have shaped the law's vision of the
ideal family.48 The vision has moved from one that is fixed, relying upon
natural law principles to determine the roles and obligations of family
members,49 to a recognition that both the composition and the functions
of families in contemporary American society have changed in recent de41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See RICHARD AsCHCRAFT. LocKE'S Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 97-121 (1987).
See C.L. TEN. MIu. ON LIBERTY 14-18 (1980).
See generally RONALD DWORKIN. A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
See, e.g., ERNST CASSlRER, THE PHILoSOPHY OF THE ENUGlITENMENT 160-81 (1951).
See, e.g., MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 252-53.

46. The transcendentalist view that certain supreme values exist in nature to be discovered and
conformed to is represented by both religious and secular philosophers. See AQUINAS, supra note 26;
KANT, supra note 27, at 112-13. This view is to be contrasted with the empiricist view that an individual's or a culture's moral code can change over time as a result of new experience and knowledge. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739). For an interesting contemporary discussion of the transcendentalist vs. empiricist view of moral codes, see Edward O. Wilson,
The Biological Basis of Morality, ATLANTIC MONTIlLY, Apr. 1998, at 53 (focusing primarily on a related debate concerning the process by which individuals or societies acquire their moral codes).
47. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 28, at 24.
48. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note I, at 270.
49. See Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 432-34 (summarizing the line of 19th century United
States Supreme Court cases that reflect a "teleological" view of the family drawn on natural law
and Christian principles of what constitutes the "good family.") This view is perhaps most clearly
reflected in the late nineteenth century Supreme Court case Bradwell v. Illinois:
[T)he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.... The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood.
83 U.S, 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in majority opinion sustaining a state's right to
deny women access to the practice of law).
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cades.50 While many commentators attribute changes in family structure
to economic and political conditions,51 such changes may also be attributed to changes in the hierarchy of values within many Western countries
over the last few decades.52 For example, greater emphasis on equality
and fairness and diminished concern for regulation of. sexual conduct are
shifts in values that have been reflected in family life.53
Much of contemporary moral philosophy represents an attempt to reinvigorate the concept of morality as the practice of virtues.54 These philosophers have attempted to catalogue the central virtues of contemporary
American culture within the "vast reaches of the realm of morality. "55
While sexual fidelity in marriage still occupies a place in the moral dialogue in this country, there is strong evidence suggesting it is not a core
or central value among most Americans.56 Instead, over the last several
50. See generally SPECIAL REPORT, Single Parents, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPmCS, Dec. 1993,
at 36 (finding that "other families"-households of people not headed by married couples-should
grow faster than the average household between 1990 and 2010, gaining share from 15 percent to 16
percent of all households); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996
UTAH L. REv. 537, 539 (examining patterns of change in family structure and fmding that most drastic changes have occurred in the "internal activities of families and the external conditions that account for their structure and composition"). But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on
What You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996
UTAH L. REv. 569, 570 (arguing that "nontraditional" label for nonmarital family is a misnomer, because such households have existed "for all of human history").
51. See, e.g., Georgia Dullea, Wide Changes in Family Life Are Altering the Family Law, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1983, at AI.
June Carbone has argued that a major factor in the current change in sexual mores-including
the increased incidence of divorce-is the change in material conditions. These changes, including
longer life spans, more effective contraception and delays in childbearing have increased the potential length of marriages and the opportunities for mUltiple relationships. See June Carbone, Morality,
Public Policy and the Family, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 267, 278 (1996).
52. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH. LAw AND MODERN SOCIETY 114-19 (1983) (describing changes in
laws concerning marriage and divorce as changes resulting from shifts in a "community's value system" and noting that such changes in the law are more "deep-seated" and irreversible than changes
resulting from economic or social change).

53. See id.
54. See generally MAcINTYRE, supra note 25.
55. Meyer, supra note 19, at 413.
56. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 52, at 119 (identifying "changing values about sexual behavior" as evidenced by the fact that "[a]dultery is no longer the heinous social and legal offense it
was"); Nancy Gibbs, In a Breathtaking Reversal of Fortunes, Clinton's Popularity Soars While Starr
Gets Stuck in the Mud, TIME, Feb. 9, 1998, at 28 (noting that a week after the Monica Lewinsky sex
scandal broke, President Clinton achieved the highest approval ratings of his five-year presidency
and that "Americans are less puritanical and more forgiving than the cartoon version suggests"); Cal
Thomas, Let's All Get in Moral Shape, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 11, 1998, at C3 (discussing the impact
of allegations of adultery on the part of President Clinton and Democratic National Committee
Chairman and Colorado Governor Roy Romer and commenting that "[w]orse than adulterous behavior is the growing acceptance of it by the public").
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decades, American society has placed increasing importance on the values of fairness, equality and compassion. Evidence of this general shift in
values comes from both public opinion and scholarship. Measuring public opinion on such complex issues as equality and fairness is difficult,
but some evidence exists that equality in family relations is valued in
theory, if not always in practice, by Americans.57
Evidence of this trend among academics is easier to identify. Contemporary philosopher Michael Meyer includes among his representative
set of "moral or ethical virtues" which may contribute to the good lifebenevolence, civility, compassion, fairness, and tolerance.58 In The Moral
Sense, James Q. Wilson identifies what he considers four primary examples of our "moral sense": sympathy, fairness, self-control and duty.59
Drawing on the classical tradition, Wilson explains that practicing these
four virtues does not always result in laudable conduct; rather, these
character traits predispose us to moral conduct.60 As Wilson puts it,
"[t]emperate people are more likely to keep promises, resist temptations,
and reciprocate our affections than are intemperate ones; sympathetic
people are more disposed to help us when we are in need and to take our
feelings into account than are hard-hearted ones. "61
Feminist moral philosophers have also added to the vocabulary of
moral discourse by adding the virtue of "care" to the list of core values,
recasting traits like good parenting as "virtues":
Traditional moral theorists, with a few exceptions, often see morality as composed
of constraints that limit our pursuits of what we desire. Feminist moral theorists, in
contrast, often stress the value of good relationships-whether personal or civiland of good parenting and emotions conducive to leading admirable lives. And we
stress that these are moral values.62

57. See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD. WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN BELIEFS ABour DISTRIBunVE Jus·
TICE 107 (1981) (studying Americans' attitudes toward distributive justice and fmding that participants favored strict equality in the family); see also RANDOLPH TRUMBACH. TIlE RISE OF TIlE EGAUTARIAN FAMILY (1978) (noting that the parent-child relationship has become more egalitarian). But
see ARLIE HOCHSCHILD. THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLurlON AT HOME
(1989) (citing examples of families that do not favor equality).
58. See Meyer, supra note 19, at 413-14.
59. See WILSON, supra note 25, at xiii. Wilson defines "moral sense" as "an intuitive or directly felt belief about how one ought to act when one is free to act voluntarily." [d. at xii.
60. See id. at 82.
61.

[d.

62. VIRGINIA HELD. JUSTICE AND CARE 3 (1995); see also ROBERT E. GOODIN. PROTECTING TIlE
VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILmES 28-41 (1985) (arguing that our primary
moral obligation is to care for the vulnerable, particularly children).
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Philosophers more closely associated with the liberal tradition have
also contributed to the debate about core American values. In A Theory
of Justice, John Rawls offers fairness as the intrinsic good, suggesting
that it is the moral imperative all would follow if we had no information
about our status Of place in society.63
Ross Evans Paulson identifies "liberty, equality and justice" as the
"core values" of modem American society.64 In his review of various social reform movements between 1865 to 1932, Paulson contends that the
potential success of these movements depends upon shifts in both the
meaning of these concepts and the ranking among them.65 He ends his
analysis at mid-twentieth century, noting that the core values still stood,
but a shift was beginning in both the meaning and priority many Americans placed on these core values:
Americans wrestled anew with the conflict between the priorities of liberty and
equality and the practical meaning of justice. Only gradually would some begin to
understand . . . that in liberty interdependence was more important than individual
independence in maintaining cultural traditions and social institutions. Only painfully would a few people face the issue that liberty as a social goal was something
more than freedom from external governmental restraint. It could also include freedom from segregation, discriminatory employment, or negative stereotypes as
well .... Only haltingly ... did the American political system and culture begin
to recognize that justice was not simply adherence to a set of procedures (due process) or a tenuous equity (reward proportionate to effort or "fairness"). Justice was
&Iso a matter of the standards, of the expectations applied to all levels, of constitutional phrases turned into daily practices, protected by courts and undergirded by a
sense of community.66

The core values in contemporary American society, then, have
shifted over time. They now embody both communitarian values--compassion, duty, and care-and more liberal values-equality, fairness, and
justice.
63. See JOHN A RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-14 (1971); see also John Rawls, Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 520-22, Sept. 1980; John A. Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS, Summer 1985, at 223-51 (supporting the
justice as fairness theory more on its utility in a pluralistic society such as modem America than on
the fact that it reflects "commonly shared presumptions").
64. Ross EVANS PAULSON. LIBERTY. EQUAUTY. AND JUSTICE: CiVIL RiGIITS. WOMEN'S RIGIITS.
REGULATION OF BUSINESS. 1865-1932, at 2 (1997).

AND THE

65.

See id. at 2-3.

66. [d. at 244-45 (emphasis omitted).
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The Relationship Between Law and Morality

Identifying a society's core values-an uncertain task in a pluralistic
country like the United States-is only part of the analysis. The next and
related question is what the role of law should be in defIning or promoting the society's morality or core values. The relationship between law
and morality has prompted considerable debate over several centuries.67
For the early classical philosophers, the primary purpose of the State was
to promote virtue.68 By punishing bad acts, the law "stimulate[d] men to
virtue and urge[d] them forward by the motive of the noble."69 The belief that a central connection exists between law and morality was challenged by the liberal tradition so strongly associated with nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill's "harm principle," which asserts that
government should remain neutral on moral questions and interfere with
a citizen's liberty only to prevent harm to others.70 A slightly different
and more contemporary version of the "harm principle" is exemplilled
by the mid-twentieth century views of H.L.A. Hart.7l Hart developed the
view that legal enforcement of morality is not necessary to prevent a society's disintegration and that a pluralistic society with competing moral
visions can both survive and flourish.72
67. See ROSCOE POUND. LAW AND MORALS 125-53 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1969) (1924).
68. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at xxviii.
69. ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1109 (quoting Nicomachean Ethics X. 9 1180a); see also
ROBERT P. GEORGE. MAKING MEN MORAL 19-47 (1993) (analyzing the writings of Aristotle and
Aquinas as providing Western thought's "central pre-liberal tradition"). This classical view of the
absolute link between law and morality was carried forward in medieval England:
On this medieval view, as on the ancient, there is no room for the modem liberal distinction
between law and morality, and there is no room for this because of what the medieval kingdom shares with the polis, as Aristotle conceived it. Both are conceived as communities in
which men in company pursue the human good and not merely as-what the modem liberal
state takes itself to be-providing the arena in which each individual seeks his or her own
private good.
MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at 172.
70. See JOHN STUART Mn.L, ON LIBERTY 13 (1955).
71. See generally H.LA HART. LAW. LIBERTY. AND MoRALITY (1963) [hereinafter HART. LAW];
see also H.L.A. Hart, Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. Cm. L REv. 1,8-13 (1967).
Hart's views were challenged by Patrick Devlin, a British High Court Judge, who believed that government should enforce a society's core moral values, not because of the intrinsic truth of the moral
choices, but as a means of protecting the society's cohesion. See PATRICK DEVUN. THE ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALS 9-11 (1965). The Hart-Devlin debate has been characterized as "one of the most remarkable debates in the history of English speaking jurisprudence." GEORGE. supra note 69, at 49. For an
interesting examination of the debate and its place in contemporary moral theory, see id.
n. See generally HART. LAW, supra note 71. Still other moral and political philosophers argue
that the question of whether the government, through its legal system, should promote morality is
rendered moot by the lack of moral consensus in this country. Thus, the function of the state through
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Morality and Family Law
1. Protecting Children: A Central Moral Goal of Family Law

The questions raised over the last several centuries about both the
meaning of morality and the law's role in supporting a society's morals
resonate in family law today. Are there central moral truths that justify
the State's interference and regulation of family life or should the law respect private choices and resist enforcing a moral code unless the breach
of the code harms a fellow citizen? If State intervention is justified, can
the State effectively intervene to promote moral behavior in families? Is
"moral behavior" limited to punishing bad acts like sexual misconduct?
Or can the virtues of commitment, responsibility and fairness translate
into family law?
Turning fIrst to the question whether there are central moral truths
in this country with regard to families, there is substantial evidence of
deep division on key issues like the importance of marriage and the defInition of family.73 However, there is some evidence that concepts like responsibility, equality, and commitment, particularly to children, now have
greater meaning in defIning morality in family law than condemnation of
its courts is "to conceal the depths of our conflicts .•. and ••• play the role of a peace-making or
truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of conflict, not by invoking our
shared moral first principles. For our society as a whole has none." MAcINTYRE, supra note 25, at
253. MacIntyre, like many other communitarians, laments the current dissociation of law and morality and would prefer to see the state take a more active role in promoting morality. See id.; see also
GLENDON, supra note 16 (calling for the law to shoulder more of the burden shared with religion and
custom in promoting community values).
73. Martha Minow is one of the commentators who has identified this deep division. She suggests that this lack of consensus on issues like the defmition of family suggest that no group or individual advocating a particular deflnition of family can claim "their own preferences as natural, consensual or obvious." Minow, supra note 4, at 305. For another view that finds less conflict among
Americans on family and other issues, see generally ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION. AFTER ALL: WHAT
MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLy THINK ABom: GOD. COUNTRY. FAMILY. RACISM. WELFARE, IMMI·
GRATION. HOMOSEXUALITY. WORK. THE RIGHI'. THE LEFT. AND EACH OTHER 278 (1998) (finding after
18 months of research examining 200 people clustered in communities around the country that
Americans are "[r]eluctant to pass judgment, ••• are tolerant to a fault, not about everything ••• but
about a surprising number of things, including rapid transformations in the family"). While this tolerance for other peoples' values and beliefs is viewed as a virtue by Alan Wolfe, others condemn
such "moral relativism." See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 25, at 10. Several commentators assert that
American society is too fragmented and too focused on the issue of cultural diversity, with no strong
concept of community. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.. HABITS OF THE HEART: INDMDUAUSM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 155-62 (1985); AMITAI ETZIONI. THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY:
RIGHTS. REsPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 1-20 (1993); John Leo, Sneer Not at
zie and Harriet, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept 14, 1992, at 24; George F. Will, Circus of the Century, WASH. POST, Oct 4, 1995, at A25.
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adultery and other sexual misconduct.74 There is also an emerging consensus about the centrality of protecting children as, perhaps, the core
value that should be promoted in family law.75 Again, public opinion
polls provide some support for this assertion.76 Such polls indicate Americans believe that providing emotional and fmancial support for children
are Americans' primary concerns.77
This theme of increasing concern for children as the central goal of
family law also runs through contemporary family law scholarship and
many policy papers. Mary Ann Glendon was one of the fIrst family law
scholars to suggest a "children fIrst" principle in the context of income
allocation after divorce:
All property, no matter when or how acquired, would be subject to the duty to provide for the children. Nor would there be any question of "spousal support" as
distinct from what is allocated to the custodial spouse in his or her capacity as
physical custodian. In cases where there is significant income and property left
over after the children's needs have been met, the regular system of marital property division and spousal support law could be applied as a residual system.78

Challenging family law scholars to rethink the moral justifIcations
for family law, June Carbone acknowledges conflict among scholars and
policymakers on most family law issues.79 She suggests that the only area
74. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
76. Marsha Garrison has gathered much of the existing data on public opinion on many family
law issues. See Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L.
REv. 41, 116 & n.334 (1998) (citing HART & TEETER REsEARCH COMPANIES National Telephone Survey of 1502 Adults for NBC News and Wall Street Journal, Question 59 (June 17, 1994) (reporting
that, in response to question on effectiveness of "several actions the government might take to try to
strengthen families and family values," 49% of the respondents rated "tougher laws to help collect
money from parents who do not make their child support payments" as "very effective," and an additional 19% rated them as "fairly effective"»; see also Mellman & Lazarus, Mass Mutual American Family Values Study (1989) (describing results of survey commissioned by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in which most respondents ranked "[b]eing responsible for your
actions," and u[b]eing able to provide emotional support to your family," as their most important
personal values while u[b]eing free of obligations so I can do whatever I want to do" came in last).
77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78. MARy ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 95 (1987); see also Mary
Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553, 1557-65 (1984); Mary Ann
Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 19 (1990-91).
79. See Carbone, supra note 51, at 281; JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE
SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (forthcoming 2000) (maintaining that the moral center of family law has shifted from adult partnerships to parental ties); see also June Carbone, Child Custody
and the Best Interests of Children, 29 FAM. L.Q. 721, 737 (1995) (reviewing MARy ANN MASON,
FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1994» [hereinafter Carbone, Child Custody] (arguing that custody law should speak in terms
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of potential agreement is likely to be "an insistence on the importance of
and obligation to children. "80 Examining family policy from a philosophy
perspective, Michael Meyer is even more explicit when identifying the
"optimal type of moral language to discuss the family and its future":
I only wish to claim that the one virtue, the nurturing of children . . . ought to be
included in our list of the central or the cardinal virtues. Indeed, even if one
wishes to distinguish between public virtues and private virtues, the virtue of nurturing children belongs high on both lists.81

More recently, Naomi Cahn has suggested that the debates that are
often phrased as " 'self-centered individualism' " and " 'family values' "
are really competing visions of the family that share the same central
goal of protecting children.82
This consensus about the centrality of protecting and nurturing children goes beyond academics. William Galston, former Domestic Policy
Advisor to President Clinton, identifies the central goal of family policy
to be "rais[ing] children well. "83 He advocates policies that "join the
languages of economics and morals" to achieve this central goal.84 The
of children's needs rather than children's rights).
80. Carbone, Child Custody, supra note 79, at 737; see also Rhode & Minow, supra note I, at
198 (arguing that "the moral obligations [under current family law standards] should embody clearer
commitments to equality between the sexes and the quality of life for children"); see generally
James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents'
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371 (1994) (arguing that talk of parents' rights should be abandoned and
replaced with language of parental privilege to care for children in ways that are consistent with
their temporal interests); Harty Krause, "Family Values" and Family Law Reform, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POl_ 109, 128 (1993) ("[T]he social contract must return to one basic value judgment:
Each child must be guaranteed a decent opportunity in home and school, in life and the economy.");
Barbara Bennen Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child· Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1748-49 (1993) (arguing that "it is parents' rights, as currently understood,
that undermine those values of responsibility and mutuality necessary to children's welfare"). But see
Scon Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 J. FAM. L. 325, 354 (1997) (arguing that,
while the "yearning to promote only one value runs deep ••. [a]mong principles we might valorize
as paramount, protecting children and other vulnerable people is surely worthy. But as with any
value, the needs of children must sometimes compete for moral attention") (footnotes omitted).
81. Meyer, supra note 19, at 413-14. See also WILSON, supra note 25, at 249 (defIning familes
as "a human commitment designed to make possible the rearing of moral and healthy children" and
stating that concern for children is "the primary-maybe only-reason for government to be concerned with families").
82. See Cahn, supra note I, at 225; see also Garrison, supra note 76, at 102-05 (arguing that
the emergence of a child-centered approach in family law scholarship generally supports a community-based child support model).
83. William A. Galston, Home Alone, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1991, at 43; see also DAVID
BLANKENHORN ET AL., REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1990);
Richard T. Gill, For the Sake of the Children, 108 PuBLIC INTEREST 81 (1992).
84. Galston, supra note 83, at 43.
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moral importance of caring for children has also been noted by politicians and the highest elected officials.85
2. The Link Between Family Law and Morality: Beyond Individual
Rights vs. Community Values
Turning next to the question of whether the law can or should promote these values, some scholars and policymakers argue that the law's
ability to promote moral, behavior is very limited.86 Mary Ann Glendon
has highlighted the limited role family law has played in promoting morality: "Much of family law is no more-and no less-than the symbolic
expression of certain cultural ideals . . . . Probably no other area of law
is so replete with legal norms that communicate ideas about proper behavior but that have no direct sanctions. "87 These sentiments are echoed
by others, including policymakers.88
Some liberal philosophers have argued that even if the law can affect moral choices, the state has little or no role in restricting individual
choices about the right to marry or divorce or how to raise children.89
Many family law scholars, reviewing law and policy trends over the last
few decades, have concluded that this liberal tradition, to a large extent,
has triumphed. 90 They claim that devotion to individual rights is the pri85. For example, in a 1996 public appearance, President Clinton stated: "You cannot imagine
how many women and children are thrown into poverty simply because the responsible parent, usually the father, walks away and leaves them without any money and won't help . . . . This is a
moral outrage and a social disaster." President William Clinton, Remarks to the Community in Denver (July 22, 1996), in 32 WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 1305.
86. The related question of the relative place of religion and government in promoting "family
values" is thoughtfully discussed in STEPHEN CARTER. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); see also STEPHEN CARTER. CIVILITY:
MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY (1998).
87. GLENDON, supra note 78, at 10. Lon Fuller suggests that the difficulty in developing laws
that foster morality within families might explain the narrow focus on sexual conduct and adultery.
See FUllER, supra note 24, at 40.
88. See Galston, supra note 83, at 40.
89. See Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, in LIBERAL RiGIITS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 1981-1990, at 250, 268-269 (1993).
90. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PuRsUIT OF INTIMACY 1-3 (1993)
(arguing that the premise of modem family law, "like other liberal institutions, should remain neutral
among visions of the good life, intervening only when necessary to prevent one individual from
harming another," promotes a vision of the self that is "fundamentally asocial" and undermines the
"communal preconditions" for intimacy in family life); Krause, supra note 80, at 125 (acknowledging the need to develop laws that respect the value this country places on parents' right to autonomy
and privacy, but finding that "[r]ecent trends of non-intervention, of 'privacy' and 'value neutrality'
favor parental autonomy in procreation and child-rearing too decisively"); William E. Nelson, Patriarchy or Inequality: Family Values or Individuality, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 435, 438 (1996) (conclud-
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mary cause of the diminished force of morality as a guiding principle in
family law.91 As Carl Schneider states:
That tradition [of noninterference in the family] has been reinforced by an ideological development-the increasing displacement of the old republican ideal and the
elevation to legal orthodoxy of that dictum from Mill's On Liberty that asserts
"that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."92

This theme-that an emphasis on individualism and non-interference
has reduced the role of morality in family policy-is also reflected in the
writings of policymakers. William Galston believes that the decline of the
two-parent family over the last three decades can be attributed, in part, to
the value society places on "individualism, on self-expression, and selfrealization, and on personal choice. "93
Amidst the voices emphasizing the conflict between individual rights
and strong families are a few commentators suggesting more fruitful
ways of analyzing the shifts in family law over the last three decades.94
The paradigm of freedom, autonomy, and individualism versus the common good, shared values, and strong families may no longer advance the
discussion. A broader view of morality and a reconception of rights as
effective tools for protecting vulnerable family members suggests that a
concern for individual rights is compatible with a concern for morality.
In an article examining the role of rights in friendships and other close
relationships, Michael Meyer suggests that recognizing rights and individual differences can actually strengthen relationships: "Individual moral
ing society's "shared commitment to individualism" has impeded gender equality and oiher family
law reforms); Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 439 (expressing dissatisfaction wiih ihe application of
Mill's iheory to family law and arguing ihat "family relationships should be founded on rules and
practices we can call good" raiher ihan simply ihe absence of harm); JOHN WITTE, JR.. FROM SACRE.
MENT TO CONTRAcr: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN WESTERN TRADmON (1997) (identifying specific strands of hundreds of years of religious and philosophical pronouncements on marriage, which
have produced ihe current model of marriage ihat is weakened by its focus on individual over
community).
91. See supra note 90.
92. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1839.
93. Galston, supra note 7 (identifying ihe shift in American values from sacrifice and selfrestraint to self-expression and personal choice as a trend ihat has contributed to ihe increase in divorce); see also JAN DIZARD & HOWARD GADLIN. THE MINIMAL FAMILY (1990) (arguing ihat individual rights and family autonomy represents a moral change ihat has rendered ihe traditional family
obsolete).
94. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note I, at 270; Minow, supra note 4, at 260; Rhode & Minow,
supra note I, at 198.

1132

UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1111

rights provide individuals with a certain secure moral standing. A proper
sense of self-worth is not inconsistent with the virtues of friendship.
Clearly, habits of self-respect inspired by rights can encourage such virtues among one's friends."95
Many feminists have rejected a rights-based approach to regulating
family law because of its connection to concepts of individual privacy
and non-interference, which tend to maintain and support the traditional
patriarchal family structure.96 Moreover, cultural feminists fmd rights-talk
hostile to the concepts of community and affiliation.97
There are, however, a number of feminists and other scholars who
believe "careful protection of rights protects friendships and affiliation of
many kinds and constructs a morally valuable sort of community."98 Extending this reasoning from the tightly woven community of friends to
the community of family members, one could argue that parents and children who are secure in their rights and responsibilities to one another
may have healthier, stronger relationships. A number of commentators
have supported the idea that rights have a place in family relationships
and that such rights and communitarian values are not mutually
exclusive.
In accounting for changes in family policy in recent decades, Martha
Minow sees liberty and private ordering as just one of the choices available to decision makers in a given conflict. In other conflicts, decision
makers may choose state intervention:
Committed to equality and liberty, driven by legacies of differences and discrimination, our legal system reflects simultaneous devotion to neutrality toward---or
95. Michael J. Meyer, Rights Between Friends, PHIL. 467, 474-75 (1992); see also Elizabeth S.
Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 687, 688-89 (arguing
that communitarian values and liberalism are not mutually exclusive).
96. For example, Carol Smart argues that:
[T]he "family" constitutes one instance of the operation of patriarchal relations in the concrete. Indeed the "family" can be identified as a focal point at which a range of oppressive
practices meet It is both an ideological and economic site of oppression which is protected
from scrutiny by the very privacy that "family life" celebrates.
CAROL SMART. THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRIARCHAL RELA·
TIONS 10 (1984).
97. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CIU. L. REv. 1, 28 (1998) (summarizing cultural feminism as revolving "not around the axis of autonomy, individuality, justice and
rights .•. but instead around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, community, responsibility and care").
98. Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning, 70 Tax. L. REV.
1019, 1027 (1992). See also MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF
MARRIAGE (1999) (arguing that altruism and sharing should coexist with rights and economic justice
in marriage); Merle H. Weiner, "Civilizing" the Next Generation: A Response to Civility: Manners,
Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy by Stephen L. Carter, 42 How. W. 241, 287-90 (1999).
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better yet, tolerance of-private choices and devotion to officially articulated values
... [B]oth religious and family freedoms protect the autonomy of the Amish who
resist a compulsory school law as an incursion on their way of life, and yet neither
religious nor family freedoms could shield a parent or guardian from a child labor
law applied to forbid a child from distributing religious leaflets on the street or
from conviction for child endangerment for withholding medical treatment due to
religious belief.99

Minow also suggests that the idea that laws are ever value-neutral is
false. loo Each time the government, through its lawmakers, decides to
regulate or refrains from regulating, a choice in values is made. lol As Minow sees it, "neutrality," in some absolute sense, is not an option; instead, there is the choice between deference to the value of private freedom and the alternative of publicly imposed values. I02 Minow goes on to
challenge policymakers to "articulate a possibility of tolerance and commitment to particular values."103
Therefore, two overarching points should guide one's analysis of the
impact of changes in family law over the last few decades on the moral
vision of family law. First, despite the debates about whether law can or
should promote morality, the fact is that regulating families is a valueladen enterprise. Building on the classical tradition, contemporary moral
philosophy has broadened the meaning of morality in ways that prompt
reconsideration of the moral implications of no-fault developments in
family law. Even laws that do not explicitly address right and wrong
often have a moral dimension. As Martha Minow puts it, no-fault and related developments have "simply shifted the focus from the moral conduct of the parties prior to divorce (who did what to whom) to the moral
obligations that should be recognized following divorce (who is responsible to whom, to what extent, and for what duration)."I04 Rethinking what
it means to promote moral conduct in family law also means rethinking
what constitutes the language of morals. Discourse in laws and decisions
that imposes duties and responsibilities on one family member for another is moral discourse.
Second, while deep division exists among the general population,105
99. Minow, supra note 4, at 258.
100. See id. at 258-59.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. [d. at 261.
104. Rhode & Minow, supra note I, at 198.
105. See generally WOLFE, supra note 23 (identifying the deep divisions on issues of homosexuality and same sex marriage among the American public).
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judges,l06 and family law scholars,107 about the ideal family, there are
shared moral principles that support the protection and support of children. los In evaluating whether there has ,been a decline in moral discourse
in family law one must ask whether the law's traditional focus on fault
addressed the central moral truths in family law, particularly protection
of children. If not, the focus should shift from evaluating the decreased
emphasis on fault to exploring the extent to which developments in family law over the last few decades address and promote these central values. The remaining sections of this Article seek to answer these
questions.

m.

THE "OLD"

MORAL

DISCOURSE: REGULATING SEXUAL

CONOuer

Despite the broad defmition of morality and virtue described in the
preceding Section, the code of behavior and the notion of right and
wrong in the "fault" era of family law were primarily concerned with
prohibiting certain sexual practices. 109 Constitutional protection for the
private sphere of the family developed in cases beginning in the 1920s,110
106. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.3 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (deflning !he family unit accorded traditional respect in our society as !he "unitary family,"
typifled by !he marital family), with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977)
(holding !hat "[olurs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for !he bonds uniting !he members
of !he nuclear family").
107. This division is, perhaps, most striking when comparing !hose scholars urging policies
and laws !hat reinforce !he traditional two parent family wi!h !hose scholars who defend !he single
parent family model. Compare Lynn D. Wardle, No·Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum,
1991 BYU L. REv. 79, 135 (1991) (arguing !hat "we have made a major mistake by not paying
greater attention to how our new divorce-on-demand system is affecting an entire generation of children brought up in !he poverty of single parent homes"), with NANCY E. DoWD. IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMIUES (1997) (arguing !hat marriage does not support women and may not protect
children).
108. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text
109. June Carbone traces !he emphasis on regulating sexual conduct as an element of family
policy in !his country to "a set of moral codes criminalizing fornication, adultery, and sodomy many
of which have been repealed or remain unenforced." Carbone, Child Custody, supra note 79, at 270
(citing MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN. THE NEUTERED MOTHER. THE SEXUAL FAMILY. AND OTHER
TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145-76 (1995».
llO. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Related cases arising under !he First Amendment
and !he Equal Protection Clause include Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also Anne C. Daily,
Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv. 955 (1993) (reviewing Supreme Court
decisions !hat have developed a right of family privacy while recognizing tradition of state regUlation
of !he family).
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but the notion that the state could regulate family life to promote moral
behavior among its members was always fIrmly embedded. 11I However,
the behavior scrutinized for its morality was primarily focused on sexual
conduct. 112 A dissent by Justice Harlan in a 1961 case upholding a state
ban on contraceptive use for married couples reflects the narrow scope of
issues viewed as "moral":
[The] inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community,
but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as
well. . . . The laws regarding marriage which provide both when . . . children are
born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to
lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.1I3

This Section will provide examples from divorce, custody, and support law of this narrow defmition of morality in the fault era, and will
evaluate the shortcomings of this approach in promoting moral conduct,
particularly with respect to the care and nurturing of children.1I4 Even if
this system worked once, it began to break down decades ago. 1I5 By the
time the sole reliance on fault was discarded in the 1970s, it did not
111. See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 8 (reviewing Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L REv. 1803 (1985) and discussing the
role courts have played in regulating moral behavior within the family).
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). June Carbone has
traced the history of the link between morality and sexual conduct. Marriage, with its common law
ideal of the "transcendental" unity of spouses, was an exception to the general hostility towards sexual relationships that existed in this country since its founding. This ideal separated conjugal intercourse from other forms and linked it to a unity that depended on the different, but complementary
natures of men and women, and the nature of marriage as a lifelong and monogamous institution.
This ideal was important to maintaining the link between sex, procreation and childrearing and was
critical to the creation of marriage as a permanent institution necessary to protect vulnerable women,
and connect children to family lineages that were an important sense of wealth and identity. The major purpose of family law, then, was to reinforce a set of norms that discouraged divorce and extramarital (both pre-marital and adulterous) conception. It was never intended to manage a system of
widespread divorce or to regulate conduct within marriage. The fault law's emphasis on regulation of
sexual conduct should therefore, she argues, not be evaluated in the context of current conditions.
See Carbone, supra note 51, at 272-75.
114. States adopted no-fault laws at different times beginning about 1967 and continuing
throughout the 1980s. Therefore, the cases describing the concepts of fault embodied in divorce, alimony and custody laws are drawn from cases that may have been decided as late as the 1980s. Additionally, because some states still retain concepts of fault in their divorce laws, particularly with respect to divorce grounds, a few cases used to illuminate concepts of fault are even more
contemporary.
115. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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work at all. 116

A.

The Meaning of Fault as Grounds for Divorce

The fault-based system of divorce, established in this country in the
mid-nineteenth century, has its roots in religious law because the ecclesiastical courts governed divorce in England. l17 Under this system a divorce was only granted at the request of an innocent spouse upon proof
of a "fault" or offense against the marriage by the other spouse. I IS This
reflected the Anglican religious view that marriage was a "permanent
moral bond between husband and wife."119 Carl Schneider describes the
ideal of marriage embodied in fault-based divorce as a "life-long mutual
responsibility and fidelity from which a spouse could be relieved,
roughly speaking, only upon the serious breach of a moral duty by the
other spouse." 120
Other commentators have described fault-based divorce as reflecting
America's view of marriage as a "contract with God and spouse" 121
which conveys a "powerful message about the permanence of marriage
and family commitments." 122 This view of the moral underpinning of
fault-based divorce law is echoed in nineteenth century Supreme Court
case law:
116. See id.
117. See HOMER H. CLARK. JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 6-7 (4th ed. 1990)
("The American colonies, upon their establisIunent, received many of the English rules concerning
marriage, divorce and the status of married women. Of course the colonies never had ecclesiastical
courts but these doctrines appeared in legislative enactments and judicial decisions and became part
of our civil law.").
Though the Ecclesiastical Law of England is no part of our Common Law • . • that part of
the jurisdication of the Ecclesiastical Courts relating to annulment of marriage and divorce
was given by law to our Courts, it is reasonable to believe that we should follow the principles and precedents of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the administration of our law . . . .
S. v. S., 29 A.2d 325, 326 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942).
118. See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 605, 607 (1996).
119. Christopher Price, Comment, Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& COMPo LJ. 669, 683 (1997) (analyzing the American experiences with both fault and no-fault systems of divorce and recommending the Irish adopt the fault-based system in implementing Ireland's
1995 referendum on divorce).
120. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1809.
121. Morse, supra note 118, at 606.
122. Wardle, supra note 1, at 750. Wardle goes on to emphasize that the fault-based system
underscored permanence in marriage because" '[c]ommitment is the moral virtue.' " Id. at 751
(quoting ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF TIiE AMERICAN MIND 201 (1987».
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[W]hile marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions of courts a civil
contract . . . it is something more than a mere contract The consent of the parties
is of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is executed
by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot
change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once
farmed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities.
It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress. l23

While many commentators acknowledge weaknesses in the application of the fault system in practice,124 reliance on fault grounds for divorce is almost uniformly described as expressing society's moral belief
that marriage is a lifetime commitment to one's spouse with all the emotional and economic obligations associated with that commitment. l25
Both the articulation in the law and application in practice of faultbased divorce did little to promote this idealized view of marriage. First,
the concept of "fault" has always been a very narrow one. Monogamy is
the principle form of commitment envisioned under the traditional fault
grounds. Other important commitments such as providing fInancially for
wives during marriage or after divorce or treating wives and children respectfully and without violence were not addressed or emphasized in the
fault system. A brief review of the evolution and history of the faultbased grounds for divorce reveals how narrow the concept of marital
misconduct was in that system.
Because the English ecclesiastical courts, under the doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church and, later, under the Church of England, viewed
marriage as a permanent bond, there was no absolute divorce under the
common law. l26 The :fIrst inroad into state-sanctioned divorce was a late
123. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-211 (1888). This view has continued well into the
twentieth century. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
124. Even those who condemn or criticize the "no-fault" access to divorce acknowledge the
failure of fault grounds to promote commitment to marriage. It is generally accepted that by the time
no-fault grounds were being adopted in some states 'in the 196Os, the fault system had resulted in the
widespread use of perjured testimony and had encouraged acrimony between divorcing couples by
requiring fault or blame to lie with one party. See, e.g., GLENDON. supra note 78, at 79 ("The [fault]
system had degenerated into a formal recitation of perjured testimony, leaving acrimony in its wake
.... "); Wardle, supra note 107, at 79, 135 (critiquing no-fault divorce, but acknowledging the negative impact of "hostile litigation [and] deceit in legal processes" in fault-era divorces). But see, e.g.,
MAx RHEINSTEJN. MARRIAGE STABILITY. DIVORCE. AND 1liB LAW 258 (1972) (arguing that the dual
system of fault-based divorce on the books and divorce by collusion and mutual consent in practice
was a "compromise" that satisfied both conservatives and liberals).
125. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
126. Of course, the Roman Catholic Church could grant annulments, and did so freely during
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seventeenth-century Parliamentary Act permitting divorce a vinculo l27 on
grounds of adultery.l28 Homer Clark and Carol Glowinsky describe this
"avenue of escape from marriage" for "the richest and most powerful
people in Britain":
This was the divorce by special Parliamentary Act, given only for adultery. . . .
Not only was this kind of divorce confmed to the rich, it was also largely the prerogative of men, only four being granted to wives during one hundred and fifty
years. There are some indications that the virtual absence of practicable legal methods for terminating marriages led large segments of society to adopt non-legal
methods for this purpose, that is, to separate and contract subsequent marriages
without benefit of divorce.J29

Adultery remained the only ground for divorce in England even after divorce jurisdiction was transferred from the ecclesiastical courts to
the civil court system in 1857. 130 It was not until 1937 that English law
added other fault-based grounds for divorce, the most commonly invoked
being cruelty and desertion. 131 Although American law has always allowed divorce more freely than English law, the development of divorce
law in this country reflects its British and ecclesiastical roots, particularly
in its emphasis on adultery as the most serious offense against the marriage. June Carbone has traced the historical development of American
family law, noting the existence of eighteenth century legislation prescribing the death penalty for "adulterie" and "sodomie":132 "Early
American family law was marked by a clear identification of sexual mothis time. See HOMER H. CLARK. JR.. THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN TIlE UNITED STATES 12526 (2d ed. 1988).
127. "a vinculo matrimonii: Lat From the bond of matrimony. A term descriptive of a kind
of divorce, which effects a complete dissolution of the marriage contract" BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 136 (6th ed. 1990). Prior to the Church's exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce in
England, Anglo-Saxon law allowed divorce by consent of the spouses or for the wife's adultery or
desertion. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 406. English common law also permitted a divorce a
mensa et thoro, or divorce from bed and board. This was a legal separation on certain enumerated
fault grounds, but neither party could remarry. See PETER N. SWISHER ET AL.. FAMILY LAW: CASES.
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 715 (1990).
128. See CLARK & GLOWINSKY, supra note 117, at 6.
129. Id.
130. See The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 20 Victoria, 1857v.
97. Divorce and Matrimony causes 20 and 21 Viet c85, described in Margaret K. Woodhouse, The
Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 AM. 1. LEGAl RlST_ 260, 273 (1959).
131. Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 ch. 57. English divorce law now includes no-fault grounds and is set forth in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. 18 (Eng.).
132. Carbone, supra note 51, at 273 (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG. GOVERNING TIlE HEARTH:
LAW AND TIlE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 19 (1985) and THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS 5 (Max Farrand ed., 1929».
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rality as fundamental to the importance of marriage, and was religious, if
not necessarily sectarian, in origin."133 While there were variations in the
speed with which divorce became available by statute in different geographic regions,I34 adultery was consistently included as one or, sometimes the only, fault ground. 135
Indeed, until 1966, the only ground for divorce in New York was
adultery.136 Even when many states added the additional grounds of cruelty and desertion, adultery was the most commonly used ground. 137 It
was a popular and reliable ground for a couple of reasons. First, in some
states, adultery was the only ground that did not require the parties to
separate for a year or more before filing for divorce. 13s Additionally,
while corroboration of adultery may have presented some proof
problems, the relatively clear and straightforward deflnition of adultery'39
133. Id.
134. Those areas settled by Protestants-primarily New England-had general divorce statules
from the time of settlement. In the middle Atlantic and Southern states, the areas most influenced by
Catholicism and the Church of England, the colonies did not permit divorce except by legislative act
throughout most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See CLARK & GLOWINSKY, supra note
117, at 7.
135. Discussing the state of marriage in the nineteenth century, David Hoffman noted that
"the policy of most countries ..• has been to allow no other ground for the actual dissolution of the
[marriage] contract, than adultery." DAVID HOFFMAN. LEGAL Ol1lUNES 150 (1836).
136. See N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988) (adding cruelty, abandonment, and excessive prison confinement, which became effective Sept. 1, 1967).
137. See Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform
No·Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REv. 607, 610 (1997). By the time no-fault grounds for divorce
were widely adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, cruelty had become the most popular ground for divorce. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 506.
138. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 7-103(a) (1991).
139. "'Adultery' is generally defined as sexual intercourse by either spouse with someone
other than their spouse." JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL.. UNDERSTANDING FAMtLY LAW 209 (1993).
However, there is some variation in the way courts have defined the term. See, e.g., Menge v.
Menge, 491 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that wife's admission of having had oral
sex but not coitus fell under definition of adultery); Bales v. Hack, 509 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986) (stating that although homosexuality is not a specifically enumerated ground for divorce,
it could constitute adultery or extreme cruelty). The potential variation on the definition of adultery
has been the subject of renewed interest as the media has examined the sexual conduct of various
public officials. See, e.g., Walter Kim, When Sex Is Not Really Having Sex, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at
30; Nancy Kruh, No Foolin': That's What Adultery Is, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 1998, at lC;
Tony Pugh, Definition of Adultery, Infidelity Debated, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 25, 1998, at A26; Jason
Vest, Robb's Unadulterated Opinion: A Rousing Debate on the Infamous Fidelity Factor, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 1994, at D1.
Of course, corroboration of adultery did present proof problems. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett,
345 So. 2d 586, 590 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("Courts are a bit more sophisticated today and infer that
people do what comes naturally when they have the opportunity."); Westervelt v. Westervelt, 258
N.E.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. 1970) (holding evidence of spouse's cohabitation with another insufficient to
prove adultery); Seemann v. Seemann, 355 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 1987) (holding that evidence that defend-
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may have made it easier to prove than other fault grounds, most of
which permitted trial judges wide discretion in defming them. l40
The emphasis in statutes and other legal commentary devoted to
adultery resulted in a preoccupation with sexual misconduct as the primary measure of morality in marriage. Other immoral behavior, such as
physical and verbal abuse or failure to provide adequate economic support to a dependent spouse or children, were sanctioned in a system in
which sexual misconduct was the only indication of fault within a marriage. The value of this focus on sexual conduct as a way to evaluate or
promote moral behavior was further undercut by the double standard
some commentators have observed in the application of adultery
statutes. 141
The other two grounds for divorce that were most widely used in
the fault era were cruelty142 and desertion. 143 While both of these grounds
permitted courts the opportunity to sanction conduct in marriage that
went beyond sexual morality, they were of limited value in promoting
moral conduct. The historical context in which these grounds were developed and the broad discretion permitted judges in applying these grounds
permitted the development of dual standards for husbands and wives. l44
For example, while cruelty was initially developed as a ground for divorce to assist women with abusive husbands,145 it was applied in an era
ant wife had spent ten nights in room with adult male was insufficient to prove adultery when wife
testified that she had not slept with the man due to her strong religious beliefs).
140. Terms like cruelty and constructive desertion are subject to wide interpretation by trial
judges applying them in divorce cases. See infra note 465.
141. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1533 n.139 (1983) ("[S]trict divorce laws have historically operated more
harshly upon women than upon men. For example, in many states a woman's single act of adultery
constituted grounds for divorce but a man's adultery would not unless it were repeated or flagrant.").
142. One defmition of cruelty is that it "occurs only when there is bodily harm or a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm." CLARK, supra note 126, at 507. In the states where cruelty is not
available (MD, NC, VA) or is strictly construed (DE, PA), the concept of constructive desertion
evolved to fill the gap in situations where the spouse's cruelty forces the other spouse to leave the
mariial home. See, e.g., Sackman v. Sackman, 203 A.2d 903 (Md. 1964).
143. Willfulness is a requirement in desertion statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050
(Michie 1998); IDAHO CODE § 32-603 (1996); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 (1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3301(a)(I) (West 1991). Most statutes require that the desertion continue over a period of
time, one year being the most common. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 501.
144. See Nelson, supra note 90, at 517 (fmding a double standard in New York courts' defmition of cruelty).
145. See Nan Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife Abuse, 3 LAW & POL. Q. 382,
388-89, 393-94 (1981); Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in EighteenthCentury Massachusettes, 33 WM. & MARy Q. 586, 588-89 (1976) (arguing that the courts interpreted
fault requirements early in the 18th century in ways that prevented women from obtaining divorces
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when a husband was entitled to use some force to discipline his wife. l46
Courts often required a pattern of substantial physical abuse where cruelty grounds were invoked against a husband. In one case, evidence that
a husband had hit his wife with his fist within the first two months of
their marriage was not sufficient to establish cruelty.147 In another case,
the wife alleged that her husband had "committed physical cruelty on
her person" and that she was "afraid to live with [him] for fear that he
[would] commit further and additional harm and injury [to her]."I48 The
complaint was dismissed because only actual violence of a degree attended with "danger to life or health" constituted cruelty.149 The courts
were so tolerant of violence by a husband that they found one man justified in striking his wife after he had found her sitting on the lap of another man and kissing him.150 Some courts also held that if the wife had
reason to know that her future husband was abusive before the marriage,
her prior knowledge barred her later use of cruelty as grounds for
divorce. 151
On the other hand, relatively minor transgressions by a wife have
been interpreted as cruelty justifying a husband's action for divorce. For
example, divorces have been granted on cruelty grounds based on the
wife's persistent nagging,152 her "denial" of the husband's "marital
rights"153 or a demand that he use contraceptives. 154 In contrast, a husband's lack of sexual interest in his wife l55 or other failure to have sexual
except for the most reprehensible male conduct).
146. See SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIlE LAWS OF ENGLAND 445 (Thomas
M. Cooley ed., 3d ed. 1884) (stating that a husband may, by force, keep his wife within the bounds
of duty). See also JAMES SCHOUI.ER. MARRIAGE, DIVORCE. SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS,
§ 1574 (6th ed 1921). For a discussion of the recent controversy over whether the law ever explicitly
adopted a "rule of thumb" permitting a man to beat his wife so long as the rod was no thicker than
his thumb, see infra note 328.
147. See Glantz v. Glantz, 310 P.2d 23 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
148. McDowell v. McDowell, 223 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. 1969).
149. [d.; see also Capps v. Capps, 219 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1975) (holding that a single act of
physical violence was not enough to entitle wife to divorce on ground of cruelty).
150. See Nilsen v. Nilsen, 183 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
151. See Williamson v. Williamson, 204 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Ark. 1947).
152. See McGann v. McGann, 186 P.2d 424, 426 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (granting divorce
where plaintiff's wife "was cold toward him, nagged him, wrote him whining letters while overseas,
turned her back on him while in bed, attempted to regulate his life and refused to permit him to go
bowling with his father . . . . ").
153. Di Croce v. Di Croce, 209 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
154. See Barretta v. Barretta, 46 N.Y.S.2d 261, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1944). But see Dahnken v.
Dahnken, 161 N.y'S.2d 539, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (holding that wife's belief that she had valid reason
to leave home for husband's use of contraception did not constitute abandonment).
155. See McClinton v. McClinton, 200 N.y'S.2d 987, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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relations did not constitute cruelty. 156
The husband's right at common law to determine where both his
wife and children could live,151 codified in some states,158 also led to an
early dual standard in desertion cases. Thus, a failure of a wife to follow
her husband when he moved, except in the most egregious circumstances, would give rise to a cause of action against her for divorce on
grounds of desertion. 159 The husband had no corresponding duty to defer
to a wife's decision to move; if a wife left the marital home, she would
be guilty of desertion. 160
The enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts l61 and the ex156. See Shepetin v. Shepetin, 229 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (App. Div. 1962). Of course, given the
absence of no-fault grounds during this period, husbands and wives often colluded to create grounds
for divorce. Thus, in some of these cases, the other party may not have opposed the charge of cruelty. Additionally, the need to circumvent the system may have contributed to the inconsistencies.
See J. HERBIE DiFoNZO. BENEATII THE FAULT LINE: TIlE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN
'TwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 55 (1997). See also discussion infra at Section ill CCl)(a).
157. The husband's right to control both his domicile and that of his wife is based on the
"unity of person" doctrine of marriage, which deprived married women of an independent legal existence. CLARK, supra note 126, at 286-88; see also Motykowski v. Motykowski, 282 N.E.2d 458,
461 (lll. App. Ct. 1972); Lewis v. Lewis, 284 A.2d 21, 23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971); Cavallo v.
Cavallo, 359 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Santarsiero v. Santarsiero, 331 A.2d 868,
869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
158. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 (repealed 1975); LA. avo CODE ANN. art. 120 (repealed
1985); Dmo REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (repealed 1974).
159. See, e.g., Roby v. Roby, 77 P. 213, 215 (Idaho 1904) (holding that husband was not
guilty of desertion where the husband established a home in a desolate mining region and his wife
refused to follow him on the ground that it was not a fit place to live because it was disagreeable
five months of the year, when most of the travel was on snowshoes, and there were no schools,
churches or theaters in the locality); Crosby v. Crosby, 434 So. 2d 162 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Bennett
V. Bennett, 79 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1951) (emphasizing the well-established doctrine that the husband, being the head of the family and legally responsible for its support, has the right to choose
and establish the domicile for himself and his wife, and when he provides a new domicile, his wife's
refusal to follow him constitutes desertion, unless the change is plainly unreasonable). This case was
superceded by MD. CONST. art. 46, Maryland's version of the Equal Rights Amendment. See Blount
V. Boston, 718 A.2d 1111 n.5 (Md. 1998».
160. See, e.g., Towson V. Towson, 258 F. 517, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (holding that a wife
who left her husband because of cruelty, taking their minor child with her, was not entitled to separate maintenance or custody of the child when she was unable to sustain her claim of cruelty and
thus had deserted her husband without just cause), overruled in part by Barlett V. Barlett, 221 F.2d
508 (D.C. Cir. 1954); McGrath v. Gimler, 60 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946) (holding that
a father who left New York to take up residence in Wyoming had the right to custody of the child
over the mother who deserted the father by refusing to follow and live with him in Wyoming).
161.
[U]nder the Married Women's Acts, in force in most if not all states, the unity of the
spouses is severed, and each is a separate legal personality in so far as the disabilities of the
wife are abolished; but such acts are to be construed as not otherwise impairing the unity of
the spouses.••• The law continues to recognize that unity with respect to certain rights, duties, and obligations arising from the marriage and constituting its object. These Married Wo-
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pansion of concepts of equal protection in gender discrimination cases 162
have resulted in more evenhanded applications of cruelty and desertion
statutes. 163 However, the statutory language adopted in most states is expansive enough to continue to allow trial judges broad discretion in their
app1ication.l64 This discretion leads to both unpredictability and inconsistency in application. 165 It also permits judges to apply their own standards of behavior which, given the composition of the state judiciary,
still means the male perspective will dominate. l66
Finally, a review of reported decisions on cruelty and desertion
grounds reveals the same preoccupation with sexual morality as the primen's Enabling Acts do not purport to operate upon the family relations, or to take from the
husband, his marital rights, except as they pertain to property.
26 AM. JUR. Husband and Wife § 3 (1940) (footnotes omitted); see also Richard H. Chused, Married
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. W. 1359 (1983).
162. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
163. The dual standard in desertion cases resulted, in part, from the husband's right to determine the family's domicile. This common law inability of married women to establish a separate
domicile was eroded in many states by the adoption of the Married Women's Property Act because
these statutes severed the common law "unity of spouses." See supra note 161. In addition, the principle of derivative domicile for married women was successfully litigated in the 1970s on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
rev'd in pan, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1968).
164. For statutory language on cruelty, see, for example, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1
(West 1998) ("cruel and abusive treatment"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 (1994) ("habitual cruel and
inhuman treatment"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (1992) ("extreme cruelty"); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:34-2 (West 1987) ("extreme cruelty"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (Michie 1994) ("cruel and
inhuman treatment"); N.Y. DOM. REI... LAw § 170 (McKinney 1988) ("cruel and inhuman treatment
... endanger[ing] the physical or mental well being of the plaintiff"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03
(1997) ("[e]xtreme cruelty"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1994) ("extreme cruelty"); OK!.. STAT. ANN. tiL 43, § 101 (West 1990) ("[e]xtreme cruelty"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3301 (West 1991) ("cruel and barbarous treatment endanger[ing] ••• life or health"); Rl GEN.
LAWS § 15-5-2 (1996) ("extreme cruelty"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1985)
("[p]hysical cruelty"); SD. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-2 (Michie 1992) ("[e]xtreme cruelty"); VT. STAT.
ANN. tiL 15, § 551 (1989) ("intolerable severity"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1995) ("cruelty"); W. VA. CODE, § 48-2-4 (1998) ("cruel or inhuman treatment").
For statutory language on desertion, see, for example, ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a) (1989); ALAsKA
STAT. § 25.24.050 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-4O (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3
(1991); 750 Iu.. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/401(2)(1) (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN.• FAM. LAw § 7-102
(1991); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West 1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West 1987);
N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1994);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN.
tiL 15, § 291 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1995).
165. Of course the indeterminancy of the cruelty ground also contributed to its popularity in
the fault era when many divorces were obtained by collusion and perjury. See DIFoNZO, supra note
156, at 51-56.
166. See WOMEN IN THE LAw: A LoOK AT THE NUMBERS 31 (American Bar Association, Dec.
1995) (finding that in 1991, 7% of federal court judges and 9% of state court judges were women).
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mary way of evaluating conduct in marriage. 167 Boasting of affairs with
other women,168 a husband's insistence on excessive, unnatural, or otherwise unreasonable sexual intercourse,169 transvestitism or transsexualism,170 refusal to engage in sexual intercourse,17I homosexuality, 172 and a
wife's desire to use contraception during sexual relations 173 have all been
considered cruelty under various state statutes.
Further, because both cruelty and desertion require that the couple
has ceased cohabitation,174 a significant number of litigated cases on desertion have focused on whether sexual relations have occurred within a
marriage. 175 These cases focus on whether a spouse has refused sexual relations,176 whether the refusal of sexual relations amounts to desertion, 177
and whether the refusal to .have sexual relations is justified. 178
The inquiry into misconduct through the fault-based divorce grounds
has provided only a very limited opportunity for legislators and judges to
engage in moral discourse about the meaning of commitment in mar167. See Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Annotation, Fault As Consideration in Alimony, Spousal
Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R. 3d 1116 (1978).
168. See Smith v. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1963); see also Diehl v. Diehl, 149 A.2d 133 (pa.
Super. Ct. 1959); RP. Davis, Annotation, Insistence on Sex Relations as Cruelty or Indignity Constiluting Ground/or Divorce, 88 AL.R. 2d 553 (1963).
169. See Thomason v. Thomason, 332 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
170. See Steinke v. Steinke, 357 A.2d 674 (pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
171. See Hinkle v. Hinkle, 74 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1953); Mante v. Mante, 309 N.Y.S.2d 944
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
172. See H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
173. See Forbes v. Forbes, 1 W.L.R. 531 (1955).
174. See ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.050 (Michie 1998) (willful desertion for one year); ARK. CODl;
ANN. § 9-12-301 (Michie 1998) (willful desertion of 18 months separation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-40 (West 1995) (willful desertion for one year); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (1991) (willful desertion for one year); MD. CODE ANN.• FAM. LAW § 7-103 (1991) (desertion for 12 months without
interruption); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1 (1998) (utter desertion for one year); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 458:7 (1992) (unexplained absence for two years; joining religious group believing the relation of husband wife unlawful and refusal to cohabit for six months); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2
(West 1987) (cruelty for three months; desertion for 12 months); N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988) (abandonment for one or more years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 101 (West 1990)
(abandonment/desertion for one year); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 1991) (desertion for
one or more years); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-2 (1996) (desertion for five years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 203-10 (Law Co-op. 1985) (desertion for five years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-101 (1996) (desertion
for one year or absent state for two years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (1998) (willful desertion for
more than one year); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1989) (desertion for seven years); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2-4 (1998) (abandonment or desertion for six months).
175. See Ct.ARK, supra note 126, at 504 (noting that the majority of litigated cases on desertion focus on whether cessation of cohabitation has occurred).
176. See id. at 504 n.47; Fortman v. Fortman, 243 A.2d 517, 520-21 (Md. 1968).
177. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 504 n.48.
178. See, e.g., Hodges v. Hodges, 131 A.2d 703, 704-05 (Md. 1957).
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riage. This body of law tells married couples that sexual indiscretions can
have serious consequences-Le., provide a legal ground for ending a
marriage. However, the messages about conduct outside the area of sexual relations are inconsistent and unpredictable and include the destructive message that treating one's spouse with respect and freedom from
physical abuse may not be obligations the law envisions in marriage.
Fault-based divorce decisions also endorse a double standard for
. men and women when judges evaluate the behavior of husbands and
wives differently as they apply divorce grounds. The expense and delay
experienced by both parties to a divorce when fault has to be litigated
hurts families trying to cope with the trauma of family breakup. These
costs can rise to the level of a moral issue when the party seeking the divorce does so to protect herself and her children from violence and protection is delayed by the expense and length of court proceedings. 179
B.

Alimony Law in the Fault Era

The "no-fault revolution"18o also resulted in a shift in the law's approach to alimony or spousal support. This change was marked primarily
by a dimunition of the role of fault in alimony decisions and is viewed
by many commentators as part of the "tendency toward diminished
moral discourse"181 in alimony.
Prior to the 1970s, alimony was awarded to wives only following a
legal separation or divorce. 182 Although there did not appear to be any
single justification set forth in the early statutes authorizing alimony,
both need and fault were the primary justifications for early awards of alimony.183 English alimony law placed greater emphasis on the need to
179. Battered women are at greatest risk of abuse when attempting to separate from their abusive partners. Among victims of violence committed by an intimate, women separated from their
husbands were three times more likely to be victimized than divorced women and twenty-five times
more likely to be victimized than married women. See Ronet Bachman & Linda E. Salzman, Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey, U.S. Dept of Justice (Aug. 1995).
180. For a description of the term "no-fault revolution," see supra note 6.
181. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note I, at 1809; see also Carl E. Schneider, Rethink·
ing Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REv. 197,233-57 (1991).
182. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSfONE. COMMENTARIES *189. In 1979, the United States Supreme
Court decided Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), holding that the Alabama statute authorizing alimony to be imposed only upon husbands and in favor of wives violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Prior to 1979, only a few states permitted alimony to be granted to husbands. See, e.g., CAL. FAM.
CODE § 4330 (West 1994); MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (1998).
183. Alimony, unknown at common law, is a creature of statute. See Chester G. Vernier &
John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 201 (1939).
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support the wife as a basis for alimony because the award was made in
the context of a legal separation in which the parties would remain married and the husband had a continuing obligation to support his wife. 184
However, in this country, where alimony was awarded upon absolute divorce, the law placed greater emphasis on alimony's punishment and reward functions. 18s Characterizing the early justification for alimony under
American law, one commentator notes that "[a]limony was based largely
on fault and was only available to innocent wives whose husbands had
caused the marriage to fail."186 Additionally, alimony tended to be
awarded for life when it was ordered because it was not directly tied to
the wife's economic need. 187
This view of alimony in the fault era has been interpreted as promoting moral discourse because it required courts to focus on "innocent"188 or "guilty" conduct. 189 Wives were regularly denied alimony
when courts interpreted their actions as conduct that "broke up the marriage"l90 or made them "guilty" parties. 191 The presumption favoring a
lifetime award of alimony has also been interpreted as promoting moral
discourse because it recognized that "each spouse assumes lifelong responsibility for the other." 192
An examination of the way alimony laws were crafted and applied
reveals the limits of fault-based alimony laws' ability to promote moral184. Under English common law, wives surrendered their property rights at marriage and had
no ability to support themselves while married. 2 BURNS, EcCLESIASTICAL LAW 450-51 (1781).
185. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 139, at 243; CHESTER G. VERNIER, 2 AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW 259 (1932).
186. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 139, at 243. But see Dayton v. Dayton, 161 S.W.2d 618 (Ky.
1942); Rader v. Rader, 126 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1961); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio
Com. PI. 1954); Bray v. Landergren, 172 S.E. 252 (Va. 1934).
187. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 650.
188. See Dayton v. Dayton, 161 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1942); Rader v. Rader, 126 So. 2d 189 (La.
App. 1961); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio Com. PI. 1954); Bray v. Landergren, 172
S.E.252 (Va. 1934).
189. The gUilt of either spouse is relevant. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 151 S.W.2d 998 (Ark.
1941); Gusman v. Gusman, 39 N.E. 918 (Ind. 1895); Poppe v. Poppe, 52 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. App.
1944). But see Bonanno v. Bonanno, 72 A.2d 318 (NJ. 1950); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 11 A.2d 128 (NJ.
Ch. 1939); Miles v. Miles, 202 P.2d 485 (Or. 1949); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 S.E.2d 64 (Va. 1942).
190. See Stumpf v. Stumpf, 179 A.2d 893, 896 (Md. 1962) (holding that wife, who refused to
reconcile with allegedly alcoholic husband until he agreed to let her resume control of their finances,
had effectively deserted her husband).
191. See Mathews v. Mathews, 459 So. 2d 546, 549-50 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (reiterating that a
party need only establish by circumstantial evidence the reasonable conclusion that adultery has been
committed and denying wife permanent alimony on the trial court's finding that she was "guilty of
adultery").
192. Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1, at 1810.
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ity. First, the fact that alimony was unavailable to husbands in most jurisdictions undermined its role in promoting mutual responsibility and commitment in marriage. Indeed, the cases from this era reveal the hardship
created under this rule. 193 The fact that wives who were not found to be
"innocent" were denied alimony also worked to exclude many deserving
wives. 194
The nature of the task of evaluating marital misconduct also increased the likelihood of harsh or unfair results. Findings of fact about
guilt or innocence are subjective and imprecise; two judges hearing the
same case could easily reach two different conclusions on whether a wife
was innocent or a husband guilty.19S For example, in a case where a wife
left her husband after he physically and mentally abused her, one judge
might fmd that the husband constructively deserted the wife and therefore award her alimony.196 On similar facts, another judge might interpret
the wife's actions in leaving an abusive husband as actual desertion on
her part and therefore deny her alimony as the "guilty party."197
Additionally, the tendency of the law is to place inappropriate
weight on sexual misconduct, specifically adultery, but not enough
weight on other kinds of misconduct such as physically or mentally abusing one's spouse 198 had implications for alimony as well. Thus, a wife
who committed one act of adultery in a thirty year marriage during
which she devoted herself to raising children and supporting the husband's career would be left with no support after marriage. l99 In an era
when most women were economically dependent, a wife who experienced abuse by her husband might have to stay in a violent marriage or
risk loss of support because the abuse may not be included under a par193. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 158, 159-60 (Ala. 1966) (holding that the husband
should not be awarded the parties' jointly owned home even though he received custody of their
child).
194. See GREGORY ET AL, supra note 139, at 243. But see, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & June
Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL L REV. 855 (1988) (reviewing
nineteenth and twentieth century cases on alimony and finding substantial variation on the issue of
whether a "guilty" spouse could collect alimony).
195. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's BestInterest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2250 (1991) (discussing drawbacks of judicial discretion).
196. See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 221 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
197. See, e.g., Towson v. Towson, 258 F. 517, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (holding that a wife
who left her husband because of cruelty was not entitled to alimony where she was unable to sustain
her claim of cruelty and thus had deserted her husband without just cause).
198. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
199. In many states, if a divorce was granted to the husband based on the wife's adultery or
some other conduct giving rise to fault-based grounds, the wife would be barred from receiving alimony. See supra notes 186, 190-91 and accompanying text.
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ticular judge's concept of cruelty or constructive desertion.2OO Thus, while
the statutes and decisionmakers used language which purported to punish
misconduct and reward virtue in marriage, often the application of these
laws did not accomplish those goals.
Finally, the message of marriage as a lifetime commitment was further undercut by the infrequency and low levels of alimony awarded
under this system. Fewer than 16% of divorces occurring between 1887
and 1922 included provisions for permanent alimony.201 Statistics in the
1960s and 1970s reveal a similar pattern in which alimony was awarded
in less than 20% of divorce cases.202 Post 1980 award data show a similar pattern.203
When alimony was awarded, the amounts were low.204 The Census
200. See Bradford, supra note 137, at 631-632; Martha Heller, Note, Should Breaking-Up Be
Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would Have upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 263, 272 (1996) (arguing that requiring women to prove the misconduct of violent husbands in support proceedings "would deter women from leaving dangerous relationships"). But see Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869, 869 (1994) ("[I]ncreased abuse and other undesirable behavior is a natural consequence of the fact that in some states the marriage contract cannot be enforced."); Wardle, supra
note 1, at 741 (critiquing the "no-fault divorce culture" and suggesting a link between no-fault divorce and violence).
201. See PAUL H. JACOBSON. AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 127 (1959). A nationwide
sample of divorce decrees revealed that 9.3% of divorces included provisions for permanent alimony
from 1887-1906; in 1916, the percentage was 15.4 and in 1922, alimony was awarded in 14.7% of
cases. See id.
202. See WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 162-68 (indicating that between 1968 and 1972, the percentage of cases in which alimony was denied went from 20% to 15% in California cases; this percentage had increased to 17% by 1977); see also Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce
Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 1. FAM. L. 443, 473 (1981-82) (indicating that alimony awards in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, declined from 20% of cases in 1965 to 16% in 1978).
203. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS.
SERIES P-23, No. 152, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1985 (1987). According to a 1986 United
States Census Bureau survey, fewer than 15 percent of all women who had ever been divorced or
were currently separated had obtained an agreement or court order to receive alimony. See id. For
other studies of the percentage of women awarded alimony at divorce, see ALASKA WOMEN'S COM.
MISSION. FAMILY EQUITY AT ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE EcONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON Woo
MEN AND CHILDREN 17 (Oct 1987) (10% in Alaska); WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 167 (17% in California); Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County,
Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 267 (1988) (38% among contested adjudications and 11.5% among uncontested cases in Montgomery County, Maryland); McGraw et aI., supra note 202, at 473 (16% in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 362 (1987) (30% received more than $1 per year
alimony in New Haven County, Connecticut); Barbara R. Rowe & Alice M. Morrow, The Economic
Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten or More Years of Marriage, 24 WU.lAMETIE L. REv.
463, 476 (1988) (28% in Oregon); Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory
Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 85 (1986) (7% in Vermont).
204. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS.
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Bureau reported that the average amount of a1imony received by women
in 1978 was $2,850205 The figure went to $3,733 in 1985, a decrease
when adjustments for inflation were ca1culated.206 The use of broad discretionary standards for setting a1imony permitted judges a wide range in
setting a1imony and resulted in low awards.207 Decisions and commentary
from the era also reflect negative stereotypes about women that may
have influenced both the scarcity and the meagerness of awards.20s
All of these circumstances--exclusion of needy husbands, exclusion
of fmancially needy women who were not deemed "innocent," the imprecision of fmdings of guilt and innocence, and the reluctance to award
any or adequate alimony in a vast majority of cases-undermined the
moral power of alimony in fault-based divorce and hurt women, and,
particularly, children.209 Despite the language in statutes, which suggested
spouses would be accountable for misconduct in marriage and that virtuous wives could count on a lifetime of support, the application of these
laws did little to reinforce those messages. On the contrary, lawyers
counseling husbands considering divorce in the fault era could assure clients that they could avoid responsibility for dependent spouses by urging
SERIES P-23 No. 112, CHiLD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, at 9 (1981). This report was the first report in which the Census Bureau reported data from a survey specifically designed to obtain data on
child support and alimony. See id. at 1.

205. See id.
206. See BUREAU OF

THE CENSUS, supra note 203, at 7. For other studies of amounts of alimony awarded at divorce see ALAsKA WOMEN'S COMMISSION, supra note 203 (median $500/month);
WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 171 (median $21O/month); Bell, supra note 203, at 286 (mean monthly
award ranged from $366.67 for marriages of 6-10 years to $650.88 for marriages over 15 years).
207. See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1106-09
(1989).
208.
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of secured indolence. It should not be
suffered to convert a host of physically and mentally competent young women into an army
of alimony drones, who neither toil nor spin, and become a drain on society and a menace to
themselves.
Samuel H. Hofstadter & Shirley R. Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 J. FAM. L. 51, 55 (1967).
We do not construe the marriage status, once achieved, as conferring on the former wife of a
ship-wrecked marriage the right to live a life of veritable ease with no effort and little incentive on her part to apply such talent as she may possess to making her own way.
Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1955); see also Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
209. Studies have documented the decline in standard of living of custodial parents-predominantly mothers-and children after divorce. See, e.g., DIANE DODSON & JOAN ENTMACHER, WOMEN'S
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, REPORT CARD ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDBUNBS 32 tbI. 4-E (1994); ELEA·
NOR E. MACCOBY BT AL, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 126-30,
257-62 (1992) (identifying a decline in standard of living experienced by custodial parents and children after divorce).
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an interpretation of facts that shifted or shared blame for the disintegration of the marriage.
The husband could be further reassured that, even if the judge found
the husband "guilty" and the wife "innocent," the chances of being ordered to pay substantial alimony were small. For similar reasons, that
same lawyer, counseling an "innocent" wife, could do little to assure
that woman that her commitment to her marriage would result in fmancial support following divorce. Therefore, the moral force of alimony law
in the fault era was very weak.

C.

Custody in the Fault Era

According to some commentators, modem custody law is another
area of family law in which the relevance of moral judgments has been
deemphasized in the no-fault era.210 However, an examination of custody
law in the fault era reveals a similar preoccupation with sexual conduct
as the primary focus of moral inquiry. As a result of this preoccupation,
discussions of right and wrong in custody cases were narrowly conceived
in the fault-era and often did not focus on behavior that was most relevant to parental fitness and protection of children.
A particularly striking example of fault-era courts' tendency to view
sexual conduct as the sole measure of morality is found in a 1962 New
York custody decision.211 In that case, the court approved a trial court's
judgment denying custody to a mother based on her extramarital affair
and described the court's role in enforcing morality:
It therefore has devolved upon the courts to establish the moral standards to be followed by persons to whom is entrusted the care and custody of children. And
never has there been a greater need for the courts to maintain a high level of moral
conduct than exists today. This court intends to give more than lip service to the
principle that the fabric of our society is composed of the family unit and when the
family unit is damaged, the fabric of society suffers. Our courts will continue to insist upon a high level of moral conduct . . . and will never succumb to the
'Hollywood' type of morality so popular today ....212

The emphasis on sexual conduct in fault-era custody cases may be
grounded in the historical tendency to stereotype and idealize women in
custody law.213 Maternal fitness in custody cases was evaluated against
210. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1528 (citing Carol S. Bruch, Forms of Exclusion in Child
Custody Law, 7 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 339, 341-42 (1986)).
211. See In re Anonymous, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1962).
212. Id.
213. This discussion is based, in part, on Jane C. Murphy, Legal/mages of Motherhood: Con-
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the stereotype of the ideal mother who was married, stayed at home, and
was, most importantly, both heterosexual and monogamous.214
Through the early nineteenth century in this country, fathers almost
invariably were awarded custody of their children upon divorce or separation.2lS Consistent with women's general loss of legal status and power
upon marriage,216 mothers had neither rights nor access to their children
if they did not live with the father. 217 As Blackstone wrote, "[AJ mother,
as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect. "218 A
maternal, or "tender years," presumption had replaced the paternal preference by the middle of the twentieth century.219 The presumption provided that unless mothers were unfit, they should have custody of their
children, particularly those under age five. 220 This presumption was
grounded in the view that women's natural disposition toward nurturing
made them the preferred caretakers.221
Even under a system in which the maternal presumption was the
rule in all fIfty states, courts generally deprived the mother of custody if
she was believed to be promiscuous.222 Reviewing the state of custody
flicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688,
693-696 (1998).
214. Mothers had neither the legal nor the economic means to raise their children unless they
were married to the fathers. The state regarded children as the father's property, subject to his control both during the marriage and after its dissolution. See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 181-82 (1916).
215. See GROSSBERG, supra note 132, at 235; sUZANNE RAMOS, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF CHILD
CUSTODY 32 (1979). For an examination of custody law in an earlier period of history see MARY
ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN
THE UNITED STATES 1-47 (1994) (examining the treatment of children during colonial times as economic assets with "custody" granted through relationships established in indenture contracts or
apprenticeships).
216. See WOMEN AND THE LAW § 3A.02[l]-[2] (Carol H. Lefcourt & Jane Campbell Moriarty
eds., 1996).
217. Mothers had neither the legal nor the economic means to raise their children unless they
were married to the fathers. The state regarded children as the father's property, subject to his control both during the marriage and after its dissolution. See Pound, supra note 214, at 181-82 (1916).
218. BLACKSTONE, supra note 146, at 441.
219. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1523, 1536 (1994). Others have described the maternal preference as taking root much earlier, between the mid-19th century and the
1920s. See MASON, supra note 215, at 118.
220. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 799 (indicating that, while few courts define "tender
years," the "presumption would clearly apply to a child under five years").
221. See Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 107, 114 (1978).
222. See Carl A. Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CON'TEMP. PROB. 720,
731 (1944) (concluding that generally, custody will not be awarded to a parent who has been
"guilty" of adultery because it is "immoral conduct"); see also Robert J. Bregman, Custody
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law in 1967, Homer Clark noted that the most common cases involving
the "morals of the parties" involved a wife who had committed adultery
and that "other forms of immorality are rarely given much discussion."223 Even twenty years later, he found "[p]arental conduct raising
questions of sexual morality has produced more custody litigation than
any other types of conduct. "224 Thus, discussions of morality in custody
cases often arise in the context of one parent seeking to change or obtain
custody based on the sexual practices of their divorced or separated
spouse.225 These cases are characterized by the courts' assumption that
cohabitation or adultery renders a parent morally unfit for custody.226
Custody cases reviewing the sexual conduct of a parent are also
marked by a tendency to apply a dual standard when evaluating the
"moral fitness" of a mother as compared to a father. 227 The most typical
cases involve attempts to control the sexual behavior of a divorced or
separated mother seeking to gain or maintain custody.228 Courts have held
that the mother's cohabitation outside of marriage is itself harmful to the
children and warrants state intervention either through a change in cusAwards": Standards" Used When the Mother Has Been Guilty of Adultery or Alcoholism, 2 FAM. L.Q.
384, 387 (1968).
223. CLARK, supra note 126, at 586.
224. [d., at 803. Clark notes that this preoccupation with sexual morality in custody cases has
continued in some states in the no-fault era. See id. ("Notwithstanding contemporary changes in sexual mores [sic] sexual morality still generates strong emotions in the minds of judges which are reflected in their judgments either expressly or under the surface.").
225. See, e.g., Beasley v. Beasley, 160 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1964) (finding that while
nonmarital sexual conduct "does not, in and of itself, serve as an absolute bar" to giving custody to
the offending parent, nevertheless, a finding of adultery on the part of one parent constitutes an "adjudication of [that parent's] relative unfitness to have custody"); Taylor v. Taylor, 309 P.2d 508, 509
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (finding "that a mother who has taken her children into an adulterous
home ... has thereby shown her unfitness for custody"); Parker v. Parker, 158 A.2d 607, 610 (Md.
1960) (depriving an adulterous mother of custody despite her "confession of error and avowal of repentance"); Wilson v. Wilson, 590 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Mont. 1979) (finding, on balance, that the children in question would be better off with their father, rather than their adulterous mother, even
though he would have to employ child care); Morrissey v. Morrissey, 154 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Neb.
1967) ("Where a wife is found ... guilty of adultery, she is an unfit person as a matter of law to
have the care and custody of her minor child.... ").
226. In one of the most frequently cited "morality" custody cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that custody could be changed on the father's showing that the mother and children were
living with her boyfriend, though there was no showing that this arrangement was harmful to the
children. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424-26 (Ill. 1979). While the court made reference to
"the mental and emotional health of the children" it focused upon "the moral hazards" from cohabitation. See id.
227. See WOMEN AND TIlE LAW, supra note 216, at § 6.05[2].
228. See Murphy, supra note 213, at 199.
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tody229 or the imposition of restrictions on the mother's behavior as a
condition to her maintaining custody.230 Evidence demonstrating similar
paternal extramarital conduct often does not trigger the same punitive response against fathers. 231
The second category of custody and visitation cases in which courts
have traditionally engaged in explicit discussion of "morality" is cases
involving gay and lesbian parents.232 Until the 1980s, few homosexual
parents were successful in custody cases.233 Similar to cohabitation and
adultery cases, the language in these decisions focused on general concerns about "immoral" and "illicit" relationships rather than specific
harm to the children involved.234
Courts in the fault-era consistently labeled both mothers and fathers
actively engaged in homosexual relationships as poor moral examples for
229. See In re Marriage of Thompson & Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ill. 1983) (distinguishing Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (111. 1979), and granting custody to father who had committed adultery and cohabited with a girlfriend and his children); Melancon v. Bergeron, 598 So. 2d
694, 697, 699 (La. Ct App. 1992) (fmding that granting mother physical custody of the children was
an abuse of discretion because the mother had lived in "open concubinage" with her boyfriend for
over three years, with no intention of getting married, while the father had remarried and could provide a stable environment); Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91-92 (Va. 1977) (affIrming the trial
court's fmding that, solely by reason of her adulterous cohabitation, the mother was unfIt to be a
custodial parent).
230. See, e.g., ParriIlo v. ParriIlo, 554 A.2d 1043, 1045 (R.I. 1989) (fInding that the court
could prohibit a wife from spending the night with cohabitant in her house while her children were
present).
231. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589, 591-93 (Kan. 1978) (awarding custody to
the father because, among other reasons, the mother's fiancee had spent the night in her home, even
though the father lived with his girlfriend in a hotel room and had allowed his lover to stay there
while the children were present); Flournoy v. Flournoy, 392 So. 4d 1096, 1098-99 (La. Ct App.
1980) (awarding custody to the father even though both the father and mother engaged in adulterous
relations, reasoning that the father's affair was more "discreet" than the mother's); see also
DEBORAH L. RHODE. SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY (1997) (fault system in
custody hurts mothers because courts are generally harsher to women than men in cases of sexual
misconduct).
232. See, e.g.,1RA MARK ELLMAN ET AL.. FMoULY LAw: CASES. TEXT. PROBLEMS 636-38 (3d ed.
1998) (summarizing and discussing cases and commentary involving custody and visitation disputes
based upon sexual conduct of homosexual parents).
233. Twenty years ago, New York courts expressed the view that homosexual relationships
were considered "clandestine deviate conduct" In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854, 860 (Sup. Ct
1976).
234. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 45 (Ct App. 1975) (holding that residence
in a homosexual household is detrimental to children and contrary to their best interests); Towend v.
Towend, No. 639, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 6193, at *8-10 (Ohio Ct App. Sept 30, 1976) (concluding trial court's preoccupation with the sexual techniques of lesbians was relevant to the direct adverse effect upon children of homosexual activity). But see Nadler v. Superior Ct, 255 Cal. App. 2d
523, 525 (Ct App. 1967) (holding that it is the duty of the trial court to exercise its discretion as to
how the welfare of the child will be affected by a parent's homosexuality).

1154

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1111

their children.235 Until recently, judges deprived gay and lesbian parents
of custody, and in some cases visitation, despite evidence that children
might be hurt by being deprived of a parent's care236 and that gay parents
are as capable of competent and loving care as heterosexual parents.237
Thus, the discussion of morals in these cases did little to protect children.
As one commentator explained, the arguments against granting custody to
homosexual parents are limited to the ideas that "if gay parents have
custody, they will perform sex acts in front of the children; if gay parents have custody, the children will be harmed because of the immoral
environment. "238
The focus of moral discourse in the fault-era was on regulating sexual conduct within marriage. Litigants' right to get a divorce, financial
support, or access to their children was largely dependent on having engaged in sexual conduct consistent with trial judges' codes of behavior.
The courts gave less protection or attention to dependent members of
families created outside of marriage, families experiencing domestic violence, or children in need of support.
IV. THE

NEW MORAL DISCOURSE IN FAMILY LAW

Beginning in the 1970s, courts and legislatures began to implement
a series of changes in family law that reduced the role of fault and, consequently, the role of sexual misconduct in deciding who should be
granted a divorce. While fault based grounds for divorce continued to exist in most states even in the no-fault era,239 the adoption of no-fault in
all fIfty states by 1985 meant that the option of obtaining a divorce by
consent without collusion and perjury was available throughout the
country.24O
235. See N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobson v. Jacobson,
314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981); MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 963-69 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v.
Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1,5 (pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692-94 (Va. 1985). Gay
parents' visitation rights were limited in J.L.P. (H.) v. DJ.P', 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. App. Ct.
1982) and in Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). Some more recent
decisions have required a demonstrated nexus between harm to the child and the parent's sexual orientation. See infra note 459 and accompanying text.
236. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
237. See id. at 1216.
238. Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 11 U. DAY·
TON L. REv. 275, 329 (1986) (summarizing case law and commentary from the 1970s and 1980s).
239. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. LJ.
773, 816 (1996).
240. See JUDITH AltEEN. CASES AND MATERIAt.S ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 75 (Supp. 1995).

1999]

NEW LANGUAGE OF MORALITY IN FAMILY LAW

1155

Following the spread of no-fault grounds for divorce, a number of
other changes occurred in family law that shifted the emphasis in family
law from punishing adults for sexual infidelity to protecting children's
welfare. Although the no-fault revolution's first changes dealt with divorce grounds, no-fault also diminished the role of sexual misconduct in
deciding the terms of custody and visitation decisions. In its place, developments in custody law refmed the best interest standard to focus on factors that more directly bear on children's well-being.
Simultaneously, other developments in family law during the last
three decades have increased both the debate about who can marry and,
to some extent, the procedural requirements that encourage couples to reflect on the meaning of commitment prior to marriage. The behavior of
family members in ongoing families has also been subject to greater regulation when courts and legislatures reject principles of family autonomy
in favor of protecting women and children from family violence. Developments in the law during the last three decades have also increased legal protections for those largely left out of the moral vision of the fault
era, financially dependent unmarried cohabitants and children born
outside of marriage. Finally, the move in the late 1980s from a broad
discretionary standard for setting child support to fixed formulae represents an important step in protecting the economic well-being of children.
A. Access to Marriage
Over the last century, the regulation of access to marriage has been
marked by a steady decline in state interference. 241 Reviewing the
changes in regulation of marriage formation in this country and other
Western countries from 1800 to the mid 1980s, Mary Ann Glendon characterized the change as follows:
The picture is one of many small changes, unremarkable in themselves, but together signaling a major transition in the way modern legal systems intersect with
marriage behavior.
Viewed in their historical context, the apparently trifling changes . . • are the
culmination of a long series of events that, beginning around 1800, gradually freed
individuals from most constraints on their ability to marry or on their choice of
marriage partner.242
241. See MARy ANN GLENDON. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW. AND FAM·
ILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 35-36 (1989) [hereinafter GLENDON. TRANSFORMA·
TlON]; GLENDON, supra note 78, at 63-64.
242. GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 35. The history of regulation of marriage
in this country for African-Americans is quite different. Until the 1860s, because Black men and wo-
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Noting both a declining public health necessity and a growing recognition of a constitutionally-based right to marry, Glendon found that the
only remaining restrictions to marriage relate to age, polygamy, and incest, and that even in these areas, many marriage impediments "lack
teeth. "243
It is only within the last decade that family law has begun to reexamine the meaning of marriage and the law's role in it. This renewed interest in the meaning of marriage has resulted in legislative debate in
both state legislatures244 and Congress245 about moral issues surrounding
the decision to marry. Family law scholars have also devoted increased
attention to the religious and moral underpinnings of marriage.246

1. Who May Marry: Same Sex Marriage
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia,247 holding that Virginia's ban on interracial marriages violated the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.248 Loving has been viewed as both an example of the law's attempt
to further moral behavior and as the beginning of a retreat from regulation of who may marry.249 The moral message of Loving-that all people
should be treated as equals with dignity and respect-was a strong
one.250
men were considered slaves and had no legal rights, they were not permitted to marry. See JEAN KOH
PETERs, REPRESENTING CIllLDREN IN CIllLD PRoTECrIVE PROCEEDINGS: EnnCAL AND PRACTICAL DIMEN·
SIONS 243-45 (1997) (describing separate system of American family law for Blacks that "actively
thwarted their attempts to live together in conventional family households").
243. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 35.
244. See infra notes 275-77, 309 and accompanying text
245. See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying text
246. See infra notes 249, 271, 279-80 and accompanying text
247. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
248. See id. at 12.
249. See Robert A. Destro, Introduction, Symposium, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Vrrginia After Thirty Years, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1207, 1215-17 (1998).
250. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also Robert F. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the
Freedom to Marry, 29 OIllO ST. LJ. 358 (1968). Given the practices and values of the time, however, Loving's moral message of respect and dignity might be categorized as an attempt to legislate
the morality of aspiration rather than reflecting values that existed in the United States in the late
1960s. At the time of Loving, seventeen states had laws that prohibited interracial sexual relations
and interracial marriage. See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation
Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1190 n.8 (1966). In 1968, the year that interracial marriage became legal across the United States, a Gallup poll found that some 72 percent of
Americans still disapproved of such marriages, even if they were prepared to tolerate them. Although
public attitudes about interracial marriage have changed since 1967, discrimination against such
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However, given its emphasis on autonomy and privacy, Loving has
also been interpreted as marking the beginning of a significant retreat
from state regulation of who may marry.251 In the thirty years following
Loving, access to marriage has been an area to which legislators and
family law scholars have paid very little attention.252 Recently, however,
in a reaction to legislative and judicial consideration of proposals to legalize same sex marriage, moral discourse about the meaning of marriage
has emerged as a central aspect of the legal and policy debate on the
issue.253
While the constitutionality of state laws denying the right for same
sex couples to marry had been challenged from time to time in the past
few decades,254 the wide ranging debate about the meaning of marriage
did not begin until 1993.255 In that year, the Hawaii Supreme Court became the first state court in the nation to hold that its laws banning same
sex marriage were subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Hawaiian constitution's equal protection clause.256 The court further held that the law is
couples continues in the 1990s. See PAUL C. ROSENBLATT ET AL.. MULTIRACIAL COUPLES: BLACK AND
WHITE VOICES 6 (1995).
251. See WALTER O. WEYRAUCH ET AL.. CASES AND MATERIALS IN FAMILY LAw: LEGAL CON.
CEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSIllPS 489 (1994) (interpreting Loving as, among other things,
signaling "the increased autonomy of the parties [to the marriage] and the decline of state involve·
ment in marriage"); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Equality and Marriage, Presentation at Law and the
Politics of Marriage (Nov. 19-21, 1997) (arguing that Loving "sets the tone" for the Supreme
Court's family law jurisprudence, which emphasizes autonomy and individual rights); Robert F.
Drinan, American Laws Regulating the Formation of the Marriage Contract, 383 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POI.. & SOc. SCL 48, 49 (1969) (characterizing Loving as reflecting a "profound consensus" in the
UniJed States that the law should say "as little as possible about who should marry whom").
252. In the intervening years, the Supreme Court also invalidaJed a state law precluding the issuance of marriage licenses to people with unpaid child support obligations. See Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court also struck down a state regulation prohibiting inmate marriages in
the state's prisons. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Both decisions rested on the Loving
Court's holding that the "right to marry" is a fundamental due process right. See id. at 95; Zablocki,
434 U.S. at 386.
253. Universal prohibitions against same sex marriage are an exception (along with prohibitions on multiple and incestuous marriages) to modem American marriage law's avoidance of definitively restricting a person's ability to marry. See GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 4950. Same sex prohibitions exist because they are outside the scope of marriage. See id. at 49.
254. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). For a comprehensive list of judicial and attorney general opinions on the
legality of same sex marriage prior to the Hawaii case, see WILUAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D.
HUNTER. SEXUALITY. GENDER. AND THE LAw 803 n.f (1997). Although the plaintiffs in many of these
cases raised constitutional challenges, most courts failed to analyze the constitutional issue holding
that the definition of marriage precludes same sex unions. See id. at 803·04.
255. The debate began with a decision to deny a marriage license to two women that
culminated in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
256. See id. at 47. The Hawaii Supreme Court granted the state's subsequent motion for c1ari-
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presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state can show that the statute's sex based classification is justified by compelling interests and is
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the couple's rights.257
Baehr v. Lewin set off a broad debate about the meaning of marriage and commitment throughout the country. Much of the discussion at
the federal level occurred in the context of the congressional debate of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),z58 introduced in May, 1996.
DOMA provides a federal definition for the terms "marriage" and
"spouse" (for purposes of federal benefits) by specifying that marriage is
a union of a man and a woman, and that the term "spouse refers only to
a person of the opposite sex. "259 DOMA also specifies that states are not
required to give effect to same sex marriages under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.260 DOMA purportedly rests on Congress's power (in Art.
IV, §1) to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause.261
While some of the debate about the legislation focused on strictly
legal questions about constitutional or conflict of laws issues that were
raised by the legislation/62 much of it can be characterized as moral discourse focused on the law's role in promoting love and commitment and
defming families. Consider the following exchange between Congressman
Barney Frank and Congressman Henry Hyde during the May, 1996 debate in the House of Representatives on the legislation:
MR.

FRANK:

We are talking here about a desperate search for a political issue.263

fication and advised that the state had the burden, on remand, to show that the statute furthered a
compelling interest. See id. at 74. The trial court then ruled that the state had failed to sustain its
burden of proof and enjoined the state from denying an application for a marriage license solely because the applicants are of the same sex. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *16
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The case has been appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court. In April
1997, the Hawaii legislature voted to place on the November 1998 ballot a constitutional amendment
that would restrict marriage to persons of the opposite sex. The proposed amendment recognizes limited benefits (inheritance rights, the right to sue for wrongful death, insurance and state pension benefits) for gay and lesbian couples. The state filed a motion seeking to delay any decision until after
the balloting, but the high court denied the motion, clearing the way for oral argument.
257. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
258. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).

259. Id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See, e.g., The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 104th Congo 42-48 (1996) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago).
263. ANDREW SUll.IVAN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRo AND CON 225 (1997) (quoting from the
House debate on the Defense of Marriage Act).
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MR. HYDE: Political! ... There is no political gain. But there is a moral issue....
Nobody wants to talk about it We are forced to talk about it by the courts. . . .
Don't assume that people are doing this for political profit People don't think
that the traditional marriage ought to be demeaned or trivialized by same-sex unions. If two men want to love each other, go right ahead. If you want to solemnize
your love affair by some ceremony, create one. But don't take marriage, which for
centuries has been a union between man and woman, and certainly is in this country, and try to say that what you're doing is American.264
MR. FRANK: I guess my problem is this. There are plenty of people here who have
had marriages that have meant a great deal to them. I salute that. I don't for a minute understand how it demeans, and I would ask the gentleman to explain that to
me. The gentleman's marriage, the marriages of other members here are based on a
deep love, a bond between two people ... How does anything I do in which I express my feelings toward another demean the powerful bond of love and emotion
and respect of two other people?26S

When the debate moved to the Senate, legislators on both sides invoked morality in their debate:
SENATOR GRAMM: So here are the issues in very simple fashion. No. I, is there anything unique about the traditional family? For every moment of recorded history,
we have said yes. In every major religion in history ... . governments have recognized the traditional family as the foundation of prosperity and happiness, and in
democratic societies, as the foundation of freedom. Human beings have always
given traditional marriage a special sanction . . . . Are we so wise today that we
are ready to reject five thousand years of recorded history?266
SENATOR ROBB: ... Mr. President, I believe it is time for those of us who are not
homosexual to join the fight. A basic respect for human dignity-which gives us
the strength to reject racial, gender and religious intolerance-dictates that in
America we also eliminate discrimination against homosexuals. I believe that ending this discrimination is the last frontier in the ultimate fight for civil and human
rights ....
Ultimately, Mr. President, immorality flows from immoral choices. But if homosexuality is an inalienable characteristic, which cannot be altered by counseling
or Willpower, then moral objections to gay marriages do not appear to differ significantly from moral objections to interracial marriages.267

The bill was passed by Congress in September, 1996268 and signed by
President Clinton amidst great controversy.269
264. [d.
265. [d.
266. 142 CONGo REc. S10105-06 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
267. 142 CONGo REc. S10122 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Robb).
268. See The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
269. See Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1996, at A21; Todd S. Purdum, Gay Rights Group Attack Clinton on Midnight Signing,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 22; David Willman, Clinton Signs Marriage Act, Lauds GOP on
Health Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 22.
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Concern that a decision. to legalize same sex marriage in Hawaii
would lead to gay and lesbian couples travelling to Hawaii to marry and
then seeking recognition of those marriages in their home state also led
to widespread debate on this issue on the state level. Many constitutional
scholars contend that the "public policy exception" of the Full Faith and
Credit c1ause270 guarantees states the right to refuse to recognize a marriage sanctioned by another state.271 Despite the questionable need for
such legislation, as of 1998, legislators in twenty-nine states have enacted
bills to ensure nullification of same sex marriages performed in Hawaii. 272 The debate in these states has also focused on the morality of
same sex marriage and the meaning of commitment in marriage. These
debates have included the traditional "vocabulary of morals"273 and have
helped to clarify the moral underpinnings of various states' marriage
laws. For example, an extended legislative debate on a bill to prohibit
recognition of same sex marriages in Kentucky, included moral discourse
on both sides.274 The legislator sponsoring the bill based much of his testimony on Christian teachings, noting that "[t]raditional marriages have
been ordained by all major religions and every major civilization."275 Another legislator, opposing the bill, invoked the "Golden Rule" and
270. u.s. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (noting that
"the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a state to apply another state's law in violation of
its own legitimate public policy").
271. See Larry Kramer, Same·Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE LJ. 1965, 1971, 1975 (1997). Kramer believes the exception would permit states to refuse to recognize same sex marriages, but argues that it is unconstitutional. See id. at
1966. Some scholars have also argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require other
states to recognize same sex marriages performed in other states. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L REv. 1, 17 n.65 (1996); see
also Symposium, Interjurisdictional Marriage Recognition (Part II), 32 CREIGIITON L. REv. 1045
(1999); Sandra Cavazos, Comment, Harmful to None: Why California should Recognize Out-ol-State
Same·Sex Marriages Under Its Current Marital Choice of Law Rule, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 133
(1998); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1119 (1999).
272. According to a state-by-state survey conducted by the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, thirty states have enacted bills banning same sex marriage since 1995. They are: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti Same Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S.,
December 1998 (last modified Dec. 1998) <http://www.ngltf.orgldownloadslmarriageI298.gif>; see
also Philip L. Bartlett, Recent Legislation: Same Sex Marriage, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 581 (1999).
273. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, supra note I, at 505.
274. See, e.g., infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text
275. Joseph Gerth, 1998 Kentucky General Assembly; Bill Opposing Gay Marriage Clears,
COURIER-JOURNAL, March 4, 1998, at 01A (quoting Rep. Sheldon Baugh).
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"Judeo-Christian tradition" to urge that Kentucky courts respect the
choices of those in sister states.276 Similar debates on same sex marriage
have occurred across the country.277
The debate among family law scholars about same sex marriage has
also reawakened discourse about the meaning of marriage and the law's
role in regulating access to marriage. A significant part of the debate has
focused on moral questions. One scholar asked "What are the costs, in
terms of pain and suffering, to children of couples married in Hawaii?
How does the legal status of marriage change the commitments of the
partners to each other? How does marriage reinforce love, honor and the
responsibility one feels for one's partner?"278 Many of these scholars, either advocating or opposing same-sex marriage, do so on both legal279
and moral grounds.280 Moral arguments examine the meaning of lifetime
love and commitment in marriage and stress the value and importance of
the institution of marriage.281
2.

Pre-Marital Procedures: Covenants and Counseling

Until recently, family law has done little to reexamine or alter the
longstanding formal prerequisites to marriage. 282 One method states283
276. [d. (quoting Rep. Michael Bowling).
277. See, e.g., Washington Bans Gay Marriage, Cm. TRlB., Feb. 8, 1998, at A7.
278. Seth F. Kreimer, Territoriality and Moral Dissensus: Thoughts on Abortion, Slavery, Gay
Marriage and Family Values, 16 QUINNlPIAC L. REv. 161 (1997).
279. See, e.g., Symposium, Constructing Family, Constructing Chonge: Shifting Legal Perspectives on Same-Sex Relationships, 7 TEMP. POL & CIV. Rrs. L. REv. 245 (1998); Claudia A.
Lewis, Note, From This Day Fonvard: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97
YALE LJ. 1783, 1784 (1988) (arguing that marriage allows individuals to make a public, intimate
commitment that is recognized by the larger community).
280. See, e.g., WILUAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CMLIZED COMMITMENT 4 (1996) (arguing that advocates for same sex marriage "valorize" the meaning of commitment in marriage); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse
on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. LJ. 1871, 1877 (1997) (arguing that the shift in priorities among many gays and lesbians from tolerance to acceptance requires
strategies and may require focusing on gay couples' need for the shared goal of love and commitment); Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 82 CORNELL
L. REv. 572, 582 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMIThIENI' (1997) and examining the meaning of commitment in marriage and arguing that access to legal marriage will strengthen gay people's commitment
to each other and reinforce their family ties to the ultimate benefit not only of themselves but the
community).
281. See Leonard, supra note 280, at 582.
282. Jana Singer has also characterized the changes in the regulation of premarital requirements as "minor" over the past two decades. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1469.
283. Regulation of access to marriage, like most areas of family law, has traditionally been an
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have used to regulate marriage formation are requirements that couples
obtain a license prior to marriage and participate in a formal ceremony.284
Every state requires parties to obtain a license before marriage.285 In order to obtain a license, parties to the marriage must provide information
that demonstrates their eligibility to marry: age, relationship, if any, between the prospective spouses and prior marriages. 286 Many states also
require a brief waiting period and some kind of medical test. 287
A formal ceremony solemnizing the marriage is also provided for in
all states' statutes.288 These statutes authorize various religious and civic
officers to perform marriages, but generally do not require any particular
form or location for the ceremony.289 Although laws regarding licensure
and solemnization of marriage have always been the subject of secular
state control in this country, these laws are directly traceable to the ecclesiastical courts and canon law of medieval Europe and England.290
Thus, while these requirements have many secular goals-record keeping, public health, prevention of fraud-they were also grounded in
moral concerns such as preventing sexual relationships among family
members and preserving parental authority.291 The state has an impact on
the level of moral discourse to the extent to which it regulates marriage
formation.
The force -of these statutes governing access to marriage has been
significantly eroded over the last century. State policies in favor of upholding marriage have led to decisions that generally validate marriages
where there is an absence of a license or an improper license. 292 Addiarea of regulation left to each state. See Michael Grossberg, Crossing Boundaries: Nineteenth·
Century Domestic Relations Law and the Merger of Family and Legal History, 1985 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 799, 819 (1985). Cases establishing a right to marry, however, have been interpreted as limiting states' power to impose barriers to marriage. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
284. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 34 (stating that license and solemnization laws exist
throughout the country).
285. See id. Some states have carved out exceptions to the licensing requirement. See id. at
34-35. Additionally, the licensing and solemnization requirements do not preclude the formation of a
marriage without a license and ceremony in the thirteen states and the District of Columbia that recognize common law marriage. See id. at 45-47 & n.11.
286. See id. at 35.
287. See id. at 36.
288. See id. at 37.
289. The only exception is West Vrrginia. See W. VA. CODE § 48-1-12c (1980).
290. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 31; SWISHER ET AL., supra note 127, at 5.
291. See CLARK, supra note 126, at 21-31 (describing the origins of the justifications for the
regulation of entry into marriage as both civil and religious).
292. See F.M. English, Annotation, Validity of Solemnized Marriage as Affected by Absence of
License Required by Statute, 61 A.L.R. 2d 847 (1958). In some states, like New York, the statute
provides expressly that lack of a license will not invalidate a ceremonial marriage. See N.Y. DaM.
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tionally, although common law marriage is only recognized in twelve
states and the District of Columbia,293 large numbers of informal marriages are validated because conflict of laws rules require a state to recognize a common law marriage if valid where formed. 294
Recently, this trend toward liberalizing enforcement of pre-marital
procedures has been slowed by the consideration and, in some cases, enactment of new requirements. While many states have considered the
possibility of reinstating fault grounds as a way of reducing the number
of divorces,295 some legislators have concluded that another method of
encouraging commitment between married couples is to encourage
greater reflection before marrying.296
States have considered a variety of proposals designed to encourage
couples to approach marriage as a lifetime commitment and enter into it
more cautiously. The legislation that has received the most attention is
the covenant marriage laws Louisiana enacted in June, 1997.297 This statute creates a new class of marriage, a "covenant marriage," defmed as a
union between "one male and one female who understand and agree that
the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship. "298 The couple must
make the commitment to a more permanent marriage knowingly299 by
signing a Declaration of Intent.300 This declaration cannot be executed
until after pre-marital counseling by a religious or secular marriage counselor.30 ) The content of the counseling must include discussion of the purpose of marriage and the commitment each individual makes to the
other.302
Since the adoption of Louisiana's statute,303 several other states have
considered bills that would give couples contemplating marriage a covenant marriage option.304 During the 1997-98 legislative session, more than
REI.. LAw § 25 (McKinney 1988).
293. See CLARK, supra note 126.
294. See ALBERT A EHRENZWE1G. A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 380 (1962).
295. See discussion infra Part m.C.1.b.
296. See, e.g., Legislating Marriage and Divorce, 5 STATE CAPITOLS REP. 30 (1997).
297. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1999). The statute also focuses on divorce
grounds, providing for an alternative to no-fault divorce.
298. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West Supp. 1999).
299. See id. § 9-273(A)(I).
300. See id. § 9-272(B).
301. See id. § 9-273(A)(2)(a).

302. See id.
303. As of March, 1998, 400 couples have opted for the "high-test" marriage in Louisiana.
See Ervin Dyer, Legislature Taking Interest in Marriage, PITT. POST-GAZETIE, Mar. 27, 1998, at 4.

304. See id.

1164

UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1111

a third of the other state legislatures proposed counseling requirements,
divorce waiting periods, or abuse prevention training.305 While many of
the legislators were very likely motivated by political rather than moral
considerations, these proposed reforms have resulted in a meaningful debate about the law's role in regulating access to marriage.306 Much of the
debate turns on issues relating to the moral justification for such legislation.307 The debates focus attention on the nature of the marriage commitment and the importance of promoting strong marriages to protect children.30g In Connecticut, a legislator supporting a bill that would require
engaged couples under 30 to complete ten hours of premarital counseling
debated its importance by invoking both the costs to the state of failed
marriages and the trauma to couples and children of such marriages.309
Modeled on a premarital counseling program developed by the Catholic
Church, the legislation also emphasizes the need for couples to reflect on
the responsibilities of marriage.310
The idea of imposing more hurdles on the front end of the marital
commitment has also received more attention from family law scholars
and policymakers.311 As William Galston commented in urging interventions to slow the rate of divorce:
It is stunning how much time public education spends on sex while failing to discuss marriage in any sustained manner . . . . These educational efforts should be
reinforced by the law. In most states it is much harder to get a driver's license than
305. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES. 1998 "COVENANT MARRIAGE" LEG.
ISLATION (1998) [hereinafter NCSL]; see also Dyer, supra note 303, at 4.
306. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text; see generally Jay Macke, Note, Of Covenants and Conflicts-When "I Do" Means More Than It Used to, But Less Than You Thought, 59
Omo ST. L1. 1377 (1998) (discussing the policy debates surrounding covenant marriage and no-fault
reform); Gary H. Nichols, Note, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment,
29 U. MEM. L. REv. 397 (1999); Rebecca E. Silberbogen, Note, Does the Dissolution of Covenant
Marriages Mirror Common Law England's Subordination of Women?, 5 WM. & MARy J. WOMEN &
1. 207 (1998) (comparing and contrasting covenant marriage with marriage in Tudor and Stuart periods of English history as they affect the subordination of women).
307. Compare Lynne Marie Kohn, Covenant Marriage Endorses Lifetime Vows, VIRGINIANPiLOT & THE LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 21, 1998, at B8 with Linda Valdez, Legislating Marriage An Insult
to Human Relationships, ARIz. REFUBuC, Feb. 20, 1998, at B4. See Katherine Shaw Spaht & Ashton
Applewhite, Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage' Be a Good Idea for America? Opposing Views,
WASH. TIMES, Oct 6, 1997, at 24.
308. See supra note 307 and accompanying text
309. See Daniela Altimari & Rita A. Niro, A Marriage Proposal: Counseling Precedes a Walk
Down the Aisle, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 17, 1997, at AI.
310. See id.
311. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573,
1594-99 (1994) (book review) (arguing that the use of covenant may be a way to strengthen marriage without reverting to traditional roles); Galston, supra note 7, at 21.
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a marriage license. At a minimum, each state should impose a reasonable waiting
period (at least one month, but preferably three) and require couples to show that
they have completed a program of counseling (religious or secular) preparing them
for marriage.312

Hoth legislative debates and scholarly commentary have hegun to reexamine the institution of marriage during the 1990s. No major legislative
reforms have yet occurred. However, the law's role in regulating who
shall marry and what procedures should be followed before marriage has
been explored in ways that may lead to a more coherent understanding of
the role of marriage in ensuring commitment to children.
B.

Reinforcing Responsibilities and Commitments Within Families

1. Family Violence
a.

Eroding the Doctrine of Family Autonomy

One of the most deeply embedded principles in American family
law is the principle of family autonomy, which limits the state's intervention in the affairs of the intact family.313 A variety of justifications have
been offered to support this limit on state intervention in family affairs.
These include a reluctance to interfere with the husband's authority,314
concern about courts' abilities to fashion and enforce appropriate remedies for intrafamily disputes,315 a belief that the adversarial process will
aggravate rather than resolve family conflicts316 and, perhaps the most entrenched, that families must be ensured privacy to flourish.317 Except in
extreme cases, the principle of family autonomy has been invoked to justify courts' refusals to provide a direct remedy for f'mancially neglected
spouses,318 to resolve a dispute between parents about their children's ed312. Galston, supra note 7, at 21.
313. The right of privacy has a constitutional dimension going back to the early 20th century.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
314. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAw 257 (1998);
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLmCS
OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 155-56 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
315. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRiNIG, AN INvITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRiNCI·
PLES, PROCESS AND PERsPECTIVES 172-74 (1996).

316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (denying wife's action
to obligate husband to provide suitable maintenance and finding that "[t]he living standards of a
family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the
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ucation,3I9 or to alter the traditional gendered roles in marriage.320
This doctrine has been criticized because it reinforces patriarchal
family relationships and leaves women and children vulnerable.321 Despite this critique, the principle of non-interference in family life to protect the welfare of a dependent spouse is still strong today.322 However,
the doctrine of family autonomy has eroded in the last thirty years. 323
These exceptions have resulted in increased state regulation of the intact
family to protect vulnerable family members from abuse. 324 An examination of the law's role in enforcing prenuptial agreements and punishing
perpetrators of family violence reveals that this is an area in which both
the language and content of the law furthers the core value of protecting
vulnerable family members.325
husband's attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said
in his behalf"); Commonwealth v. George, 56 A.2d 228, 231 (pa. 1948) (denying wife's claim for
support and stating that the statute authorizing a support order was not intended to make the court a
"sounding board for domestic fmancial disagreements nor a board of arbitration to determine the extent to which a husband is required to recognize the budget suggested by the wife ..."). But see
Miller v. Miller, 30 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Mich. 1948) (holding that when "there is great discrepancy
between a husband's large income and the very small and insignificant amount he is willing to pay
[his wife] for her maintenance and support, the court is justified in fmding that the acts of the husband constitute non-support and extreme cruelty").
319. See Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (Ala. 1958) (refusing to enforce a prenuptial agreement providing that child will be raised in father's religion).
320. See Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (B.D. Mich. 1940) (refusing to enforce an agreement between husband and wife, which provided that wife would pay the husband S300 per week to
quit his job so he would travel with her).
321. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION. EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW 279 (1990) ("Within a sphere cordoned off as 'private,' removed from state intervention, family members remain individuals who have or who lack rights to appeal to the state ...•
The law thus helped to shield from view the governmental refusal to see some kinds of power or
abuse as warranting public restraint. ").
322. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mathiasen, 268 Cal. Rptr. 895, 897 (1990) (invalidating an
agreement between husband and wife to share equally in support expenses during their marriage).
323. These developments are evidence that the trend Carl Schneider identified in 1994 toward
greater non-interference by the state in the family has not taken hold. See Schneider, Marriage,
Morals, supra note 1, at 550.
324. See infra notes 332-46, 352-57 and accompanying text.
325. Contracts setting forth parties' marital duties and responsibilities have recently begun to
gain the approval of family law scholars and courts. Some early advocates of this kind of private ordering did so on theories based on the importance of reinforcing autonomy and individual rights in
families. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 329-30 (1982). More recently scholars have focused on the value of
these agreements to reinforce important marital obligations and strengthen the marital commitment.
See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage
Contract, 73 IND. LJ. 453, 464-65, 501-02 (1998) (advocating that couples should have options to
establish terms of matrimony, grounds for divorce and terms for dissolution); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 42-44, 79-90 (1990) (advo-
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b. New Laws: Reducing Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
i. Domestic Violence
Historically, the principle of family autonomy was used to justify
the state's non-interference in cases where one spouse or intimate partner
physically abused another. In one of the early cases holding that the negative effects of state intervention in the family outweigh the "evils" of a
husband's physical abuse of his wife, the court reasoned:
The violence complained of would without question have constituted a battery if
the subject of it had not been the defendant's wife. The question is how far that
fact affects the case.... Our conclusion is that family government is recognized
by law as being as complete in itself as the State government is in itself, and yet
subordinate to it; and that we will not interfere with or attempt to control it, in
favor of either husband or wife, unless in cases where permanent or malicious injury is inflicted or threatened, or the condition of the party is intolerable. For, however great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting
only temporary pain, they are not comparable with the evils which would result
from raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery
and the bed chamber.326

In the 1870s, the women's movement and temperance activists
called for legislation to eradicate wife abuse,327 and by the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, a husband no longer had a "right" to beat his
wife.328 Notwithstanding these legal changes, wife abuse continued to be
justified or ignored by the police, courts, and general public.329 This view
prevailed until the 1970s, when a coalition of feminists, legislators, academics, and advocates brought domestic violence to the public attention
eating the enforceability of agreements in which couples set forth marital obligations and conditions
under which they agree marriage could be dissolved).
326. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349, 350 (1868).
327. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1243, 1262 (1993) (citing Ellen C. Dubois &
Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century Femi·
nist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 31, 42 (Carole S.
Vance ed., 1984»; Elizabeth Pleck, Wife Beating in Nineteenth-Century America, in VlcnMOLOGY 60,
60-61 (1979).
328. However, recent scholarship has cast doubt on the long-held view that a common law
"rule of thumb" provided that a husband could beat his wife with a stick no bigger than his thumb.
See Henry Ansgar Kelly, Rule of Thumb and the Folklaw of the Husband's Stick, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC.
341, 341-42 (1994)..
329. See Murphy, supra note 327, at 1262 (citing EUZABE'I1I PLECK. DoMESTIC TYRANNY: THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POUCY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE

PREsENT (1987».
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once again. 330
Building on the work of feminist legal theory,33l new laws and policies aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence have been adopted
across the country over the last twenty years. The legal approaches taken
to protect battered women and control family violence have resulted in
significant changes in family law.332
New laws include statutes permitting or requiring that spousal abuse
be considered in custody and/or visitation decisions,333 and civil protection or restraining order statutes.334 Both of these types of statutory reforms provide protection to both adult victims and their children. Evaluating a parent's fitness by considering past acts of violence to other
family members results in decisions that are more likely to protect children than decisions that discount or disregard spousal abuse.335 Civil pro330. See generally SUSAN SCHECIITER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUG·
GLES OF TIlE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982) (discussing the early days of the battered women's movement); Kathleen J. Tierney, The Battered Women's Movement and the Creation of the
Wife Beating Problem, 29 Soc. PROBS. 207 (1982) (discussing the social movement to combat wife
beating).
331. Feminist scholars illuminated the dynamics of power and gender and have developed legal theories that reflect and value women's experiences. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MAcKiNNON, FEMI·
NISM UNMODIAED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw (1987); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND TIlE POWER
OF LAW (1989). Feminist theory helped other scholars and practitioners to recognize that women's
experience of violence in their homes and in their relationships is critical to an understanding of women's oppression. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MiCH. L. REv. I, 1-10 (1991).
332. Changes in criminal laws including creating new criminal sanctions to fit the patterns of
domestic violence and encouraging the enforcement of existing criminal sanctions in domestic situations have also developed in the last decade. See Bonnie J. Campbell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, A Message from Violence Against Women Office Director, Bonnie J. Campbell, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WoMEN ACT NEWS, July 1996 (last modified July 2, 1996) <http://www.usdoj.gov/vawo/newsletter/
bjc796.htm>. See generally Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1528-51 (1993) (discussing new state and federal responses to domestic
violence).
333. See infra notes 405-14 and accompanying text.
334. All 50 states and the District of Columbia now have some form of protection order statute. See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, C1VIt. PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLA.
TION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 7 (1990). Since its publication, Delaware and
Arkansas have enacted civil protection order statutes. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-101 to 9-15-302
(Michie 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041-48 (protection from abuse proceedings); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit 13, § 701(A)-71I(A) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (child protection from domestic violence act).
Statutes typically provide for eviction of the abuser from the home, temporary child custody, and a
prohibition against continued abuse. Some state statutes provide for monetary relief for the duration
of the order. The duration of the order varies with each state and ranges from 60 days to 3 years.
See FINN & COLSON, supra note 334, at 33 & Fig. 9; see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff,
Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1085-87 (1993).
335. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 334, at 961-65.
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tection orders can provide abused women and their children with a quick
and easily accessible remedy that provides housing, fmancial relief, and
an order for custody.336 While there is some controversy about the effectiveness of such orders in cases involving severe violence,337 most advocates and scholars agree that, under many circumstances, these statutes
have improved the lives of women and children.338
During the same period, Congress followed the states in legislating
to reduce domestic violence. In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), which, among other things, makes certain
acts of domestic violence federal crimes,339 provides a civil rights remedy
for victims of domestic violence,340 and provides federal funding for enhanced state services for victims of domestic violence.341 Along with
mandating interstate enforcement of protective orders,342 establishing a
National Domestic Violence Hotline,343 and providing training for state
and federal judges,344 the Violence Against Women Act enables victims
of gender-motivated crimes to sue their attackers in federal court for violating their civil rights. 345 The legislation also begins to address the needs
of undocumented immigrant women who are abused by their husbands.346
ii.

Child Abuse

Historically, the government was less reluctant to interfere in the
family to protect children. from abuse and neglect.347 The juvenile court
336. See id. at 910-1044.
337. See, e.g., Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction to Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 1, 1-5 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
338. See LENORE E. WALKER. THE BATTERED WOMAN 210-12 (1979); Molly Chaudhiri &
Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Ballered Women's Experience with Male Violence and
Legal Process, in DoMESTIC VIOLENCE 227, 245-47 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992);
Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Ballered Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, 4 WOMEN
& POI.., 13, 19-20 (Fall 1984) (concluding that protection orders are most effective in curtailing
abuse when the level of violence is not severe); Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for
Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 (1984).
339. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2262 (West Supp. 1998).
340. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995).
341. See id. § 3796gg-hh, § 13971 (West 1995 and Supp. 1998).
342. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (West Supp. 1998).
343. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10416 (West 1995).
344. See id. § 13991.
345. See id. § 13981.
346. See Leslye E. Orloff et aI., With No Place to Tum: Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 324-25 (1995).
347. The early child welfare programs in this country were modeled on England's Elizabethan
Poor Law, which separated the children of the poor from their families. See Act for Relief of the
Poor,43 Eliz., ch.2 § 1 (1601 Eng.). Massachusetts, Connecticut, and VIrginia, for example, specifi-
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system in the United States was created at the beginning of the 20th century to assist the State acting as parens patriae, or as "father. "348 Efforts
to protect children from abusive or neglectful caretakers have taken many
forms, from the creation of large orphanages and foundling homes to the
relocation of children from the city to the country.349 Eventually, most jurisdictions settled on the present day foster care system as a way to protect children whose families apparently could not care for them.350 However, juvenile courts have been the subject of criticism and calls for
reform since they were ftrst created.351
Recent reform efforts have emphasized a greater commitment to
protecting children over the rights of parents. These reforms have included development of state laws that mandate compiling records of
child abuse352 and reporting of abuse.353 Most recently, the federal standards for governing removal of children have shifted the emphasis from
reuniftcation with parents to permanency planning for children. In November of 1997, President Clinton signe~ into law the Adoption and Safe
cally authorized magistrates to "bind out" or indenture children of the poor over parental objections.
HOMER FOLKS. THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED. AND DEUNQUENT CIflLDREN 28-29, 96-97 (Arno
Press and The New York Times 1971) (1900). Criminal laws punishing parental child abuse or neglect also have a long history in this country. See generally LINDA GORDON. HEROES OF THEIR OWN
LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988) (including an historical review of
records of the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children from 1880-1910); see
also A. Schwartz & H.L. Hirsh, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Survey of the Law, in CHn.D ABUSE 31
(A. Carmi & H. Zimrin eds., 1984) (examining criminal punishment of child abuse within the last
two centuries). Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have child abuse statutes that require
an act of commission, an act which directly inflicts harm on the child. All but twelve states also
have child abuse laws that punish omissions, the 'failure to protect' laws. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19
HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 229, 236-38 (1996).
348. See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv.
1187, 1187-88, 1192-93 (1970).
349. See id. at 1207-12.
350. See ANTHONY M. PLArr. THE CIflLD SAVERS: THE lNvENnON OF DEUNQUENCY 46-74, 10136 (1969).
351. See id. at 152-63; Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile
Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. I, 17-18 (1992).
352. In 1995, investigations by child protective services (CPS) agencies in 50 states determined that over 1 million children were victims of substantiated or indicated child abuse and neglect.
CPS agencies investigated an estimated 2 million reports alleging the maltreatment of almost 3 million children. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.• NAT'L em. ON CIflLD ABUSE & NEG.
LECT. Child Maltreatment 1995: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System ix (1997).
353. See NATIONAL CLEARiNGHOUSE ON CIflLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS.• CIflLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTE SERIES No.1, REPoRTING LAWS: DEFINI.
TIONS OF CIllLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996) (compiling state reporting laws).
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Families ACt.354 States must now comply with this Act in order to receive
federal funds. 355 This statute seeks to avoid the harm that children experience from extended foster care placement.356 Under the Act, a state's receipt of federal funds is conditioned upon establishing procedures that
make child welfare bureaucracies move more quickly to rule out parents
as caretakers, making children available for adoption sooner.357
Much of the language in the debates supporting both child abuse
and domestic violence law reforms and the language of the laws themselves focuses on the public health and safety goals of these law reform
efforts.358 Considerable attention is also paid, however, to the moral imperative underlying family violence legislation. Consider, for example,
the following statement from the floor of Congress, which ties the issue
of prevention of violence against women to the themes of responsibility
and commitment to community:
354. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, III STAT. 2115.
355. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (West Supp. 1998).
356. See, e.g., RICHARD GEllES, THE BOOK OF DAVIS: How PREsERVING FAMILIES CAN COST
C1m.oREN'S LIVES (1996); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423,
423-24 (1983) (discussing the harm to children as a result of "foster care drift"). In fact, there is
much evidence that for those children who are removed, "foster care drift" continues today. A 1995
report found that
[o]ne in ten foster children remains in state care longer than 7.4 years. At least 40,600
foster children have been in care for five years or longer; another 51,300 have been in care
between three and five years. System kids, on average, live with three different families,
though ten or more placements is not uncommon.
Conna Craig, "What I Need is a Mom": The Welfare State Denies Homes to Thousands of Foster
Children, 73 POL'y REv. 41, 45 (1995); see also BEYOND RHEToRIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMlUES. FINAL REPoRT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN 288 (1991) ("In
1986, slightly fewer than 60% of children in foster care were either reunited with their families or
placed with a parent, relative, or other caregiver.").
357. Hearings to determine permanent placement of children removed from parents must now
begin no later than 12 months after a child enters foster care, a reduction from the former 18 month
limit. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(c) (West Supp. 1998). States must also move to terminate parental
rights when a child has been in foster care for 15 of the previous 22 months. See id. § 675(5)(e).
The extent to which the AFSA actually fulfills its promise of providing greater protection to children
is still an open question. See, e.g., M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637 (1999).
358. An impatience with the slow pace at which children move through the child welfare system encouraged legislators to develop such procedures even before the federal mandate. See, e.g.,
Act Concerning the Reporting, Investigation and Prosecution of Child Abuse and the Termination of
Parental Rights, 1996 Conn. Pub. Acts 246 (Reg. Sess.) (new Connecticut statute providing that a
child under the age of one year can be put up for adoption if a parent has not been in contact with
the child for sixty days). Some states have also recently passed legislation permitting removal of a
child at birth if a mother abuses drugs during her pregnancy. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 51A (West Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(l)(b) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 7oo1-1.3AI4.b (West Supp. 1998).
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Much of the problem is rooted in the erosion of personal responsibility, the breakdown of families, and the deterioration of community life. Each of us can contribute to the task of renewal. That is why lawmakers' insistence on sound policies
that protect and assist victims, law enforcers' steadfastness in punishing perpetrators, advocates' commitment to providing counsel and much needed services, and
health professionals' willingness to broaden their sphere of responsibility are so
heartening. Together, we can undertake the varied efforts required to tum this
threat around.359

Representative Schroeder, in protesting a last minute attempt to reduce
the appropriations under the bill, referred to the important role of government in strengthening families by making the home safe from violence:
Violence against men or violence against women in the home is wrong. Violence
against children in the home is wrong. Instead you see everybody now moving to
say that Government should back out of all of that and we should just again go
back; the home is totally off limits, and you can batter children, batter spouses, do
whatever.... but the most important thing is the home and the family, and if the
home and the family [are] the roots of violence, if the home and the family [are]
absolutely torn asunder, then you are never going to get off square one when it
comes to fighting crime.360

Scholars have also commented on the increased attention the law has
given in the last three decades to protecting family members from
abuse. 361 There is broad consensus among politicians, scholars and
policymakers that such developments are a healthy trend toward protecting vulnerable family members.362
2. Recognizing Commitments in Families Created Outside Marriage
In previous sections, this Article has dealt with changes in moral
discourse in areas where family law has traditionally focused moral attention: divorce, alimony, child custody and visitation. However, limiting
this discourse to these issues excludes many families created outside of
marriage from the moral vision in family law.363 Recent shifts in the law
359. 140 CONGo REe. Hl0688 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Price).
360. 140 CONGo REc. H5180 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
361. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401,
2435 (1995) ("[pJublic concern about child abuse and neglect has increased in the past generation");
see also Garrison, supra note 76, at 103 (noting in general that "the last three decades have witnessed a wave of new limitations on parental prerogatives" and citing the strengthening of child
abuse laws as one example).
362. See HERMA HILL KAy & MARTHA S. WESr. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 1192 (4th ed.
1996) (describing developments in research, scholarship and legislation that have "transfonned the
law into a protective tool for battered women" over the last 25 years).
363. Increasing numbers of children now face life in a single-parent family. In 1994, 27% of
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reveal a healthy trend toward increased attention to those who may be in
most need of the law's protection, children of unmarried cohabitants.
Historically, nonmarital cohabitation was considered deviant and
subje~t to criminal sanctions.364 Although criminal sanctions still exist,
prosecutions have been rare since the 1950s.365 Instead, until the 1980s,
the law tended to ignore couples who created families outside traditional
marriage.366 This meant little or no protection for the dependent partners
and children of such unions, either during the relationship or at its dissolution. Many commentators, however, attribute the law's indifference or
condemnation of informal families to the fact that such families have always been disproportionately headed by women367 who are poor368 and
non-white.369 As Mary Ann Glendon describes it:
Another large proportion of infonnal unions, especially earlier in the century, was
composed of persons who belonged to subcultures of the poor, or to racial and ethnic minorities for whom the legal structures of traditional marriage and divorce
were sometimes irrelevant and with whom the framers of such laws were rarely
concerned-groups ignoring and ignored by traditional family law.370
children under the age of 18 lived in a female-headed family, up from 12% in 1970. See ARLENE F.
SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENrs. MARCH 1994, at
viii-xii (1996).
364. See EDWIN POWERS. CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN EARLY MAsSACHUSETIS 1620-1692: A
DOCUMENTED HISrORY (1966).
365. While criminal prohibitions on cohabitation and fornication still exist in some states,
prosecutions for private, consensual acts are rare. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th
Cir. 1986). State laws imposing criminal sanctions for sodomy still exist in about half the states. See
Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Courts Go
in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. U. 997, 997
(1994).
366. See GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 254-55. Glendon points out that
under the traditional family law approach, the law "wavered between expressions of moral disapproval and covert compassionate remedies" with umnarried cohabitants, such remedies were put into
play only in the most "hardship" cases. [d. at 255.
367. See SALlJI'ER, supra note 363, at ix (stating that mothers are most often the custodians of
children in single parent families with 88% of children in single parent homes living with their
mothers); see also WORKING GROUP ON WELFARE REFoRM. FAMILY SUPPORT. AND INDEPENDENCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.• BACKGROUND PAPERS ON WELFARE REFoRM: CmLD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 3 (1994).
368. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD. WE THE POOR PEoPLE: WORK. POVERTY
AND WELFARE 54 (1997) (discussing the disproportionate number of female-headed households in the
overall poverty popUlation).
369. Among Black female-headed families, nearly 60% are below the poverty line. NATIONAL
REsOURCE COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S ClDLDREN?: CmLD CARE POUCY FOR THE 19905, at
27 fig. 2-9 (Cheryl D. Hayes et al. eds., 1990); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709 (1996) (tracing history of common
law marriage and finding that its abolition hurt poor, non-white women and children the most).
370. GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 253.
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While the last two decades have not seen significant change in the law
on common law marriage,371 there has been a significant movement toward extending the law's protection to individuals "who have become
dependent or suffered detriment over the course of a long relationship"372
and to children of those unions.373
Other commentators have observed this trend and recognized its
moral dimension. To some extent, Carl Schneider has recognized the increased moral discourse in the law of unmarried cohabitants in his singling out of contractarianism as a counter trend to the diminution of
moral discourse in family law.374 He notes, as examples of this counter
trend, courts' recent willingness to enforce contracts or imply contracts
between unmarried cohabitants.375 Mary Ann Glendon, while disapproving of many recent trends, sees the increased protection for unmarried
cohabitants, particularly the children of those unions, as appropriate:
Traditional family law rigorously policed the boundaries of the legitimate family. It
carefully regulated the conditions under which children born outside legal marriage
would be permitted to acquire rights in relation to their parents, especially the allimportant right of inheritance. As for couples who had not entered into formal
marriage, the law, for the most part, ignored them, or pretended to ignore them.376
Over time, the focus of the law relating to children born outside marriage has appropriately shifted from preoccupation with wealth and status to concern for the
children themselves. Not only have children of unwed parents been accorded substantially equal rights to support and derived benefits, the establishment of paternity (without which these rights would be meaningless) has everywhere been facilitated, both in law and through technological advances.377

Despite his overall concern with strengthening marriage, Milton Regan has also noted the moral imperative of protecting dependent partners
and children of unmarried cohabitants noting that "unmarried cohabitation . . . is widely accepted and raises important issues of responsibility
in intimate relationships. Failure to respond to the claims of cohabitants
371. See Bowman, supra note 369, at 740 (noting that ten states abolished common law marriage between 1921 and 1959, and only four have recognized it since that time).
372. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 288.
373. See Larry L. Bumpass et al., Cohabitation and the Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J.
MAR. & FAM. 913, 919 (1991).
374. See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note I, at 1832.
375. See id. at 1829-30 (recognizing that the areas of family law "susceptible to contractual
analysis" are areas in which the courts have had increased interest in moral analysis, but concluding
that contract law's emphasis on private ordering, among other reasons, will ultimately contribute to
the trend toward diminished moral discourse).
376. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 253.
377. [d. at 285. See also Krause, supra note 80, at 116-20.
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thus could undermine the relational ethic that family law should
reinforce. "378

c.

Family Dissolution
1. Access to Divorce
a.

What No-Fault Divorce Really Means

Before analyzing the moral implications of the shift to no-fault
grounds for divorce, further clarification of the way these new laws
changed divorce practice is helpful in understanding their impact. First,
even prior to widespread adoption of no-fault grounds, couples had obtained divorces by consent through collusion and, in some instances, perjured testimony.379 As courts and litigants became increasingly frustrated
with fitting the circumstances of the breakdown of their marriage into the
existing fault categories,380 mutually agreed upon fabricated testimony became commonplace.381 Thus, the "consent divorce disguised as fault divorce . . . had become a relatively common way of terminating a
marriage. "382
Second, the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce resulted in divorce on demand-an immediate right to file for divorce without waiting
and without the consent of the other spouse (divorce on demand) in only
a few states.383 In most states, a divorce without the consent of the other
spouse (unilateral divorce) cannot be granted unless the parties have been
separated for a minimum period of time ranging from six months to three
years. 384 A few states still do not permit unilateral divorce at al}.385 Additionally, in most states there are significant procedural barriers to ob378. REGAN. supra note 90, at 124.
379. See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 232.
380. See GLENDON, supra note 78, at 76 (contrasting U.S. and European treatment of divorce
law).
381. See HERBERT JACOB. SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAw IN THE
UNITED STATES (1988).
382. GLENDON, supra note 78, at 65.
383. See Ira Mark EHman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and
Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. Iu... L. REv. 719, 723 (1997).
384. See id. at 723.
385. At least three states require mutual consent and a separation agreement before a divorce
can be granted. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 to § 93-5-2 (1994); N.Y. DOM. REI.. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (1996).
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taining a no-fault divorce.386 Thus, the perception that the no-fault revolution has resulted in easy access to divorce is not true.
In enacting the first no-fault statute, California reformers never intended to eliminate fault or accountability from the divorce process:
We would underscore that this is not to say that we think immoral or reprehensible
conduct should be overlooked. Quite the contrary, the purpose of adopting the standard we suggest would be to permit-indeed to require-the Court to inquire into
the whole picture of the marriage. Misconduct would thus be completely relevant,
and could be completely explored.387

Indeed, the adoption of no-fault grounds did not eliminate the role
of fault in the laws governing access to divorce. 388 Fault continues to
playa role in custody, property and alimony issues in many states.389
An evaluation of the impact of no-fault divorce on the values of
commitment and responsibility to family members must also acknowledge that at least some of the goals underlying the adoption of no-fault
divorce have been accomplished. In addition to addressing concerns
about the integrity of the judicial system that resulted from the perjury
and collusion in the fault era,390 no-fault divorce was intended to reduce
the trauma of breakup on the family, particularly the children.39I Even if
they were delayed, divorces occurred with or without the availability of
no-fault grounds.392 The idea under no-fault was that the process of ob386. See Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J.
PuB. L. 123, 124 (1993).
387. 1966 Report By the Governor's Commission on the Family cited in JUDITH AREEN. CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 342 (1992).
388. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. Ll.
773, 778-80 (1996) (analyzing and categorizing each state's consideration of fault in alimony and
property decisions and finding that only twenty states can be categorized as "pure no-fault" in that
they exclude consideration of marital misconduct from alimony and marital property decisions unless
the misconduct has affected the property available or the fmancial need of a spouse); see also Peter
Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 292-300 (1997).
389. See Swisher, supra note 388, at 320 n.158.
390. See Olive M. Stone, Moral Judgments and Material Provision in Divorce, 3 FAM. LQ.
371, 371 (1969).
391. See HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 181
(1965) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
392. Furthermore, while the existence of no-fault grounds for divorce has certainly made getting a divorce easier, there is some question as to what role it has played in increasing the rate of
divorce in this country. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law Is Assailed in
Michigan, and Debate Heats up, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al (citing conflicting studies on contribution of no-fault divorce to increased divorce). Although the divorce rate accelerated after the
adoption of no-fault, it began rising sharply in 1965, before the implementation of no-fault. See
Cahn, supra note 1, at 250; see also Ellman & Lehr, supra note 383, at 724-32 (arguing that the law
is a "minor player" in affecting divorce rates and citing studies to demonstrate that divorce laws had
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taining a divorce should not further traumatize children already in emotional upheaval over their parent's break-up.393 As Professor Robert Levy,
a reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, stated in a report of the Commission endorsing no-fault divorce LTl 1965:
As debilitating as the existing hodgepodge of laws on divorce and marriage may be
for the lives of the participants, the destructive effect upon children is incalculable.
If the time for improvement and uniformity in this field were not at hand for the
sake of the marriage partners, it is surely at hand for the sake of the children.394

Although assessments of whether no-fault has achieved the goal of
reducing the trauma of divorce for children are mixed,395 there has been a
shift in the focus in divorce proceedings from an evaluation of the
adults' conduct to the children's well-being. This shift is reflected in the
many court-related programs that focus on children after divorce that
have developed since the adoption of no-fault396
b.
Fault Era

Continued Debate About the Morality of Divorce in the No-

The adoption of no-fault divorce did not end discourse and debate
about the impact of divorce grounds on commitments undertaken in marriage and the impact of divorce on children. To many commentators, the
moral message conveyed by the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce
was that couples can quickly and easily escape commitments of marriage.397 While no-fault grounds have made it easier to divorce, it is not
clear that the addition of no-fault grounds for divorce signaled a radical
a "weak correlation, if any" to the rise in divorce rates in the 1960s and 1970s); Dirk Johnson,
Campaign Aims to Put the "Fault" Back in Divorce: Several States Consider Efforts to Make Mar·
riages Harder to End, MORNING NEWS TRIB., Feb. 18, 1996, at G6 (quoting Professor Larry
Bumpass, a University of Wisconsin sociologist, as stating that no-fault divorce merely facilitates divorces by speeding up "those cases that were already coming down the pipeline"). Many scholars
and commentators argue that no-fault divorce laws were a reflection of other changes that contributed to the rise in the divorce rate more than they were a direct cause of increased divorce. See, e.g.,
Cahn, supra note I, at 250-51 (attributing the increase in divorce since the mid 19605 to a number
of factors including unhappiness of women in patriarchal marriages and their increased participation
in the workforce).
393. See HANDBOOK, supra note 391, at 181.
394. Id.
395. Compare Wardle, supra note 107, at 99-103 (finding that termination of marriage under
no-fault regime is still acrimonious) with JACOB, supra note 381, at 151 (discussing the movement
leading to no fault divorce and several commentators view's on the effects of those changes).
396. See infra notes 430-43 and accompanying text.
397. See generally Wardle, supra note 107.
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change in the moral discourse and vision in American divorce law.398
Scholars,399 legislators,400 and social scientists401 continue to debate these
issues.
A substantial part of the moral discourse about the law's role in divorce has occurred in debates about the wisdom of restoring the emphasis on fault in divorce. Some proposals call for the repeal of no-fault
grounds altogether. 402 One alternative proposal suggests longer waiting
periods for divorce everywhere,403 while others would allow couples who
are getting married to limit themselves to fault-based grounds for di398. This Section addresses grounds for divorce or other preconditions specifically tied 10 the
state's grant of a divorce. In marriages involving children or property, resolution of issues of alimony, child custody and support and marital property also continue 10 act as barriers to divorce. See
GLENDON. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 198-199 (discussing the traditional system's reliance
on private agreements "as the principal mechanism for adjusting economic and child-related disputes
upon divorce.•.. "). Traditional fault or a broader concept of marital misconduct continues to play
a role in these decisions.
399. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Morse, supra note 118, at 605;
Swisher, supra note 388, at 270-76. For a response 10 arguments made against no-fault divorce. see
Ellman & Lahr, supra note 383, at 719.
400. See Connie Koenenn, Legislatures Move to End No·Fault Divorces, SAN ANTONIO Ex.
PRESS-NEWS, Mar. 26, 1996 (claiming that Michigan, Idaho, Georgia, Iowa, Virginia, Washington,
Minnesota, llIinois, and Pennsylvania are considering laws that will make marriage and divorce more
difficult); Russ Pulliam, Real Reform for the Family, INDIANAPOUS NEWS, Feb. 14, 1996, at A8 (discussing proposals to reform the no-fault divorce laws in Indiana); see also H.B. 3751, 18th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1995) (proposing a one year waiting period and mandatory pre-divorce counseling
for couples with children because "it is often too easy for couples to obtain a 'no-fault' divorce").
Several states are considering bills that would repeal no-fault divorce in certain circumstances. See,
e.g., H.B. 1765, 143d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); H.B. 470, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(IDBiII File, Idaho 1996); S.B. 1842, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (ILBiII File, III.
1996); H.B. 911, 1996 Reg. Sess. (KYBiII File, Ky. 1996); H.B. 1975, 79th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 1995); H.B. 2562, 180th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (pa. 1995); H.B. 1188, 1996
Reg. Ses$. (Va. 1996); H.B. 2950, 54th Leg., 1996 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1996); H.B. 4416, 1996 Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 1996). Other states are considering imposing mandatory counseling or other impediments to divorce. See, e.g., H.B. 477, 19th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska 1996); S.B. 2265, 76th Gen.
Assembly, Reg. 2d Sess. (Iowa 1996) (enacted); S.B. 367, 410th Gen. Assembly 1996 Reg. Sess.
(Md. 1996).
401. See, e.g., COLLEEN LEAHY JOHNSON. Ex FAMILIA: GRANDPARENTS. PARENTS. AND CtDLDREN
ADJUST TO DIVORCE (1988); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD. THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1996); FRANK F.
FURSTENBERG. JR. & ANDREW J. CHERUN. DIVIDED FAMIUES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CIULDREN WHEN
PARENTS PART (1991); Paul R. Amato, Children's Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses, and
Empirical Support, 55 J. MAR. & FAM., 23, 23-28 (1993); R.T. Gill, Family Breakdown as Family
Policy, PuB. INT., Winter 1993, at 84.
402. See supra note 400 and accompanying text. Among the many legislative proposals to revise no-fault divorce grounds, Tennessee's proposal to completely eliminate no-fault grounds entirely
is the most extreme.
403. See William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PuB. INT., Summer 1996, at 22 (advocating a 5 year waiting period for all divorces with children.).
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vorce.404 A number of legal scholars have also pushed for fault to play a
more important role in issues attendant to divorce, such as alimony and
property distribution.405 These proposals are all grounded in the rhetoric
of strengthening families and protecting children.406
In response to these calls for a broadened role of fault in divorce.
some commentators have reexamined the moral bases for no-fault, particularly in cases involving domestic violence. These commentators argue
that no-fault divorce is necessary to protect women and children seeking
the quickest separation possible from violent spouses.407
While this debate has resulted in very little legislative change,408 it
has provided an opportunity for all participants in the development of
family law to rethink the goals, including moral goals, of marriage and
commitment. The debate has also lead to more creative thinking about
the law's role in strengthening families, particularly families with
404. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
405. See Swisher, supra note 388, at 296; Morse, supra note 118, at 625.
406. Some commentators have argued that these proposals are more pro-marriage than antidivorce: "I would never call this an anti-divorce movement. It's a marriage movement. The focus is
not to punish people who have divorces. It's to tell people that there is this extremely important
thing called marriage that needs a lot of support from education, religion, and public policy." Pia
Nordlinger, The Anti-Divorce Revolution, WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 2, 1998, at 25 (quoting Maggie
Gallagher describing the debate about marriage and divorce taking place "across the country, in
statehouses and church basements and living rooms").
407. See, e.g., Ellman & Lohr, supra note 383; see also Frank Furstenberg & Andrew Cherlin,
Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great Britain and the United States, 252
SCI. 1386 (1991) (reporting research findings that demonstrate that while divorce is generally harmful
to children, even more harmful is prolonged conflict). But see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 1.. REv.
1241, 1247 (1991) (arguing that immigrant women who are victims of domestic violence and who
are threatened with deportation may have difficulty meeting the current requirement that marriage be
terminated for good cause if divorce was obtained on no-fault grounds); Martha Heller, supra note
200, at 282 (evaluating the impact of recent movement to reinstate fault-based divorce has on domestic violence and finding fault-based systems would be a further obstacle to victims' attempts to
divorce).
408. See NCSL, supra note 305. In one state, the effort to protect battered women and children through more effective divorce grounds led to the addition of a new fault ground in the state's
divorce law. Because Maryland only permitted divorce without a waiting period in cases of adultery,
sponsors argued, on moral grounds, that battered women were entitled to the same protection as
spouses experiencing infidelity. As Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend argued before
the legislature, "We cannot continue to tell women ... that when their husbands sleep with someone
else, they can file immediately for divorce, but when they beat them up or even rape them, that they
have to stay in the marriage for another year." Jane C. Murphy, Assembly Bill to Speed Divorce After Abuse Will Save Many Lives, Bring Needed Reform, BALT. SUN, Feb. 24, 1998, at A14. The bill
adding abuse grounds passed in April, 1998. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 7-103(a)(7-8) (Supp.
1998).
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children.409

2. Protecting Children: Changes in Custody and Visitation Law
Modern custody law has been dominated by the "best interests of
the child" standard.410 This ambiguous standard pennits judges broad discretion in deciding custody and visitation cases.411 This discretion has resulted in inconsistent application of the standard,412 gender bias413 and expensive, lengthy custody proceedings.414 However, several developments
over the last decade indicate that courts and legislatures are attempting to
refme this standard and curb judicial discretion in ways that focus more
directly on the welfare of the child. Additionally, several recent developments in custody law are intended to increase the involvement of both
parents. Both the debate surrounding these developments and the new
laws themselves reflect a commitment to the central moral goal of family
409. The recent debate among social science and legal scholars about marriage and divorce
has also encouraged new, non-partisan research efforts aimed at understanding Ihe impact of bolh
Ihose events on children. Leaders in bolh Ihe American Bar Association and Ihe American Psychological Association approved a proposal to establish "a university-based research center to provide
more Ihorough and objective information on marriage and divorce." Lynn Smilh, Giving Context to
Issues '90s Families Face Values: Tired of What it Calls Politically Charged and Simplistic Solutions
to Societal Woes, a New Group Tries a Fresh Approach, LA. TIMES, Nov_ 12, 1997, at El.
410. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provides Ihe best summary of prevailing
standards, states:
§ 402. [Best Interest of Child]
The court shall determine custody in accordance wilh Ihe best interest of Ihe child. The
court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) Ihe wishes of Ihe child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) Ihe wishes of Ihe child as to his custodian;
(3) Ihe interaction and interrelationship of Ihe child wilh his parent or parents, his siblings, and any olher person who may significantly affect Ihe child's best interest;
(4) Ihe child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) Ihe mental and physical heallh of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian Ihat does not affect his relationship to Ihe child.
UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aer, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
411. See discussion infra at 128-139; see also Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey
of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989) ("What is 'in Ihe best interests of child(ren)' is often a complex
balancing of numerous competing factors, many of which are highly subjective.").
412. See RICHARD NEELY. THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF
ENDING A MARRIAGE 9-10 (1984).
413. See Susan Belh Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child"
Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L REv. 845-901 (1997).
414. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 386, at 127-30 (describing Ihe complexities of what should
be a ralher simple divorce); NEELY, supra note 412, at 93-118.
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law, protecting children.415 While some of these developments have resulted in fewer explicit references to "moral conduct" in custody decisions, overall the trend toward more child-centered custody law has
strengthened the law's commitment to nurturing children.416

a. Developments Encouraging Post Breakup Involvement of
Both Parents
i.

Joint Custody

The addition of no-fault concepts in laws in the 1970s included
marked shifts in custody law that were intended to encourage the participation of both parents in raising children.417 One of the fIrst developments of this kind was the introduction of the concept of joint custody.
The tITst joint custody statute was passed in 1979 in California418 and
most states eventually followed suit, either by joint custody statutes or
through case law.419 While the legislative history surrounding the adoption of these statutes reflects a concern for parents' right to have access
to their children,420 the primary purpose of these statutes seems to be to
benefIt children.421
415. See supra notes 73·85 and accompanying lext.
416. See, e.g., Scott Coltrane & Neal Hickman, The Rhetoric of Rights and Needs: Moral Dis·
course in the Reform of Child Custody and Child Support Laws, 39 Soc. PROBS. 400, 404 (1992)
(discussing the role of father's groups and mother's groups in shaping the laws).
417. See, e.g., ELLMAN ET AL., supra nole 232, at 666 (describing the joint custody trend as reflecting "an underlying policy of encouraging both parents to maintain their relationship with the
child afler divorce").
418. See CAL. CIV. CODE 4600.5 (Deering 1984) (repealed 1981).
419. As of 1996, 43 stales and the District of Columbia had statules that specifically authorize
the courts to order joint custody. In some staleS, joint custody is referred to as shared custody. In the
43 stales with joint legal custody statutes, 11 stales and the District of Columbia declare a presumption in favor of joint custody, which means that courts are supposed to grant joint custody unless
there is proof that joint custody is not in the child's best inlerest. Eight states declare a presumption
in favor of joint custody if both parents agree to it. The remaining 24 stales with joint custody statules make joint custody an explicit option without any presumption for or against joint custody.
Seven stales do not have joint custody statules, but courts in those stales can use their equitable
powers to order joint custody in appropriale circumstances. Joint custody usually is considered appropriale when parents appear willing to cooperale in raising their children. See Jeff Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice, sec. 6.01 in AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION'S FACfS ABOur CHILDREN AND
THE LAW (1996).
420. See Legislative History of CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080.
421. See Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 969-70 (Md. 1986) (discussing the equitable powers
of Maryland courts to enter joint custody orders, and observing that "the power of the court is very
broad so that it may accomplish the paramount purpose of securing the welfare and promoting the
best inlerest of the child").
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The impact of joint custody statutes on the welfare of children has
been mixed. 422 Many commentators and researchers have concluded that
joint custody promotes the welfare of children.423 Others argue that joint
custody should be reserved for low conflict, high resource couples. 424
However, in the years since the adoption of the fIrst statute in California,
joint custody laws have been refmed in a variety of ways to further the
goal of providing children with the benefIt of both parents' care. These
changes include permitting joint custody only in cases where parents
have agreed to such an arrangement. 425 Additionally, eleven states either
prohibit joint custody when a court fmds that there has been domestic violence or direct the courts to consider violence as a factor that weighs
against an award of joint custody.426 These statutory provisions are consistent with social science and legal scholarship, which have found that
children living under joint custody orders in high conflict families have
more emotional and behavioral problems than those in sole custody.427
ii.

Parenting Classes and Parenting Plans

Another development over the last decade that has promoted involvement of both parents in children's lives when parents live apart is
the growing use of "parenting classes" and "parenting plans. "428 While
422. See generally JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING (Jay Folberg ed., 1991) [hereinafter JOINT CUSTODY] (presenting various writings on child development relating to joint custody).
423. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, in CIDLDREN OF DIVORCE,
at 210, 211 (examining the effects of custody laws, among other factors, on post divorce parenting
role for fathers and noting that the most important reason for considering father's role is "to advance
the welfare of the child").
424. See, e.g., Richard Gardner, Joint Custody is not for Everyone, in JOINT CUSTODY, supra
note 422, at 66.
425. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-56a(b) (West
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214(6) (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
§ 722.26a(2) (West 1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125.490(1) (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17(11) (1992).
426. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124
(West 1994); Fl.A. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1994); 750 ILL. COMPo
STAT. 5/602 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-212, 222, 224 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1993); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1994); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 14.021 (West 1994); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2-112 to 113 (Michie 1994).
427. See Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Post Divorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint
Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCIDATRY 576 (1989); see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Janet R. Johnston, Children of Divorce: Recent Findings Regarding Long-Term Effects and
Recent Studies of Joint and Sole Custody, 11 PEDIATRICS IN REV. 197 (1990).
428. AFCC DIRECTORY OF PARENT EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1996) [hereinafter AFCC DIRECTORY] (providing brief program descriptions and contact people); see also Peter Salem et aI., Special
Issue: Parent Education in Divorce and Separation, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION REv. No.1 (Jan. 1996)
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the fonnat and content vary,429 the primary focus of most court-affiliated
parent education programs is easing the family transition for children.43o
Mental health professionals, and in some cases lawyers, team together to
teach parents techniques to improve parental cooperation and other skills
designed to minimize the negative impact of divorce on children.431 Early
reports indicate a positive impact on children.432 Over 40 states now offer
families experiencing divorce or separation educational programs to assist
parents to better care for their children.433 Laws in at least thirteen states
authorize courts to order divorcing parties to participate in such programs, and three states mandate that all parties to a divorce case with
children participate in parent education.434
Parenting plans are another feature of recent custody law that courts
and legislatures have introduced to protect children involved in custody
disputes by promoting the involvement of both parents in their children's
lives.435 Parenting plans typically delineate each parent's responsibilities
(containing essays and research reports on parent education programs throughout the country).
429. In some jurisdictions, parents do not attend the same session; in others, they are
expected to attend together. However, most states offer spouses the option of attending sepa·
rately. Some programs include information on the legal process, while others focus solely on
emotional issues. Programs operate in courthouses as well as community centers, universities,
churches, and synagogues.
Andrew Schepard et aI., The Push for Parent Education, 19 FAM. Aovoc., Spring 1997, at 52, 54.
430. See, e.g., Andrew Schepard & Stephen W. Schlissel, Planning for P.EA.G.E.: The Devel·
opment of Coun-Connected Education Programs for Divorcing and Separating Families, 23 HOFSTRA L REv. 845, 851 (1995) (noting that parents report that participation in the planning program
helps them to focus on the best interests of their children during the reorganization of their family
and that they receive information and perspective that will help their children cope with the difficult
transitions of divorce).
431. See AFCC DIRECTORY, supra note 428.
432. See Salem et aI., supra note 428, at 13-14.
433. See Schepard et aI., supra note 429, at 53.
434. See id.
435. See Elizabeth R. Kosier, Mediation in Nebraska: An Innovative Past, a Spirited Present,
and a Provocative Future, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 183, 195 (1997) (discussing Nebraska's Parenting
Act, which supplements and extends legislative support for mediation in the area of domestic relations following legislative findings that joint parental decision-making is in the best interest of minor
children experiencing divorce or separation and mandates district court distribution of information regarding parenting plan mediation and encourages the use of mediation for the development of a
parenting plan); Deborah Maranville, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought
and Action: Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment Compensation
Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1081, 1089 (1992) (noting the Washington legislature's rejection of conventional custody/visitation terminology for proceedings involving parental access to their children in favor of the phrase "residential time" and a procedure involving the preparation of "parenting plans"); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative
Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REv. 687, 691 (1985) (urging that the state must promote cooperative parenting through its procedures for dispute resolution, by creating an atmosphere for negotia-
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for the care of the children and decisions about education, health care,
discipline and education.436 They also describe visitation times or, if applicable, joint physical custody. These plans also make provisions for
resolving future disputes. 437 About ten states and the District of Columbia
currently require parties to submit proposed parenting plans prior to a
grant of custody. Another eight states have statutes that give judges discretion to require parenting plans in custody cases.438
While many plans written under these statutes will result in more
private ordering child placement decisions after divorce, these statutes
tion that encourages both parents to make concessions to ensure that the other parent is involved in
the child's post divorce emotional and financial life).
436. See Don R. Ash, Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law:
Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Law in Tennessee, 22 MEMPms ST. L REv. 769,
804-05 (1997) (suggesting parenting plans should be divided into five different sections, including:
(1) the time a child is with the parent overnight with the parent at home; (2) the actual time the parent and the child spend together; (3) the portion of the time the child and the parent spend in recreation or projects together or activity time; (4) how the parents will work together to make day-tcrday
decisions, which would include, for example, discipline, curfew, allowances, health care habits, and
other short term activities; and (5) how the parents will make major decisions about such things as
education, religious affiliation, critical or long-term medical care, and for older children, sports, the
purchase of cars, and decisions about college); Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's
Joint Custody Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CArn. U.L REV. 767, 793
(1997) (citing Arizona's parenting plan statute as a good example of what these plans should delineate: (1) each parent's rights and responsibilities for the personal care of the child and for decisions in
areas such as education, health care, and religious training; (2) a schedule of the physical residence
of the child, including holidays and §chool vacations; (3) a procedure by which proposed changes,
disputes and alleged breaches may be mediated or resolved, which may include the use of conciliation services or private counseling; (4) a procedure for periodic review of·the plan's terms by the
parents; and (5) a statement that the parties understand that joint custody does not necessarily mean
equal parenting time).
437. See supra note 436 and accompanying text; see also Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections,
and Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 MICH. J.L REF. 65, 107-08 (1990) (discussing Washington's statutory requirements that
the parenting plan must specify terms with respect to three discrete components: a dispute resolution
process; allocation of decision-making authority; and residential provisions for given days of the
year, including a provision for holidays, birthdays, vacations, and other special occasions).
438. See ALA. CODE 30-3-153 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(1) (West Supp. 1996);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(2)(A) (Supp. 1996); 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/602.1 (West Supp.
1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1996) ("At the trial on the merits, if ...
either party seeks shared legal or physical custody, the parties, jointly or individually, shall submit
..• a shared custody implementation plan."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(8) (West Supp. 1997)
(U Any decree providing for joint custody shall include a specific written plan setting forth the terms
of such custody. Such plan may be suggested by both parents acting in concert, or one parent acting
individually, or if neither ... the plan shall be provided by the court."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4223(b)(2) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-4-9.1(F) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 109(C)
(West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (West Supp. 1996) ("In any proceeding ... each
party shall file and serve a proposed permanent parenting plan."). But see DEI.. CODE ANN. tit 13,
§ 727 (1993).
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give courts authority to require parents to focus on the care of their children. This shifts the emphasis in divorce and custody cases from the
adults to the children.439 Again, there is evidence that the use of parenting plans has begun to accomplish the goal of minimizing the negative
impact that parents living apart has on children.440
b.

The Child's Voice in Custody Proceedings

Another development that has reinforced the focus on children in
custody disputes is the trend toward increased emphasis on the "child's
voice" in custody proceedings.441 This has been accomplished, in part, by
greater use of appointed attorneys for children in custody cases.442 While
appointment of counsel is still discretionary in most states,443 appellate
courts have increasingly emphasized the need to have the child's voice
heard in some way.444 As one court put it:
439. See Ash, supra note 436, at 805 (noting that the advantage of a mediator in the parenting
plan process is that he or she can help parents focus on making the children a priority, and also
stress the importance to parents of maintaining an ongoing relationship with one another for the benefit of the children); Ellis, supra note 437, at 88-89 (explaining that requiring parents in all cases to
use a plan with specific components is intended to refocus parental consciousness on the needs of
their children).
440. See Lynne M. Kenney & Diana Vigil, A Lawyer's Guide to Therapeutic Interventions in
Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARIz. ST. Ll. 629, 645 (1996) (stating that when parents are in disagreement over matters concerning the child, parenting plans can help them reach an agreement). But
see Jane W. Ellis, Caught in the Middle: Protecting Children of High Conflict Divorce, 22 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 253, 261 & n.48 (explaining that the parenting plan sometimes exacerbates
the conflict between parents rather than lessening it).
441. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Laoking for Rights in all the Wrong Places: Resolving Cus·
tody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1563 (1994) (suggesting that
under a strong version of rights, hearing a child's voice and giving her input would ameliorate the
negative consequences of bargaining over custody and reduce animosity between the spouses who
would need to confront the effects of their behavior on the child); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended
Family System in the Black Community: A Child· Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L.
REv. 1649, 1671-72 (1995) (noting that commentators have attempted to refine the child-centered approach into a doctrine that would support a greater recognition of children's rights and voices in custody disputes, and advocating an approach that listens to the child's voice, includes the child's experiences and values, and tames the adult "rights talk" by viewing children's needs both as children
and as the adults they become); Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1990, 2035 (1995) (noting that in the continuing debate about the role of the child in decision making about that child's life, the question of the child's voice is a persistent theme and at the
center of a legal controversy over the child's custody and care, the adults involved all struggle to determine how much "voice" the child should possess).
442. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: A Search
for Definitions and Policy, 31 FAM. L.Q. 613, 628 (1998).
443. Only one state mandates such representation in contested cases. See WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.045 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
444. See, e.g., Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394, 404-405 (1989) (remanding the case with in-
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We are most concerned that a five-year-old child has been the subject of litigation
for over one-fourth of his life and has yet to see an end to it We are also concerned that during the four days of testimony before the Master, the Master never
spoke to the child, never heard from a truly objective witness and did not have the
input of someone who would speak on behalf of the child. Since no other testimony was offered, the hearing before the Chancellor suffered from the same deficiency. This deficiency should be remedied by our direction that separate counsel
be appointed for [the child].44s

Advocates and scholars have encouraged this trend of requiring
counsel for children in custody cases by identifying the benefits to children of having representation446 and developing standards to improve the
effectiveness of such representation.447
c. Refining the Best Interest Standard
i.

The Nexus Requirement in Determining Parental Fitness

The focus of moral discourse in custody cases during the fault era
was on parents' sexual conduct. In the last decade, courts have moved
from rules that presumptively disqualify parents who engage in
nonmarital sexual relationships 448 to a standard that requires a "nexus" or
connection between any challenged conduct and harm to the child before
considering such conduct relevant449 While decisions applying the nexus
structions that an attorney be appointed to represent the interests of the five-year-old child whose
custody was at stake, although no one had sought the appointment of counsel for the child at the
trial court level); see also Grist v. Grist, 946 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. Ct App. 1997) (stating that if there
are allegations of abuse, the trial court must appoint a guardian ad litem for the child).
445. Levitt, 79 Md. App. at 404-05. Courts have also held that children in custody disputes
should be pennitted to dismiss an attorney and retain counsel of his or her choice. See ARsEN, supra
note 240, at 77.
446. See Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judicial
Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 255, 269-70 (1991); see also Linda Elrod, Counsel for the Child in
Custody Disputes: The Time is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 63 (1992); Emile R. Kruzick & David H.
Zemans, In the Best Interests of the Child: Mandatory Independent Representation, 69 DENV. U.L.
REv. 605 (1992). But see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE TIlE BEST INTERESTS OF TIlE CHILD 119
(1979) (arguing that generally, parents should decide whether their child needs legal representation).
447. See Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From "Best" to "Better": The Interests of Children and the
Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. REV. 633 (1990); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. &
Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, But Who Am I?," 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1917,
1941-42 (1996); David Peterson, Comment, Judicial Discretion Is Insufficient: Minors' Due Process
Right to Participate with Counsel When Divorce Custody Disputes Involve Allegations of Child
Abuse, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1995).
448. See supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text
449. See 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL.. CHILD CUSTODY ANO VISITATION LAW ANO PRACTICE
§ 10. 12[2]£b], 10-212-213 (1996) ("The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child.") Some fault-era cases did apply a nexus standard,
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requirement may make fewer explicit references to morality, such a requirement places a greater emphasis on child welfare and less emphasis
on punishing parents. It is that emphasis on child welfare that supports
the moral vision in family law more directly than the punishment of sexually active parents.
One of the earliest cases marking the trend toward the harm requirement where a parent's sexual behavior was challenged was the New York
case of Feldman v. Feldman.45o In Feldman, the trial court transferred
custody of two children from the mother to the father because of the
mother's "desire to experiment sexually."451 The appellate court reversed
stating:
In my opinion, amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and what we conveniently
consider aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody.
. . . In the instant case our sole concern is for the best interests of the children. As
both children have resided with the mother since birth, a change of custody at this
late date should not be made unless there is a showing that she is unfit to continue
as the custodial parent....452

Since 1975, many states have moved from a standard focused on punishing the "guilty party " 453 to a standard that makes "an honest attempt to
evaluate what would be in the best interest of the child rather than on the
basis of subjective reactions to parental moral values. "454
but these discussions represented the minority view at that time. See, e.g., McAnespie v. McAnespie,
200 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. Dist Ct 1957) ("The moral unfibless of a mother must be such as has a
direct bearing on the welfare of the child, if it is to deprive her of the custody of the child."); Reiland v. Reiland, 160 N.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Minn. 1968) ("The fact that the mother has been indiscrete
or unfaithful does not necessarily disqualify her as custodian of the children. The moral unfitness of
the mother must be such as to have a direct bearing on the welfare of the child if she is to be deprived of custody."). Likewise, some contemporary decisions still consider involvement in nonmarital sexual conduct as evidence of unfibless. See, e.g., Dockins v. Dockins, 475 So. 2d 571, 573
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (mother denied custody for entertaining lover in her home once while children
were present).
450. 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
451. [d. at 509-10.
452. [d. at 512 (citations omitted); see also Davis v. Davis, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (Md. 1977)
("[W]hereas the fact of adultery may be a relevant consideration in child custody awards, no presumption of unfibless on the part of the adulterous parent arises from it; rather it should be weighed
along with all other pertinent factors, only insofar as it affects the child's welfare.").
453. See Beck v. Beck, 120 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Neb. 1963).
454. Nora Lauerman, Non·Marital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 CIN. L. REv. 647,
672, 681 (1977) (noting the variety of approaches courts were taking in the 1970s in custody cases
involving non-marital sexual conduct and finding cases that require a "clear direct impact" of harm
to the child as a result of the sexual misconduct the "soundest"). For modem cases reflecting this
trend see, e.g., Hanhart v. Hanhart, 501 N.W.2d 776, 778 (S.D. 1993) (awarding custody to mother
was in child's best interests despite mother's adulterous affair, where affair had no detrimental im-
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Courts still are fairly consistent in labeling both mothers and fathers
actively engaged in homosexual relationships as poor moral examples for
their children.45~ However, recent custody decisions have also begun to
require a demonstrated nexus between harm to the child and the parent's
sexual orientation.456 These decisions signal a trend away from custody
decisions that place primary emphasis on punishing parents for sexual activity rather than focusing on arrangements that will best serve children.
ii.

Primary Caretaker Standard

Another development in custody that has refined the best interests
test is the emphasis on the primary caretaker in custody decisions. 457 The
primary caretaker can be defmed as the parent who has been most involved in providing day-to-day care, such as preparing meals, purchasing
clothes, arranging for medical care, education, and social activities, putting the child to bed at night, and waking the child in the moming.458
pact on children); Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625, 628 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that
adulterous behavior of mother could not be used to rebut primary caretaker presumption; and granting mother custody); Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260, 262 (W. Va. 1985) (stating that acts of sexual
misconduct by a mother may not be considered as evidence of fitness for custody unless it is injurious to the children).
455. The majority of state courts still suggest that a parent's homosexuality is a negative factor in the best interest analysis. See Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States 1994-1995: Case
Digests, 29 FAM. LQ. 775, 810-11 (1996).
456. See, e.g., DeLong v. DeLong, No. 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *6, *11 (Mo. Ct. App. W.
Dist., Jan. 20, 1998) (noting that Missouri trial courts appear to have adopted a per se rule in awarding custody to heterosexual parents when the other parent is homosexual, the court held that focusing
a custody decision on a parent's sexual preference, without assessing either parents' fitness and relationship to the child, is not in the child's best interest); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36, 37 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (overturning a lower court order prohibiting a lesbian mother from visiting her son
in the presence of her female companion).
457. See generally Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed? ... Should It?, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 75-84 (1993) (citing a
1982 study of appellate court decisions that "found the idea of primary caretaker increasingly popular in determining custody disputes").
458. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). Garska has been modified by
recent statutory changes in West Virginia that continue to instruct judges to allocate custodial responsibility for children based upon past caretaking responsibilities, but do not create a presumption in
favor of the primary caretaker. See W. VA. CODE §§ 48-11-101 to 48-11-501 (Supp. 1999). For a full
discussion of the merits of the primary caretaker rule, see David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 527-38 (1984) (recommending
a rule favoring the primary caretaker for children five and under); see also Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REv.
168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing for a presumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker). This rule is
not necessarily inconsistent with the trend toward involvement of both parents after divorce. In families where parents shared the caretaking responsibilities equally during the marriage, joint custody
would be appropriate upon divorce. See id. at 184. One scholar has proposed a refmement of the pri-
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This increased emphasis on the primary caretaker has been reflected in
cases that apply a best interest standard but place special importance on
the primary caretaker as one of many factors to be taken into account in
the custody decision.459 A few states have adopted a rule that presumes
that the primary caretaker will have custody unless that parent is unfit or,
in some cases, an older child's preference will prevail.460 Advocates of
the primary caretaker rule have long argued that it best advances the virtues of certainty and predictability while furthering the goal of producing
decisions in the best interests of the child.461 An increasing number of
states have incorporated this concept into their custody law.462 In applying the primary caretaker rule, decisionmakers look to past behavior
rather than attempting to predict future behavior.463 Judges base decisions
on the reasonable assumption that the interests of a child are best served
by preserving the relationship that has been the primary source of nurturing and care.464
mary caretaker standard that would take into account an expanded role for the non-custodial parent.
Elizabeth Scott has proposed the "approximation" rule in which the decisionmaker "focuses (almost) exclusively on the past relationship between parents and child and seeks to approximate as
closely as possible the predivorce pattern of parental responsibility in the custody arrangement."
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 630
(1992). This approach is aimed at responding to two areas of concern about the child's welfareminimizing trauma of family breakup and maximizing involvement of both parents in child's life.
See id.
459. See generally Bookspan, supra note 457, at 84.
460. See, e.g., Garslal, 278 S.E.2d at 363; see also In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
461. See Chambers, supra note 458, at 527-38; see also Neely, supra note 458, at 185-86;
Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 241-43 (1982). But see Mary V. Becker, Maternal
Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 154-58 (analyzing decisions under the primary caretaker standard and finding that it hurts mothers).
462. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990) ("[T]he golden
thread running through any best interests analysis is the importance •.• of [a child's] bond with the
primary parent. •.. "); Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d at 1222 (affrrming custody award to mother because she
was the primary caretaker, although both parents were fit); In re Boldt, 801 P.2d 874, 875 (Or. Ct.
App. 1990) (affirming custody award to mother because she had been the primary caretaker); Garsial, 278 S.E.2d at 364 (awarding custody to the mother, because she was clearly the primary caretaker before the proceedings).
463. See Neely, supra note 458, at 180-82.
464. See Maxfield, 452 N.E.2d at 223. After its adoption in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,
713 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Legislature rejected the primary caretaker presumption and restored
the best interest standard. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1998); see also Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Re-examining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 42829 (1990) (concluding Minnesota courts continue to place strong emphasis on the primary caretaker
as a factor in the best interest equation).
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Social science research emphasizing the link between the primary
caretaker's emotional and economic well-being and the well-being of
children46S has also begun to change the focus from parents' right to have
access to their children to a greater emphasis on children's welfare in
custody "relocation" cases.466 These cases involve custody modification
requests, which are triggered when a custodial parent attempts to relocate
and, in so doing, increases the distance between the children and the
noncustodial parent.467 In the past decade, an increasing number of courts
and legislatures have placed restrictions on such moves on a variety of
grounds, including protection of rights of noncustodial parents. 468 Research has demonstrated that children's interests are served by supporting
the custodial parent even where it interferes with the non-custodial parent's desire for more frequent visitation.469 This research has begun to reverse the trend of modifying custody when the custodial parent relocates.470 Appellate courts from a wide variety of states have signalled to
trial courts that protection of the custodial family unit should take precedence over deference to the noncustodial parent's rights. 471
465. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 263-64 (1996) ("rrlhe central
importance of the primary relationship has been convincingly demonstrated, while no similar support
has been found for the visiting relationship.").
466. See Cheryl S. Kamer, Relocation: What Ought to Be, 20 FAM. L.Q. 12 (1997).
467. See id.
468. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1983) (finding that the limited purpose of a statute requiring notice to a noncustodial parent before a custodial parent makes a substantial move is "to safeguard the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent"); see also In re Marriage
of Elser, 895 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Mont. 1995) (focusing exclusively on the disruption of the father'S
visitation that would result if the custodial mother were allowed to remove the couple's children
from the state so that she could further her education), overruled in part by Porter v. Galameau, 911
P.2d 1143, 1150 (Mont. 1996); Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 854-55 (NJ. 1988) (fmding that
the purpose of the New Jersey removal statute "is to preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent
and the child to maintain and develop their familial relationship").
469. See, e.g., FURSTENBERG & CHERUN. supra note 401, at 107-108; see also Valarie King,
Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-Being: Can Dads Make a Difference?, 15 J. FAM. Is.
SUES 78 (1994); see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q.
305, 311-14 (1996).
470. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 401, at 107-08.
471. See, e.g., Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 376 (Alaska 1996); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1996);
Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 419-20 (Fla. 1993); Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98-99 (Ind.
1992); Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996); Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 847
(Miss. 1990); In re Marriage of Hogstad, 914 P.2d 584, 587 (Mont. 1996); Harder v. Harder, 524
N.W.2d 325, 328 (Neb. 1994); Trent v. Trent, 890 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Nev. 1995); Holder v. Polanski,
544 A.2d 852, 856 (NJ. 1988); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996); Stout v. Stout,
560 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1997); Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828, 832 (S.D. 1996); Fortin v.
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llZ.
Recognizing the Connection Between Domestic Violence
and Parental Fitness

Over the last two decades, courts and legislators have begun to discover the connection between domestic violence and "best interests" of
children in custody cases.472 Twenty years ago, judges routinely excluded
evidence of a parent's abusive behavior toward another adult in the
household because it was thought that such abuse was not relevant to a
parent's fitness for custody.473 Advocates, supported by research demonstrating the connections between domestic violence and child abuse, began petitioning state legislatures to permit or require judges to consider
domestic violence when determining custody or visitation. 474 Statutes permitting judges to consider spousal abuse as relevant to fitness began appearing in the 1980s.475 In 1990, only about sixteen states had such statutes. 476 As of 1995, forty-four states and the District of Columbia had
amended their custody statutes to include some provision that alerts
judges to the danger spouse abusers pose to children.4TI These provisions
generally either (1) permit or require courts to consider the occurrence of
domestic violence between parents as one of several factors relevant to
determining the best interests of the child; or (2) create a presumption
against an award of custody to a parent who has demonstrated a pattern
Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229, 231 (S.D. 1993); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (fenn. 1996); Lane
v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 791 (Vt. 1992); Bohrns v. Bohrns, 424 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Wis. 1988);
Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 1993). But see In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d
1041, 1047 (Ill. 1988); Domingues v. Johnson, 593 A.2d 1133, 1041 (Md. 1991).
472. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice,
29 FAM. L.Q. 197,225-27 (1995) [hereinafter Family Violence Project].
473. See Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, 43 Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 3, 29, 34 (1992).
474. A number of studies have reported on the harm to children who witness domestic violence. For example, one study focused on 25 children who witnessed their mothers being abused. See
Jane H. Pfouts et. al., Deviant Behaviors of Child Victims and Bystanders in Violent Families, in Ex.
PWRlNG TIlE RELAnoNsmp BE'IWEEN CmLD ABUSE AND DELINQUENCY 79-99 (Robert J. Hunner &
Yvonne Elder Walker eds., 1981). Of the 25 children, 53% acted out with parents, 60% with siblings, 30% with peers, 33% with teachers; 16% had appeared in juvenile court, 20% were labeled
truant, 58% were below average or failing in school; caseworkers labeled 40% as anxious and 48%
as depressed. See id. at 95; see also Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence
Against Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L REv. 1109, 1111-14 (1995) (summarizing studies describing both direct and indirect harm to children living in homes where mothers are
victims of domestic violence).
475. See Hart, supra note 473, at 29.
476. See id.; see also Family Violence Project, supra note 472, at 199. However, the majority
of states still do not presume that a father who abuses the mother is unfit. See id. at 208.
477. See Family Violence Project, supra note 472, at 225-27.
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of violence.478
I have argued elsewhere that contemporary custody law still reflects
a double standard for mothers. 479 The custody law reforms I have described have not eliminated that double standard. Moreover, the overall
effect of these statutes requires consideration of abuse to reduce the potential that children will be abused by a violent parent or will suffer from
observing the abuse of their mothers.
The impact of these refmements to the "best interest standard" have
not yet been evaluated, but the focus of these reforms on protecting children over furthering parents' rights should contribute to the overall trend
toward a more child-focused custody law. Additionally, they "fost[er] a
substantive vision of family life" in which "the role of the father is constitutive" involving shared responsibility in childraising.48o

3.

The Child Support Revolution

During the 1980s and 1990s, another "revolution" in family law has
been taking place that has transformed child support law. 481 Both the establishment and enforcement of child support were once primarily private
matters where parents had the ability to contract between themselves for
appropriate awards and were primarily responsible to initiate court actions to enforce those awards.482 Family law's increasing attention in recent decades on the protection of children, among other reasons, has led
to increasing public responsibility for establishing and enforcing child
support obligations.483
Blackstone described the duty of parents to provide for the support
of their children as "a principle of natural law."484 Traditionally, American divorce laws provided only vague guidance on postdissolution child
support, using terms such as "suitable," "just," "reasonable," "proper,"
478. See id.
479. See generally Murphy, supra note 213, at 693-702.
480. REGAN. supra note 90, at 188.
481. See WEISBERG & ApPLETON, supra note 314, at 763 (describing child suppon enforcement
techniques as having "undergone a revolution in recent decades as a result of federal involvement").
482. See id. at 118. For an historical account of the development of child suppon law in this
country from "moral duty to equitable remedy" see Garrison, supra note 76.
483. It is interesting to note that while different moral justifications are proffered for developments in spousal and child support, the two are very closely linked. Thus, while improvements in the
establishment and collection of child suppon reflect a moral commitment to children, they are also
justified by a similar commitment to their caretakers, often ex-spouses. See GLENDON, TRANSFORMA.
TION, supra note 241, at 198.
484. BLACKSTONE, supra note 146, at 447-48.
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"fit," "sufficient," or "necessary" to direct courts how to set an
award.485 Later, statutes listed factors to be considered in the exercise of
judicial discretion to determine parental child support obligations.486
Until the 1980s, laws governing child support were primarily a matter of state law and were generally framed as broad discretionary standards.487 Courts were free to set child support at any level as long as
there was some indication that the fmder of fact had considered the ability of the non-custodial parent to pay and the needs of the child[ren].488
The inadequacy of most states' discretionary standards in setting initial child support awards took on critical proportions by the early
1980's.489 Insufficient child support was a major cause of the spiraling
poverty rate among women and children.490 When courts did award child
support, award levels were often inadequate, thrusting many children and
custodial parents into poverty or a seriously diminished standard of living.491 Studies estimating the costs of raising children in intact households demonstrate the inadequacy of such amounts of child support.492 In
addition to the inadequacy of the award itself, the traditional system of
virtually unlimited judicial discretion in this area led to "pronounced disparities in award amounts from court to court, from judge to judge, and
485. See VERNIER, supra note 185, at 193.
486. For example, section 309 of the Unifonn Maniage and Divorce Act allows courts to set
an amount "reasonable or necessary," considering:
all relevant factors including: (1) the fmancial resources of the child; (2) the fmancial resources of the custodial parent; (3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had
the maniage not been dissolved; (4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his
educational needs; and (5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
UNIF. MARluAGe AND DIVORCE Acr § 309, 9A U.L.A. 573 (1998).
487. See HARRy D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERsPEcnve 10 (1981)
("[T]he court's discretion regarding the amount of child support usually reign[ed] supreme.").
488. See id.
489. See generally Murphy, supra note IS, at 226-29.
490. Of the 9.4 million custodial parents in 1987, 41% had no child support award. See Bu.
REAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS. SERIES P-23, No.
167, CHILD SUPPORT AND AuMONY: 1987, at 1 (1990).
491. See Lucy Marsh Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study
of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DENY.
U. L. REv. 21, 50 (1979). In 1987, the average child support for the 3.7 million custodial parents
who actually received payments was $2,710 per year. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 490,
at 1-2.
492. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Will This Divorced Woman Receive Child
Support?, JUDGES J. 40, 42-43 (1986) (describing the project that examined the child support implicaitons of various custody arrangements, and finding, among other things, that the level of support
awarded in the cases examined fell "far below the costs of rearing children estimated by
economists").
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from case to case. "493
The overall problem of inadequate awards, the lack of objective
guidelines for establishing support obligations and the resulting inconsistencies in awards prompted reaction in both Congress and the White
House, which framed the issue in moral terms.494 In response, beginning
in the mid 1970s Congress enacted a series of related statutes addressing
the child support problem.495 Both the substance and rhetoric surrounding
these changes reflected the increased emphasis on duty and commitment
to children. Probably the most important legislation from the perspective
of moving toward guaranteeing children support was the Family Support
Act of 1988.496 This Act required every state to establish presumptive
child support guidelines as a condition for continued federal funding of
the state's welfare program.497
A number of requirements of this statute strengthened the federal
push for standardized child support decisions. Under this statute, each
state had to adopt child support guidelines that presumptively established
the appropriate child support obligation in any child support proceeding. 498 As a result of this federal legislation, by 1990 every state had
adopted some type of child support formula. 499 In addition to providing
493. Sally F. Goldfarb, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Child Support Guidelines, 13
FAM. L. REP. 3031, 3032 (1987).
494. See HR REP. No. 98-527, at 49 (1983); see also President Ronald Reagan, Proclamation
of National Child Support Enforcement Month, 1987 (Aug. 13, 1987) in 22 WEEKLY COMPo PREs.
Doc. 939. ("[M]uch remains to be done to foster a nationwide conviction that child support represents not only a legal responsibility but a profound ethical obligation of parents and an urgent moral
right of children.") While a significant factor in the initial push for federal intervention to strengthen
child support was to reduce the federal welfare costs, the focus broadened to include a concern to
reinforce parental duty to support children from all income groups. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 166, 169-74 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
495. For a description of these statutes, see Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support,
5 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 541, 545-48 (1998).
496. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat 2346-48 (1988).
497. See 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1997) (stating that an approved state plan is a condition for federal financial assistance); id. § 302.56(a) (requiring that state plans contain child support guidelines).
498. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1994).
499. See JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AI... NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS. CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES: A COMPENDIUM SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUiDEUNES (1990). The Income Shares
Model, which the majority of states have adopted, employs various economic studies to identify the
percentage of family income the child(ren) would have received if the parents lived together. The income of both parents is combined to calculate the basic child support obligation. See Irwin Garfinkel
et al., Child Support Orders: A Perspective on Reform, in THE FUTURE OF CIDLDREN, Spring 1994, at
84, 87-88. This basic amount is then pro-rated between the parents in proportion to their respective
incomes. See id. at 87-88. The noncustodial parent must pay his or her share as child support; the
custodial parent presumably pays his or her share directly to the child(ren). See id. Because the eco-
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some uniformity to the method of establishing child support throughout
the country, the Family Support Act signalled an important shift from
child support law framed as a discretionary standard to child support
framed as a rule or right.5°O
The Persona! Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA),501 imposed new requirements for child support
enforcement.5Ol This controversial503 welfare reform legislation replaced a
federal entitlement to welfare with a block-grant system. One commentator describes the attempt to establish child support as a right guaranteed
to children under this new legislation: "The vision for child support enforcement that guided much of the development of the legislation is that
the payment of child support should be automatic and inescapable-'like
death or taxes.' "504 Both the Family Support Act and the PRWORA statute followed much substantial debate in Congress that was often focused
on the moral imperative of guaranteeing financial support for children.505
Some commentators have interpreted these developments as evidence of family law's increasing concern for "caring and commitment"506 by parents for their children. Additionally, these laws are further
evidence that family law is not dominated by the ideology of liberal individualism507 to the extent that strengthening child support laws pushes
nomic studies of intact families suggest that families spend a decreasing percentage of total income
on children as income levels increase, the guidelines provide for noncustodial parents at higher income levels to pay a declining percentage of income. See id. at 88-89. Additionally, most income
shares formulas include cost-sharing for certain child-related expenditures such as child care and extraordinary medical expenses. See id. at 89.
500. The Act preserved limited judicial discretion by permitting judges to make a specific
finding that application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined under criteria established by each state. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (b)(2) (1988).
501. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996).
502. See id. §§ 331-333.
503. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, THB ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43-45.
504. Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996
Welfare Act, 30 FAM. LQ. 519, 538 (1996).
505. See, e.g., Welfare: Reform or Replacement? (Child Support Enforcement), Hearings on
S.1511 Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Finance Committee,
looth Congo 273-308 (1987) (statements of J. Byran Hehir, U.S. Catholic Conference, and Charles V.
Bergstrom, Lutheran Council in the USA in support of the Family Support Act of 1988; both emphasizing the moral issues involved in the elimination of child poverty); see also President Bill Clinton,
State of the Union Address 1996 (emphasizing the moral obligation to pass federal welfare legislation that emphasizes responsibility of both parents for children).
506. Cahn, supra note 1, at 238 n.59; see also Galston, supra note 83 (describing increased
efforts to enforce child support as an important part of the moral commitment to raise children well);
Coltrane & Hickman, supra note 416, at 412-17.
507. See Cahn, supra note 1, at 270. Interestingly, Carl Schneider predicted in 1985 that child
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parents in the direction of responsibility and away from self-fulfillment
and autonomy.
Has the goal of strengthening parental obligation for support been
realized? Research on the impact of the guidelines is mixed. Early reports indicated that guidelines had improved the status of custodial parents,S08 but more recent studies have focused on the increasing rate of
child poverty despite the imposition of guidelines and other child support
reforms of the 1980s.S09 However, most agree that fixed formulas for
child support are a step in the right direction.slo Additionally, there are
some signs that tougher child support enforcement laws are fmally increasing collection of child support.Sl1 Promising new proposals aimed at
assuring more generous and uniform child support awards are being developed by scholars and policymakers.Sl2 These developments and suggestions for future refmements evidence the trend toward reinforcing responsibility and commitment to children. Together with the changes
support law was moving in a direction in which the increasing public responsibility for child support
was undermining parental responsibility for children. See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 1,
at 1813. While recognizing "evidence to the contrary," he supported his claim by pointing to the
abysmal record for child support collection that existed at that time. Id. at 1812. In the intervening
years, both improvements in child support collection and the shift from public to private responsibility as evidenced by PRWORA indicate a strengthening of parental duty under the law.
508. See, e.g., Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support Guidelines: Will They Make a Difference?,
12 J. FAM. ISSUES 404, 405 (1991) (predicting that award levels would rise upon implementation of
the guidelines); Murphy, supra note 15, at 232 ("The consensus . . . is that [the] guidelines are
working."); Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy,
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 332 (1991) (citing studies
showing increased awards after implementation of the guidelines).
509. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 76, at 63 (summarizing data showing that guidelines
"have not dramatically improved the lot of children eligible for child support").
510. See id. at 101.
511. See, e.g., ELAINE SORENSON & ARIEL HALPERN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT REcEIPT: How WELL IS CIflLD SUPPORT DOING? (Urban Institute 1999) (finding that nevermarried mothers increased their rate of child support receipt from 4% in 1976 to 18% in 1997); Ann
Marie Rotondo, Comment, Helping Families Help Themselves: Using Child Support Enforcement to
Reform Our Welfare System, 33 CAL. w_ L. REv. 281, 282-84 (1997); see also Michael Holmes, Millions Culled in Child Support, Hous. CHRON. Sept. 10, 1996, at 20.
512. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
and Recommendations §§ 3.04, 3.05B (Preliminary Draft No.7 vol. I, June, 1997) (advocating an
Equal Living Standard Model for child support to ensure that the supported child enjoys a standard
of living that is at least equal to lhat of the non-custodial parent); Garrison, supra note 76, at 117
(arguing for the adoption of a "Community Model" which bases the support obligation on "family
membership" and "mandates income sharing as the basic approach"); Murphy, supra note 213, at
728-730 (arguing for voluntary impoverishment rules which are more generous to caretakers of
young children); see also Harry D. Krause, Review of Part X, Child Support, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Soc. Sec. Am. of 1972, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, H.R. 1 (unpublished consultant's paper)
52-53 (advocating a uniform federal formula related to the non-custodial parent's ability to pay).
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identified in custody law that promote deeper involvement of fathers in
child rearing, these child support reforms are a step in the direction of
creating laws that encourage parents' fulfillment of the moral commitment to support their children.513
D. Creating Rights for Family Members: From Discretionary Standards
to Rules
Standards in family law for allocating family assets, deciding child
custody and visitation, child support and alimony have traditionally been
characterized by broad discretion. 514 Over the last two decades, several
developments in family law have signalled a shift from broad standards
to rules.515 A brief history of the development of discretionary standards
illuminates the ways in which such a shift holds promise for protecting
vulnerable family members.
Discretion in domestic law has its origins in the concept of the equity court.516 Equity courts were established to replace a system of justice
that applied rigid rules in the courts of law with a system that permitted
some measure of discretion.5J7 It was believed that rigidity was the mark
of a primitive legal order.5lS Citizens thought that the law courts could no
longer dispense justice.519 Inflexible application of rules forced the parties
to go to the king for relief. The king appointed chancellors to provide the
individualized justice that rigid courts of law could not; the chancellors'
authority gradually developed into the equitable Court of Chancery.s2o
The use of discretion continued to grow in most areas of Anglo513. See FURSTENBERG & CHERUN, supra note 401, at 104, 118-19.
514. This discussion is based, in part, on Murphy, supra note 15, at 212-14, 218-19.
515. Some commentators have analyzed changes in trends in family law over the same time
period and interpreted the balance between rules and discretion as "moving simultaneously in both
directions." Judith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce and Family: A Cautionary Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1367, 1376 (1993); see also Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in
Family Law: A Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).
516. See, e.g., KENNETH DAVIS. DISCRETIONARY JusnCE: A PRELlMtNARY INQUIRY 18 (1969).
517. See id. at 19.
518. See HENRy S. MAINE. ANCIENT LAW: ITS CoNNECJ10N WID! TIlE EARLy HISTORY OF SOCI·
ETY. AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 65-69 (5th ed. 1888); REGAN, supra note 90, at 188.
519. See, e.g., DAVIS. supra note 516, at 19; see also JOSEPH STORY. 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQ.
UITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 29-31 (photo reprint) (1877) (reviewing the British roots of the American courts of equity).
520. However, in time, the Chancery Court developed its own rules to guide the exercise of
discretion. See DAVIS, supra note 516, at 19. Thus, the recognition that rules should be developed to
avoid arbitrariness and inequity has always tempered the ideal of individualized justice through the
exercise of discretion.
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American law.52l Given the complex issues of human behavior underlying
child placement and other family law issues, it is not surprising that reliance on the exercise of judicial discretion became particularly prevalent
in family law. illcreasingly, discretion replaced the development of meaningful standards and rules in state regulation of the family. ill contrasting
family and property law, for example, Mary Ann Glendon has noted:
In our legal system, property law traditionally has been and even now continues to
be characterized by a high degree of strict law, due to what are generally thought
to be special needs in that field for stability, predictability, and security of titles.
Family law, on the other hand, is characterized by more discretion than any other
field of private law. This fact is typically explained by a perceived need to tailor
legal resolutions to the unique circumstances of each individual and family. However, when the fields of property and family law intersect, as they frequently do,
especially when a family is dissolved by divorce or death, difficult questions arise
concerning the proper accommodation of the interests served by rules establishing
"bright lines" and those furthered by individualizing discretion.s22

Commentators have offered a variety of rationales for the persistent
hold of discretion on family law in addition to the general argument that
individualized decisions are necessary given the complexity and diversity
of families appearing before the COurt.523 One commentator attributes the
rise of judicial discretion to the distinctly local nature of family law jurisprudence.524 Because "state domestic relations chauvinism" produced
conflicts among state family codes, judges had to develop a "loosely arranged set of national domestic relations doctrines" to harmonize local
law.52S These vague doctrines allowed judges to assume a "patriarchal
stance by evaluating state legislation in terms of their perception of family needs, community interest, and national common law priorities. "526
Perhaps the most compelling explanation for the strong reliance on
discretion in family law comes from feminist legal scholars.527 Mary
521. See id. at 20.
522. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1167-68 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also Schneider, supra
note 195, at 2228-31 (discussing the vagueness of family law standards).
523. See NEELY, supra note 412, at 34-38.
524. See Grossberg, supra note 283, at 819.
525. Id. at 819.
526. Id. at 820.
527. See, e.g., GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 232; Glendon, supra note 522,
at 1176-77 (observing that judicial discretion reflects a reluctance to impose significant burdens on
an absent father in order to force him to support his children); Schneider, supra note 195, at 221926; Scott, supra note 325, at 9, 34 n.75 (arguing that reluctance to increase child support results
from judicial ignorance of the actual costs of raising children).
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Becker, for example, contrasts family and contract law and offers a gender-based explanation for the rights versus discretion dichotomy in these
two areas.528 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the ideal of individualized discretionary justice played a significant role in contract law
remedies. Juries set damages WillI few, if any~ fIxed rules; their only guidance was a nebulous admonition to reach an appropriate decision in
light of the actual injuries, needs, and abilities of the parties to the contract.529 However, since that time courts and legislatures have developed
rules that severely limit the jury's discretion.53o Becker notes that no similar movement to curb the "virtually unbounded" discretion in the area
of family law has occurred.53l She suggests that the greater tolerance of
discretion in family law than in commercial cases is attributable to the
gender of the parties seeking relief.532
When a commercial relationship collapses, the parties seeking relief
tend to be male. In contrast, when a family relationship collapses, it is
primarily women who tend to need and seek remedies such as alimony,
child custody, and support.533 Judges and legislators, who are still overwhelmingly male,534 are more willing to fashion rules to enforce ,the bargains men strike in commercial relationships, because they identify and
empathize with the parties and place value on the transactions at issue.
However, these decision makers neither value or understand the choices
made by women seeking relief following the termination of a marital relationship. These women are often traditional homemakers who agreed to
defer or give up career opportunities and income potential to raise children and provide a home for the family in exchange for rmancial and
528. Mary Becker, Transcript of Address at 1989 American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 1989).
529. See E. AllAN FARNSWORm, CONTRAcrs § 12.8, at 840 (1982).
530. See, e.g., Perfecting Servo CO. V. Prod. Dev. & Sales Co., 131 S.E.2d 9, 22 (N.C. 1963)
("Absolute certainty is not required but evidence of damages must be sufficiently specific and complete to permit the jury to arrive at a reasonable conclusion.") (quoting Tillis v. Calvine Cotton
Mills, Inc., III S.E.2d 606, 612 (N.C. 1959».
531. Becker, supra note 528.
532. See id.
533. Mothers are most often the custodians of children in single parent families. The majority
(88%) of children living in single parent homes live with their mother. See SALUTER, supra note 363,
at ix; see also WORKING GROUP ON WELFARE REFORM, FAMILY SUPPORT. AND INDEPENDENCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALm & HUMAN SERVS., BACKGROUND PAPERS ON WELFARE REFORM: CmLD SUPPORT EN.
FORCEMENT 3 (1994) (citing a similar statistic).
534. See CENTER FOR TIlE AMERICAN WOMEN AND Poucrncs, FACT SHEET (1999) (finding that
22.3% of state legislators are women in 1999); WOMEN IN TIlE LAw: A LooK AT TIlE NUMBERS 31
(American Bar Association, Dec. 1995) (finding that in 1991, 7% of federal court judges and 9% of
state court judges were women).
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emotional support from their husbands. In this situation the discretionary
standards-giving primarily male judges control over women's income
from ex-husbands-have resulted in retention by men of a disproportionate share of family assets after divorce. 535 Thus, Becker maintains that
discretionary standards are used to reinforce male power and female subordination by keeping women subject to and dependent upon the judgment of mostly male judges.536
The alternative to the near total reliance on discretionary standards
in family law is the infusion of some rules that will more effectively secure the obligations family members owe one another.537 Scholars with a
variety of perspectives have discouraged rules and individual rights in
family law. Communitarians have argued that an emphasis on privacy
and individual rights undermines strong families. As Michael Sandel puts
it: "[In] a more or less ideal family situation, where relations are governed in large part by spontaneous affection ... individual rights ... are
seldom invoked, not because injustice is rampant but because their appeal
is preempted by a spurt of generosity. "538
Many feminist scholars also believe that rules and rights should be
discouraged in families. From their perspective, rules favor established
535. See GLENDON. 'TRANSFORMATION, supra note 241, at 232 (arguing that today's judges, in
exercising their "virtually uncontrolled discretion," tend to protect the former husband's standard of
living).
536. See Becker, supra note 528; see also Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L REv. 1483, 1516, 1518 (1991) (noting
both that the "law itself is 'male,' representing and incorporating male values" and that "judges
have tremendous discretion in divorce cases" in this country).
537. Of course, rules can be used to reinforce patriarchy and consolidate power and authority
in a single family member. Prior to the adoption of equitable distribution statutes to allocate property
after divorce, most states used a rule dividing property by title. See KRAUSE ET AL.. FAMILY LAW:
CASES. COMMENTS. QUESTIONS 719 (1998). This method of distribution of property meant most property went to husbands after divorce. See id. Similarly, prior to the adoption of the best interests standard for child custody decisions, a paternal presumption governed custody cases. See Polikoff, supra
note 461, at 235-36. These rules do not work to protect vulnerable family members and the shift
away from them generally helps custodial parents and children.
538. MICHAEL J. SANDEL. LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 33 (1982); see also JEAN
BETHKE ELSHTAIN. A COMMUNITARIAN PosmON ON THE FAMILY. NATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW 25-35
(1991); Galston, supra note 83; MARy ANN GLENDON. THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 42
(1981) (describing the "emergence of the self-determining, separate individual from the network of
family and group ties"); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 464-72, 496-501
(1983) (criticizing individual rights analysis of family relationships while stressing the importance of
traditional marital family); John Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights, 94 ETHICS 441,
448 (1984) (examining the relationship between rights and close-knit communities and concluding
that "thinking in terms of rights systematically denies the unity, the togetherness, the "we" that we
are trying to create").
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hierarchies and do not conform with women's experiences.539 However, a
growing number of feminists have urged a reconception of rights that can
protect vulnerable family members and take precedence over family privacy rights when the two sets of rights confliCt.540 Susan Okin has urged
policymakers to recognize that "however much the members of fami1ies
care about one another and share common ends, they are still discrete
persons with their own particular aims and hopes, which may sometimes
conflict. [W]e must see the family as an institution in which justice is a
crucial virtue. "541
In analyzing the shifts between discretion and rules in the no-fault
era, it is true that we seem to "be moving simultaneously in both directions."542 However, a close examination of the underlying changes in the
law as a result of these shifts suggests a move towards rules when they
are needed to secure rights for vulnerable members of families.
Of course the movement from discretion to rules for divorce
grounds started this trend. 543 While the retention of fault grounds in most
states has meant continued reliance on discretion in some divorce cases,
statutes that permit unilateral or consent divorces after a waiting period
can be classified as rules.544 Many commentators have claimed that the
easier access to divorce has hurt women and children.545 Others argue
539. See generally CAROL GILUGAN. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 64-105 (1982) (reporting on research demonstrating that reliance on rules and rights is more common in the male experience).
Within the more specific debate about achieving fairness for women when families divorce, other
feminist scholars mainlain that a decisionmaking model that recognizes the complexity of relationships has more promise. See Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 Goo. J. LEGAL Ennes I, 8-12 (1990).
540. See Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FLA. L. REv. 627, 643-44 (1987) (arguing that rights belong both to the family as a group, and to
each individual family member and when competing rights need to be accommodated, the rights of
the weaker party should take priority over the privacy rights of the family).
541. SUSAN M. aKIN. JuSTICE. GENDER AND TIlE FAMILY 32 (1989); see also Garrison, supra
note 76, at 46, arguing that
The lack of an established ethical tradition relating to child support may help to explain policy makers' failure to articulate a theoretical basis for current support guidelines, but does not
excuse it. In a society in which law will prescribe the economic relationships of at least half
of the children and their parents, we cannot afford to disregard issues of justice between family members. The family as a set of affective and altruistic relationships may lie beyond the
realm of justice, but family law most certainly does not.
542. Younger, supra note 515, at 1376; see also Schneider, supra note 515, at 229.
543. Application of fault-based grounds for divorce involve substantial judicial discretion. See
supra notes 110, 114-149 and accompanying text. No-fault grounds, on the other hand, which involve proof of more objective facts like the length of separation, require little or no judicial discretion in their application. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
545. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
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that these no-fault grounds have achieved the goals of reducing acrimony
and trauma to families, particularly children, experiencing divorce.546 In
abusive marriages, the evidence is quite clear that easier access to divorce protects women and children.547
The most significant shift from discretion to rules in the no-fault era
has been in the area of child support.548 The rules that have resulted in
the move from a broad standard to fIxed formulae for establishing child
support certainly need to be refmed.549 However, the new child support
rules have secured rights for children. The debate about the rules and the
resulting standards have also communicated the message that noncustodial parents should take responsibility for their children, even when
the obligation to support signfficantly inhibits personal autonomy.
Limited acceptance of the primary caretaker rule to replace the
broad discretionary best interests standard for child custody decisions
represents a similar trend. 550 Some have advocated the adoption of this
rule from a perspective of fairness to mothers.55 ! Others argue that applying the rule will be less costly and reduce delays for litigants.552 However, most of the support for this rule, comes as a result of the research
demonstrating that it protects children. better than the indeterminate best
interests standard.553
Developments in alimony law in the last decade also reveal substantial support for discarding the prevailing discretionary standard and moving to a rule based approach. A number of proposals emphasize income
sharing to equalize the post-divorce standards of living.554 The widely circulated and debated555 American Law Institute Principles of the Law of
546. See supra notes 395, 407 and accompanying text.
547. See Furstenberg & Cherlin, supra note 407.
548. See supra notes 481-513 and accompanying text.
549. See id.
550. See supra notes 458-63 and accompanying text.
551. See Becker, supra note 461, at 175-83. But see Schneider, supra note 195, at 2215, 2216
(discussing judicial discretion in custody cases and arguing that, despite its weaknesses, the best interest standard should be retained).
552. See Mwphy, supra note 386, at 133-34.
553. See supra notes 457-80 and accompanying text.
554. See Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FoRI).
HAM L. REV. 539, 563-64, 573, 578-83, 592 (1990); Jana Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The
Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2423 (1994);
Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests at Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 159-60 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (proposing a system in which
each spouse's interest in post-divorce income would be based on the length of marriage).
555. See J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 801 (1997); Carl Schneider, Rethinking Alimony? Marital Decisions and Moral Dis-
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Family Dissolution (ALI principles)S56 have developed alimony formulae,
which have compensation of a spouse for fmancial loss arising from the
dissolution of the marriage as one of its principal goalS.SS7 The ALI principles emphasize fairness and encourage sharing rather than need or fault.
The goal of these principles is to return spouses to their premarital situations in short marriages and, in longer marriages to compensate fmancially vulnerable spouses for their marital investment. Another major
theme of the principles is to replace the discretionary alimony system
with a more rule-based one.
Some rule-based formulae for property distribution and alimony
have found their way into law.sSg Research on their impact to achieve the
goals of fairness, equality or protection of vulnerable family members is
yet to be done. These proposals, along with the child support and custody rules already in place, offer the promise of securing commitment
and responsibility among family members.

v.

CONCLUSION

Family law has undergone substantial changes since the fIrst "no
fault" divorce statute in 1970. These changes have reduced the role of
fault in divorce, custody, visitation and alimony. This diminished role of
fault has reduced the emphasis in family law on sexual misconduct. Because family law jurisprudence has traditionally labelled sexual misconduct issues as "moral," cases and statutes since the adoption of no-fault
divorce have fewer explicit references to morality. This change in the
language of family law, along with increases in both rates of divorce and
single-parent families over the last three decades, have caused both
policymakers and scholars to comment on the decline of morality in family law. This Article has challenged the assumption that the decline in the
role of fault has meant diminished emphasis on morality in either the
language or the substance of family law.
Two streams of contemporary thought have informed the understanding of the term morality. The fIrst, which has been developed by
contemporary moral philosophers building on the classical tradition,
course, 1991 BYU L. REv. 197 (1997); Swisher, supra note 388, at 298-300.
556. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUI"E, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLtmON: ANALYSIS
AND REcOMMENDATIONS. TENrATIVE DRAFT No.2 (Mar. 14, 1996) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
557. See id.
558. See 31 MINN. REv. STAT. ANN. § 518.6111 (West Supp. 1999); MICH COMPo LAWS ANN.
§ 722.3 (West Supp. 1998); Gregory 1.M. v. Carolyn A.M., 442 A.2d 1373, 1377 (Del. 1982); Ball
v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Pa. 1994).
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teaches that morality is about practicing virtues. There is much debate
within this group of communitarian philosophers about the degree to
which certain virtues have universal appeal; the importance of different
virtues varies among cultures and changes over time. However, there is
some consensus that caring for children is a core feature of most societies' moral systems. Within the context of contemporary American family
law, there is much evidence that caring for children has become the
moral imperative.
The second stream of thought relates to rights and their connection
to morality. A substantial body of commentary suggests that "rights talk"
is hostile to the notions of care and interconnectedness that are essential
to the family and its role in protecting children. But the concept of rights
has been reconceived by feminists and others to emphasize protection of
vulnerable and dependent family members, especially children. This conception of rights rejects the focus on autonomy in traditional liberal
rights discourse and is compatible with more communitarian values.
This scholarship, which suggests a broader meaning of morality and
rights, has revealed the substantial limitations in the view of morality
during the fault-era. The emphasis on sexual conduct during the fault-era
combined with broad discretionary standards, reinforced traditional gender roles in family law and contributed to inadequate financial support
for custodial parents and children. The broader concept of morality, with
its emphasis on the virtues of care and protection of children, has provided both a new language for moral discourse and a new perspective
from which to evaluate developments in family law over the last three
decades. While some of these developments address issues that are more
traditional "moral" issues, such as the meaning of commitment in marriage, others address issues that are more commonly thought of as economic or psychological issues, such as how to guarantee adequate support for children and how to evaluate parental fitness.
Still other developments have brought family law into an area that
the law declined to regulate during the fault era-preventing family
abuse. Finally, the emerging shift from discretion to rules on key issues
involving children evidences a new understanding that the concept of
rights is not anti-family; rather, strengthening the laws that express the
commitments family members owe to another, particularly parents to
children, can strengthen families. All of these changes have a moral dimension and enhance the virtues of commitment and responsibility, p'articularly to children.
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Creating a family policy559 that fulfIlls what I have characterized as
the central moral imperative of family law, protection of children, is an
ambitious goal that is still unrealized.560 Despite the widespread rhetoric
suggesting that this country sees our children as its greatest resource,561
there is still an enormous gap between that rhetoric and the existence of
policies that protect children.562 Much of the gap can be attributed to the
large costs associated with issues like adequate health care and child
care.563 But part of the gap can be attributed to a lack of consensus about
how to achieve the goal of protecting children.
A number of areas of the law have a critical role to play. Welfare
law, labor law, social security law and tax law, all playa significant role
in the well-being of children. However, family law still has a leading
role to play in improving the lives of children. If the focus of family law
is returned to punishing the sexual misconduct of married couples there
will be little hope that this area of the law will improve the lives of children. The developments outlined in this Artic1e--child custody and visitation laws that evaluate parental fitness based on their capacity to harm
or help their children rather than on their sexual misconduct; laws that
provide legal protection to family members who are abused by other
family members; child support that is predictable and more widely enforced-all have the potential of promoting the moral goal of protecting
children. Future refmements of these laws are needed but should be evaluated from a perspective that incorporates both the concepts and the language of this new morality in family law.

559. Family policy can be broadly defined as "objectives concerning family well·being and
the specific measures taken by governmental bodies to achieve them." Jacqueline B. Stanfield, Family Policy in America: A Continuing Controversy, 50 REv. OF Soc. EcON. 420, 424 (1992) (citing
Joan Aldous & Wilfried Dumon, Family Policy in the 198Os: Controversy and Consensus, in CON.
TEMPORARY FAMILIES: LooKING FORWARD LooKING BACK (Alan Booth ed., 1991».
560. As one commentator put it, despite the emphasis on children's welfare in contemporary
family law, "[o]ur society does not embrace a child-centered morality generally." Altman, supra
note 80, at 346.
561. See, e.g., HILLARy RODHAM CUNTON. IT TAKES A Vll.LAGE: AND OrnER LESSONS CmLDREN TEACH Us 318 (1996) ("[N]othing is more important to our shared future than the well-being
of children.").
562. See, e.g., KIDS COUNT: STATE PROALES OF CmLD WEU.-BEING (Annie E. Casey Foundation 1997) (finding that children growing up in poor communities today "face tough odds" including
being at greater risk of being sick and having inadequate health care; of being parents before they
complete school; of being users of easily available drugs; of being exposed to violence; and of being
incarcerated before they are old enough to vote).
563. See Gilbert Steiner, Looking for Family Policy---Big Tickets on Moral Judgments, in THE
POLITICS AND PROGRAMS OF FAMILY POUCY. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MAN (J. Aldous & W.
Dumon eds., 1980).

